Paul Carrick v. Santa Cruz County ( 2015 )


Menu:
  •                                                                            FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                               MAR 02 2015
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                      U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    PAUL CARRICK,                                    No. 13-16730
    Plaintiff - Appellant,            D.C. No. 5:12-cv-03852-LHK
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    SANTA CRUZ COUNTY; et al.,
    Defendants - Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of California
    Lucy Koh, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted February 17, 2015**
    Before:        O’SCANNLAIN, LEAVY, and FERNANDEZ, Circuit Judges.
    Paul Carrick appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his
    42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging constitutional and statutory violations in
    connection with legal proceedings relating to his real property. We have
    jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Whitman v. Mineta, 541
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    F.3d 929, 931 (9th Cir. 2008), and we affirm.
    The district court properly dismissed Carrick’s § 1983 claims challenging
    the issuance and enforcement of citations on his property because the parties or
    their privies previously litigated the claims to final judgment in California state
    court. See Adam Bros. Farming, Inc. v. County of Santa Barbara, 
    604 F.3d 1142
    ,
    1148-49 (9th Cir. 2010) (describing California res judicata requirements); Sosa v.
    DIRECTV, Inc., 
    437 F.3d 923
    , 928 (9th Cir. 2006) (California judgment is final for
    res judicata purposes after resolution of appeal).
    To the extent Carrick alleged a denial of due process by the state court in
    ruling on discovery issues and entering judgment against him, the district court
    properly dismissed the claim as barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See
    Henrichs v. Valley View Dev., 
    474 F.3d 609
    , 613 (9th Cir. 2007).
    The district court properly rejected Carrick’s claim that it would be
    impossible to comply with the contempt order sought by the County of Santa Cruz,
    and properly denied Carrick’s motion to enjoin the state court contempt
    proceedings. See Juidice v. Vail, 
    430 U.S. 327
    , 335-36 (1977) (Younger abstention
    doctrine precludes federal interference with state court contempt proceedings);
    Potrero Hills Landfill, Inc. v. County of Solano, 
    657 F.3d 876
    , 882 (9th Cir. 2011)
    (setting forth Younger abstention requirements).
    2                                     13-16730
    The district court also properly dismissed Carrick’s additional claims
    challenging aspects of the state court contempt proceedings because review of
    alleged errors by the state court and relief from its rulings was barred under
    Rooker-Feldman, see 
    Henrichs, 474 F.3d at 613
    , the civil contempt proceedings
    did not entitle Carrick to a jury trial, see Int’l Union, United Mine Workers of Am.
    v. Bagwell, 
    512 U.S. 821
    , 827 (1994), and Carrick did not allege that he was
    imprisoned or otherwise subjected to a punishment implicating the Eighth
    Amendment, see Ingraham v. Wright, 
    430 U.S. 651
    , 667-68 (1977).
    The district court properly dismissed Carrick’s claims alleging errors in the
    recording of judgment liens against his property because Carrick’s allegations did
    not plausibly assert any violation of the statutes at issue. See Cal. Civ. Code
    §§ 1171 (“Grants, absolute in terms, are to be recorded in one set of books, and
    mortgages in another.”), 8460 (action to enforce lien shall commence “within 90
    days after recordation of the claim of lien”), 8461 (plaintiff shall record notice of
    pendency “on or before 20 days after the commencement of the action”).
    Contrary to Carrick’s contentions, the district court was not required to hold
    oral argument on the motions to dismiss, and was not required to take judicial
    notice of the unauthenticated exhibits submitted with the second amended
    complaint. We also reject Carrick’s contentions regarding the impact of a land
    3                                      13-16730
    patent applying to his property.
    AFFIRMED.
    4   13-16730