Delmy Vega-Molina v. Merrick Garland ( 2022 )


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  •                                                                             FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    MAY 12 2022
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    DELMY ESMERALDA VEGA-                            No.   21-70382
    MOLINA,
    Agency No. A208-537-987
    Petitioner,
    v.                                              MEMORANDUM*
    MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
    General,
    Respondent.
    On Petition for Review of an Order of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    Submitted May 10, 2022**
    Portland, Oregon
    Before: TALLMAN and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges, and BLOCK,*** District
    Judge.
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    ***
    The Honorable Frederic Block, United States District Judge for the
    Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation.
    Petitioner Delmy Vega-Molina, a native and citizen of El Salvador, seeks
    review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) decision affirming the
    immigration judge’s (“IJ”) denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and
    protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction
    pursuant to 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    , and we deny the petition. Because the parties are
    familiar with the facts of this case, we need not recite them here.
    Substantial evidence supports the agency’s adverse credibility finding. See
    Shrestha v. Holder, 
    590 F.3d 1034
    , 1039-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (stating standard of
    review). “Where, as here, the BIA agrees with the IJ decision and also adds its
    own reasoning, we review the decision of the BIA and those parts of the IJ’s
    decision upon which it relies.” Duran-Rodriguez v. Barr, 
    918 F.3d 1025
    , 1027-28
    (9th Cir. 2019). Several events informed the agency’s adverse credibility
    determination. For example, in her credible fear interview, petitioner stated that
    she was able to escape her boyfriend while he was “high and he was sleeping.”
    But during the hearing, petitioner testified that she ran out of the house, her
    boyfriend followed her, but she was able to escape from him because she got on a
    bus before he did. As another example, during her credible fear interview,
    petitioner stated that she fled to her mother’s house and left the country on the
    same day. But during the hearing, petitioner testified that she went to a friend’s
    2
    house and remained in El Salvador for about three days before leaving the country.
    As the agency correctly noted, petitioner’s statements are plainly inconsistent. See
    Shrestha, 
    590 F.3d at 1044
     (“[I]n evaluating inconsistencies, the relevant
    circumstances that an IJ should consider include the petitioner’s explanation for a
    perceived inconsistency, and other record evidence that sheds light on whether
    there is in fact an inconsistency at all.” (internal citation omitted)).
    The above events were related to whether petitioner was persecuted based on
    her membership in the particular social group “women who are abused because
    they are seen as lesser, unprotected, and are unable to find support or aid as a result
    of being females.” See 
    id. at 1046-47
     (“Although inconsistencies no longer need to
    go to the heart of the petitioner’s claim, when an inconsistency is at the heart of the
    claim it doubtless is of great weight.”). The agency properly considered “the
    totality of the circumstances[] and all relevant factors.” 
    8 U.S.C. § 1158
    (b)(1)(B)(iii). Petitioner has failed to show that the record compels us to
    reach a contrary conclusion. See Don v. Gonzales, 
    476 F.3d 738
    , 745 (9th Cir.
    2007).
    Substantial evidence also supports the agency’s denial of petitioner’s claim
    for protection under CAT. See Shrestha, 
    590 F.3d at 1048
     (stating standard of
    review). “An adverse credibility determination is not necessarily a death knell to
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    CAT protection.” 
    Id.
     But because petitioner’s testimony was found not credible,
    other evidence in the record must compel the conclusion that she “is more likely
    than not to be tortured.” See 
    id. at 1048-49
    . The BIA did not err in concluding
    that petitioner is not entitled to protection under CAT because there was
    insufficient objective evidence, beyond her discredited testimony, to demonstrate
    that she is more likely than not to be tortured if returned.
    Petitioner failed to meet her burden of establishing eligibility for asylum,
    withholding of removal, or protection under CAT. See 
    id.
    PETITION DENIED.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 21-70382

Filed Date: 5/12/2022

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 5/12/2022