Leobardo Flores-Montano v. Eric Holder, Jr. , 594 F. App'x 416 ( 2015 )


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  •                             NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                            FILED
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT                              FEB 27 2015
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    LEOBARDO FLORES-MONTANO,                         No. 12-71417
    AKA Leobardo Flores, AKA Leovardo
    Flores, AKA Scrappy Moniker, AKA                 Agency No. A200-243-299
    Leobardo Montano, AKA Miguel
    Quinones,
    MEMORANDUM*
    Petitioner,
    v.
    ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General,
    Respondent.
    On Petition for Review of an Order of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    Argued and Submitted February 12, 2015
    Pasadena, California
    Before: CALLAHAN, WATFORD, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.
    Petitioner Leobardo Flores-Montano (“Flores-Montano”) petitions for
    review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) dismissal of his appeal of an
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    Immigration Judge’s (IJ) decision denying him adjustment of status and
    cancellation of removal. The BIA found that the IJ properly pretermitted the
    application because Flores-Montano was statutorily ineligible for relief under the
    Federal First Offender Act (FFOA), 18 U.S.C. § 3607, due to his 2004 conviction
    for possession of a controlled substance in violation of California Health and
    Safety Code § 11350(a).
    We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D) to review the BIA’s
    determination that a controlled substance conviction precludes immigration relief
    as a matter of law. Estrada v. Holder, 
    560 F.3d 1039
    , 1041 n.1 (9th Cir. 2009)
    (citing Ramirez-Altamirano v. Mukasey, 
    554 F.3d 786
    , 789 (9th Cir. 2009)). The
    BIA’s legal determinations are reviewed de novo. See Nunez-Reyes v. Holder, 
    646 F.3d 684
    , 688 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc); Aguiluz-Arellano v. Gonzales, 
    446 F.3d 980
    , 983 (9th Cir. 2006).
    Because Flores-Montano’s drug conviction was in 2004, the prospective rule
    in 
    Nunez-Reyes, 646 F.3d at 694
    , does not apply. We accordingly apply the
    reasoning of Lujan-Armendariz v. INS, 
    222 F.3d 728
    (9th Cir. 2000), which
    extended FFOA relief to expunged state convictions. The FFOA provides that first
    offenders may be placed “on probation for a term of not more than one year
    without entering a judgment of conviction” and “if the person has not violated a
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    condition of his probation, the court shall . . . dismiss the proceedings.” 18 U.S.C.
    § 3607(a). However, Flores-Montano conceded, and the record discloses, that he
    violated his probation multiple times. Thus, Flores-Montano does not qualify for
    FFOA relief under 
    Estrada, 560 F.3d at 1042
    .
    Generally, if the BIA has not addressed a particular issue, “‘the proper
    course, except in rare circumstances, is to remand to the agency for additional
    investigation or explanation.’” Gonzales v. Thomas, 
    547 U.S. 183
    , 186 (2006) (per
    curiam) (quoting INS v. Ventura, 
    537 U.S. 12
    , 16 (2002) (per curiam)). However,
    “remand is not required where, as here, the issue is purely legal and it involves an
    interpretation of the FFOA, a statute which the BIA is not charged with
    administering [and the] case requires no further agency expertise or evaluation.”
    
    Aguiluz-Arellano, 446 F.3d at 984
    ; see also Halim v. Holder, 
    590 F.3d 971
    ,
    979–80 (9th Cir. 2009). The conclusion that the FFOA does not apply to Flores-
    Montano’s conviction is purely legal, fully supported by the record, and requires
    no further agency expertise or evaluation. Therefore, Flores-Montano is removable
    and ineligible for adjustment of status. The petition is DENIED.
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