William Torres v. Thomas Read ( 2015 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                            FILED
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT                              FEB 25 2015
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    WILLIAM TORRES,                                  No. 13-15096
    Plaintiff - Appellant,             D.C. No. 1:11-cv-00724-SOM-
    BMK
    v.
    THOMAS READ; JOHN DOES, 1-10,                    MEMORANDUM*
    Defendants - Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Hawaii
    Barry M. Kurren, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
    Submitted February 19, 2015**
    Honolulu, Hawaii
    Before: CLIFTON, N.R. SMITH, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.
    William Torres brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging that his sentence
    recalculation resulted in post-conviction overdetention that violated his Eighth and
    Fourteenth Amendment rights. The district court denied Torres’s Fed. R. Civ. P.
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    56(d) motion to continue discovery and granted Defendant-Appellee Read’s
    motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. Torres timely
    appealed. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
    We review de novo a district court’s order denying summary judgment on
    the ground of qualified immunity. Rodis v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 
    558 F.3d 964
    , 968
    (9th Cir. 2009). We review a district court’s order denying additional discovery for
    abuse of discretion. See United States v. Kitsap Physicians Serv., 
    314 F.3d 995
    ,
    1000 (9th Cir. 2002).
    The two-pronged qualified immunity inquiry asks (1) whether “the officer’s
    conduct violated a constitutional right” and (2) whether “the right was clearly
    established” at the time of the alleged misconduct. Alston v. Read, 
    663 F.3d 1094
    ,
    1098 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 
    533 U.S. 194
    , 201 (2001), overruled
    in part on other grounds by Pearson v. Callahan, 
    555 U.S. 223
    (2009)). We may
    begin our analysis with either prong. 
    Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236
    . “The plaintiff
    bears the burden to show that the contours of the right were clearly established” at
    the time of the alleged misconduct. Clairmont v. Sound Mental Health, 
    632 F.3d 1091
    , 1109 (9th Cir. 2011). “We begin with the second prong, and we hold that
    Torres has not pled facts indicating that Read violated a “clearly established”
    constitutional right. See Anderson v. Creighton, 
    483 U.S. 635
    , 640 (1987).
    2
    This case is controlled by Alston, 
    663 F.3d 1094
    . In Alston, we addressed
    the issue of qualified immunity in a § 1983 action against Read alleging Eighth and
    Fourteenth Amendment violations for substantially the same conduct challenged
    by Torres in this 
    case. 663 F.3d at 1096-97
    . We concluded that “where [a
    prisoner’s] institutional file appears complete, the [prisoner’s] sentence was
    appropriately recalculated under state law, and the prisoner has presented no
    evidence to the contrary,” a prison official had no clearly established duty under
    the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to a prisoner alleging overdetention
    beyond reviewing the prisoner’s institutional file, relevant state laws, and the
    original judgment received from the court. 
    Id. at 1099-100.
    Torres has not alleged
    facts showing that his institutional file was incomplete, or that his sentence
    recalculation was inappropriate under state law. Therefore, Read did not violate a
    clearly established right and he was entitled to summary judgment on both Torres’s
    Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims. See 
    id. The district
    court did not abuse its discretion in denying Torres’s Rule 56(d)
    motion to continue summary judgment to allow further discovery. Torres failed to
    identify specific facts to be obtained in discovery that would have precluded
    3
    summary judgment. Natural Res. Def. Council v. Houston, 
    146 F.3d 1118
    , 1133
    (9th Cir. 1998).1
    AFFIRMED.
    1
    Read requests we take judicial notice of his opening brief filed in Alston.
    See Dkt. No. 33. The document is a matter of public record. See Lee v. City of Los
    Angeles, 
    250 F.3d 668
    , 688-89 (9th Cir. 2001). Thus, we take judicial notice of the
    document, but “not for the truth of the facts recited therein.” See 
    id. at 690
    (internal quotation marks omitted).
    4