Theresa Stevens v. zappos.com., Inc. , 884 F.3d 893 ( 2018 )


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  •                 FOR PUBLICATION
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    IN RE ZAPPOS.COM, INC., CUSTOMER         No. 16-16860
    DATA SECURITY BREACH
    LITIGATION,                                 D.C. No.
    3:12-cv-00325-
    RCJ-VPC
    THERESA STEVENS; KRISTIN
    O’BRIEN; TERRI WADSWORTH;
    DAHLIA HABASHY; PATTI HASNER;              OPINION
    SHARI SIMON; STEPHANIE PRIERA;
    KATHRYN VORHOFF; DENISE
    RELETHFORD; ROBERT REE,
    Plaintiffs-Appellants,
    v.
    ZAPPOS.COM., INC.,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Nevada
    Robert Clive Jones, Senior District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted December 5, 2017
    San Francisco, California
    Filed March 8, 2018
    2                       IN RE ZAPPOS.COM
    Before: John B. Owens and Michelle T. Friedland, Circuit
    Judges, and Elaine E. Bucklo, * District Judge.
    Opinion by Judge Friedland
    SUMMARY **
    Article III Standing
    The panel reversed the district court’s dismissal, for lack
    of Article III standing, of plaintiffs’ claims alleging that they
    were harmed by hacking of their accounts at the online
    retailer Zappos.com.
    The panel held that under Krottner v. Starbucks Corp.,
    
    628 F.3d 1139
     (9th Cir. 2010), plaintiffs sufficiently alleged
    standing based on the risk of identity theft. The panel
    rejected Zappos’s argument that Krottner was no longer
    good law after Clapper v. Amnesty International USA, 
    568 U.S. 398
     (2013). And the panel held that plaintiffs
    sufficiently alleged an injury in fact under Krottner, based
    on a substantial risk that the Zappos hackers will commit
    identity fraud or identity theft. The panel assessed plaintiffs’
    standing as of the time the complaints were filed, not as of
    the present. The panel further held that plaintiffs sufficiently
    alleged that the risk of future harm they faced was “fairly
    traceable” to the conduct being challenged; and the risk from
    *
    The Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo, United States District Judge for
    the Northern District of Illinois, sitting by designation.
    **
    This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It
    has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
    IN RE ZAPPOS.COM                        3
    the injury of identity theft was also redressable by relief that
    could be obtained through this litigation.
    The panel addressed an issue raised by sealed briefing in
    a concurrently filed memorandum disposition.
    COUNSEL
    Douglas Gregory Blankinship (argued), Finkelstein
    Blankinship Frei-Pearson and Garber LLP, White Plains,
    New York; David C. O’Mara, The O’Mara Law Firm P.C.,
    Reno, Nevada; Ben Barnow, Barnow and Associates P.C.,
    Chicago, Illinois; Richard L. Coffman, The Coffman Law
    Firm, Beaumont, Texas; Marc L. Godino, Glancy Binkow &
    Goldberg LLP, Los Angeles, California; for Plaintiffs-
    Appellants.
    Stephen J. Newman (argued), David W. Moon, Brian C.
    Frontino, and Julia B. Strickland, Stroock & Stroock &
    Lavan LLP, Los Angeles, California; Robert McCoy,
    Kaempfer Crowell, Las Vegas, Nevada; for Defendant-
    Appellee.
    4                     IN RE ZAPPOS.COM
    OPINION
    FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judge:
    In January 2012, hackers breached the servers of online
    retailer Zappos.com, Inc. (“Zappos”) and allegedly stole the
    names, account numbers, passwords, email addresses,
    billing and shipping addresses, telephone numbers, and
    credit and debit card information of more than 24 million
    Zappos customers. Several of those customers filed putative
    class actions in federal courts across the country, asserting
    that Zappos had not adequately protected their personal
    information. Their lawsuits were consolidated for pretrial
    proceedings.
    Although some of the plaintiffs alleged that the hackers
    used stolen information about them to conduct subsequent
    financial transactions, the plaintiffs who are the focus of this
    appeal (“Plaintiffs”) did not. This appeal concerns claims
    based on the hacking incident itself, not any subsequent
    illegal activity.
    The district court dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims for lack of
    Article III standing. In this appeal, Plaintiffs contend that
    the district court erred in doing so, and they press several
    potential bases for standing, including that the Zappos data
    breach put them at risk of identity theft.
    We addressed standing in an analogous context in
    Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 
    628 F.3d 1139
     (9th Cir. 2010).
    There, we held that employees of Starbucks had standing to
    sue the company based on the risk of identity theft they faced
    after a company laptop containing their personal information
    was stolen. 
    Id. at 1140, 1143
    . We reject Zappos’s argument
    that Krottner is no longer good law after Clapper v. Amnesty
    International USA, 
    568 U.S. 398
     (2013), and hold that, under
    IN RE ZAPPOS.COM                                5
    Krottner, Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged standing based
    on the risk of identity theft. 1
    I.
    When they bought merchandise on Zappos’s website,
    customers provided personal identifying information
    (“PII”), including their names, account numbers, passwords,
    email addresses, billing and shipping addresses, telephone
    numbers, and credit and debit card information. Sometime
    before January 16, 2012, hackers targeted Zappos’s servers,
    stealing the PII of more than 24 million of its customers,
    including their full credit card numbers. 2 On January 16,
    Zappos sent an email to its customers, notifying them of the
    theft of their PII. The company recommended “that they
    reset their Zappos.com account passwords and change the
    passwords ‘on any other web site where [they] use the same
    or a similar password.’” Some customers responded almost
    immediately by filing putative class actions in federal district
    courts across the country.
    1
    We address an issue raised by sealed briefing in a concurrently
    filed memorandum disposition.
    2
    Although Zappos asserts in its briefs that the hackers stole only the
    last four digits of customers’ credit card numbers, it has presented its
    arguments as a facial, not a factual, attack on standing. See Safe Air for
    Everyone v. Meyer, 
    373 F.3d 1035
    , 1039 (9th Cir. 2004) (distinguishing
    facial from factual attacks on standing). Where, as here, “a defendant in
    its motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)
    asserts that the allegations in the complaint are insufficient to establish
    subject matter jurisdiction as a matter of law (to be distinguished from a
    claim that the allegations on which jurisdiction depends are not true as a
    matter of fact), we take the allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint as
    true.” Whisnant v. United States, 
    400 F.3d 1177
    , 1179 (9th Cir. 2005).
    6                        IN RE ZAPPOS.COM
    In these suits, Plaintiffs alleged an “imminent” risk of
    identity theft or fraud from the Zappos breach. Relying on
    definitions from the United States Government
    Accountability Office (“GAO”), they characterized “identity
    theft” and “identity fraud” as “encompassing various types
    of criminal activities, such as when PII is used to commit
    fraud or other crimes,” including “credit card fraud, phone
    or utilities fraud, bank fraud and government fraud.” 3
    The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation transferred
    several putative class action lawsuits alleging harms from
    the Zappos data breach to the District of Nevada for pretrial
    proceedings.      After several years of pleadings-stage
    litigation, including a hiatus for mediation, the district court
    granted in part and denied in part Zappos’s motion to dismiss
    the Third Amended Consolidated Complaint (“Complaint”)
    and granted Zappos’s motion to strike the Complaint’s class
    allegations. The court distinguished between two groups of
    plaintiffs: (1) plaintiffs named only in the Third Amended
    Complaint who alleged that they had already suffered
    financial losses from identity theft caused by Zappos’s
    breach, and (2) plaintiffs named in earlier complaints who
    did not allege having already suffered financial losses from
    identity theft.
    3
    Plaintiffs did not provide a precise cite but appear to be referring
    to the description of identity theft in a report entitled Personal
    Information, which explains that “[t]he term ‘identity theft’ is broad and
    encompasses many types of criminal activities, including fraud on
    existing accounts—such as unauthorized use of a stolen credit card
    number—or fraudulent creation of new accounts—such as using stolen
    data to open a credit card account in someone else’s name.” U.S. Gov’t
    Accountability Office, GAO-07-737, Personal Information: Data
    Breaches are Frequent, but Evidence of Resulting Identity Theft is
    Limited; However, the Full Extent is Unknown 2 (2007).
    IN RE ZAPPOS.COM                        7
    The district court ruled that the first group of plaintiffs
    had Article III standing because they alleged “that actual
    fraud occurred as a direct result of the breach.” But the court
    ruled that the second group of plaintiffs (again, here referred
    to as “Plaintiffs”) lacked Article III standing and dismissed
    their claims without leave to amend because Plaintiffs had
    “failed to allege instances of actual identity theft or fraud.”
    The parties then agreed to dismiss all remaining claims with
    prejudice, and Plaintiffs appealed.
    II.
    We review the district court’s standing determination de
    novo. See Maya v. Centex Corp., 
    658 F.3d 1060
    , 1067 (9th
    Cir. 2011). To have Article III standing,
    a plaintiff must show (1) it has suffered an
    “injury in fact” that is (a) concrete and
    particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not
    conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the injury is
    fairly traceable to the challenged action of the
    defendant; and (3) it is likely, as opposed to
    merely speculative, that the injury will be
    redressed by a favorable decision.
    Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC),
    Inc., 
    528 U.S. 167
    , 180–81 (2000); see also Spokeo, Inc. v.
    Robins, 
    136 S. Ct. 1540
    , 1547 (2016). A plaintiff threatened
    with future injury has standing to sue “if the threatened
    injury is ‘certainly impending,’ or there is a ‘substantial risk
    that the harm will occur.’” Susan B. Anthony List v.
    Driehaus, 
    134 S. Ct. 2334
    , 2341 (2014) (quoting Clapper v.
    Amnesty Int’l USA, 
    568 U.S. 398
    , 414 & n.5 (2013))
    (internal quotation marks omitted).
    8                    IN RE ZAPPOS.COM
    III.
    We addressed the Article III standing of victims of data
    theft in Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 
    628 F.3d 1139
     (9th Cir.
    2010). In Krottner, a thief stole a laptop containing “the
    unencrypted names, addresses, and social security numbers
    of approximately 97,000 Starbucks employees.” 
    Id. at 1140
    .
    “Starbucks sent a letter to . . . affected employees alerting
    them to the theft and stating that Starbucks had no indication
    that the private information ha[d] been misused,” but
    advising them to “monitor [their] financial accounts
    carefully for suspicious activity and take appropriate steps to
    protect [themselves] against potential identity theft.” 
    Id.
     at
    1140–41 (internal quotation marks omitted).              Some
    employees sued, and the only harm that most alleged was an
    “increased risk of future identity theft.” 
    Id. at 1142
    . We
    determined this was sufficient for Article III standing,
    holding that the plaintiffs had “alleged a credible threat of
    real and immediate harm” because the laptop with their PII
    had been stolen. 
    Id. at 1143
    .
    A.
    Before analyzing whether Krottner controls this case, we
    must determine whether Krottner remains good law after the
    Supreme Court’s more recent decision in Clapper v.
    Amnesty International USA, 
    568 U.S. 398
     (2013), which
    addressed a question of standing based on the risk of future
    harm.
    As a three-judge panel, we are bound by opinions of our
    court on issues of federal law unless those opinions are
    “clearly irreconcilable” with a later decision by the Supreme
    Court. Miller v. Gammie, 
    335 F.3d 889
    , 900 (9th Cir. 2003)
    (en banc). This is the first case to require us to consider
    IN RE ZAPPOS.COM                                 9
    whether Clapper and Krottner are clearly irreconcilable, and
    we conclude that they are not.
    The plaintiffs in Clapper challenged surveillance
    procedures authorized by the Foreign Intelligence
    Surveillance Act of 1978—specifically, in 50 U.S.C.
    § 1881a (2012) (amended 2018). 4 Clapper, 
    568 U.S. at 401
    .
    The plaintiffs, who were “attorneys and human rights, labor,
    legal, and media organizations whose work allegedly
    require[d] them to engage in sensitive and sometimes
    privileged telephone and e-mail communications with . . .
    individuals located abroad,” sued for declaratory relief to
    invalidate § 1881a and an injunction against surveillance
    conducted pursuant to that section. Id. at 401, 406. The
    plaintiffs argued that they had Article III standing to
    challenge § 1881a “because there [was] an objectively
    reasonable likelihood that their communications [would] be
    acquired under § 1881a at some point in the future.” Id. at
    401. The Supreme Court rejected this basis for standing,
    explaining that “an objectively reasonable likelihood” of
    injury was insufficient, and that the alleged harm needed to
    “satisfy the well-established requirement that threatened
    injury must be ‘certainly impending.’” Id. (quoting
    Whitmore v. Arkansas, 
    495 U.S. 149
    , 158 (1990)).
    4
    50 U.S.C. § 1881a authorizes electronic surveillance of foreign
    nationals located abroad under a reduced government burden compared
    with traditional electronic foreign intelligence surveillance. Compare
    
    50 U.S.C. § 1805
     (2012) (amended 2018) (requiring “probable cause to
    believe . . . the target of the electronic surveillance is a foreign power or
    an agent of a foreign power”), with 50 U.S.C. § 1881a (requiring that
    surveillance not intentionally target people in the United States or United
    States nationals but not requiring any showing that the surveillance target
    is a foreign power or agent of a foreign power).
    10                   IN RE ZAPPOS.COM
    The Court then held that the plaintiffs’ theory of injury
    was too speculative to constitute a “certainly impending”
    injury. Id. at 410. The plaintiffs had not alleged that any of
    their communications had yet been intercepted. Id. at 411.
    The Court characterized their alleged injury as instead
    resting on a series of inferences, including that:
    (1) the Government will decide to target the
    communications of non-U.S. persons with
    whom they communicate; (2) in doing so, the
    Government will choose to invoke its
    authority under § 1881a rather than utilizing
    another method of surveillance; (3) the
    Article III judges who serve on the Foreign
    Intelligence Surveillance Court will conclude
    that the Government’s proposed surveillance
    procedures      satisfy   § 1881a’s     many
    safeguards and are consistent with the Fourth
    Amendment; (4) the Government will
    succeed in intercepting the communications
    of respondents’ contacts; and (5) respondents
    will be parties to the particular
    communications that the Government
    intercepts.
    Id. at 410. The Court declined to speculate about what it
    described as independent choices by the government about
    whom to target for surveillance and what basis to invoke for
    such targeting, or about whether the Foreign Intelligence
    Surveillance Court would approve any such surveillance. Id.
    at 412–13. The plaintiffs’ multi-link chain of inferences was
    thus “too speculative” to constitute a cognizable injury in
    fact. Id. at 401.
    IN RE ZAPPOS.COM                           11
    Unlike in Clapper, the plaintiffs’ alleged injury in
    Krottner did not require a speculative multi-link chain of
    inferences. See Krottner, 
    628 F.3d at 1143
    . The Krottner
    laptop thief had all the information he needed to open
    accounts or spend money in the plaintiffs’ names—actions
    that Krottner collectively treats as “identity theft.” 
    Id. at 1142
    .     Moreover, Clapper’s standing analysis was
    “especially rigorous” because the case arose in a sensitive
    national security context involving intelligence gathering
    and foreign affairs, and because the plaintiffs were asking
    the courts to declare actions of the executive and legislative
    branches unconstitutional. Clapper, 
    568 U.S. at 408
    (quoting Raines v. Byrd, 
    521 U.S. 811
    , 819 (1997)).
    Krottner presented no such national security or separation of
    powers concerns.
    And although the Supreme Court focused in Clapper on
    whether the injury was “certainly impending,” it
    acknowledged that other cases had focused on whether there
    was a “substantial risk” of injury. 5 
    Id.
     at 414 & n.5. Since
    Clapper, the Court reemphasized in Susan B. Anthony List v.
    Driehaus, 
    134 S. Ct. 2334
     (2014), that “[a]n allegation of
    future injury may suffice if the threatened injury is ‘certainly
    impending,’ or there is a ‘substantial risk that the harm will
    occur.’” 
    Id. at 2341
     (quoting Clapper, 
    568 U.S. at
    414 &
    n.5) (internal quotation marks omitted).
    5
    The Court noted that the plaintiffs in Clapper had not alleged a
    substantial risk because their theory of injury relied on too many
    inferences. Clapper, 
    568 U.S. at
    414 n.5.
    12                       IN RE ZAPPOS.COM
    For all these reasons, we hold that Krottner is not clearly
    irreconcilable with Clapper and thus remains binding. 6 See
    Miller, 
    335 F.3d at 900
    .
    B.
    We also conclude that Krottner controls the result here.
    In Krottner, we held that the plaintiffs had “alleged a
    credible threat of real and immediate harm stemming from
    the theft of a laptop containing their unencrypted personal
    data.” 
    628 F.3d at 1143
    . The threat would have been “far
    less credible,” we explained, “if no laptop had been stolen,
    and [they] had sued based on the risk that it would be stolen
    6
    Our conclusion that Krottner is not clearly irreconcilable with
    Clapper is consistent with post-Clapper decisions in our sister circuits
    holding that data breaches in which hackers targeted PII created a risk of
    harm sufficient to support standing. For example, the D.C. Circuit held
    in Attias v. Carefirst, Inc., 
    865 F.3d 620
     (D.C. Cir. 2017), cert. denied,
    No. 17-641, 
    2018 WL 942459
     (U.S. Feb. 20, 2018), that “[n]o long
    sequence of uncertain contingencies involving multiple independent
    actors has to occur before the plaintiffs [who were victims of a data
    breach] will suffer any harm; a substantial risk of harm exists already,
    simply by virtue of the hack and the nature of the data that the plaintiffs
    allege was taken.” 
    Id. at 629
    ; see also Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp.,
    LLC, 
    794 F.3d 688
    , 693 (7th Cir. 2015) (“Why else would hackers break
    into a store’s database and steal consumers’ private information?
    Presumably, the purpose of the hack is, sooner or later, to make
    fraudulent charges or assume those consumers’ identities.”). The Eighth
    Circuit did hold in In re SuperValu, Inc., Customer Data Security Breach
    Litigation, 
    870 F.3d 763
     (8th Cir. 2017), that allegations of the theft of
    credit card information were insufficient to support standing. 
    Id.
     at 771–
    72. But no other PII, such as addresses, telephone numbers, or
    passwords, was stolen in that case. See 
    id. at 766, 770
    . The Eighth
    Circuit acknowledged cases like Attias and Remijas but opined that
    standing questions in data breach cases “ultimately turn[] on the
    substance of the allegations before each court”—particularly, the types
    of data allegedly stolen. 
    Id. at 769
    .
    IN RE ZAPPOS.COM                            13
    at some point in the future.” 
    Id.
     But the sensitivity of the
    personal information, combined with its theft, led us to
    conclude that the plaintiffs had adequately alleged an injury
    in fact supporting standing. 
    Id.
     The sensitivity of the stolen
    data in this case is sufficiently similar to that in Krottner to
    require the same conclusion here.
    Plaintiffs allege that the type of information accessed in
    the Zappos breach can be used to commit identity theft,
    including by placing them at higher risk of “phishing” and
    “pharming,” which are ways for hackers to exploit
    information they already have to get even more PII.
    Plaintiffs also allege that their credit card numbers were
    within the information taken in the breach—which was not
    true in Krottner. 7 And Congress has treated credit card
    numbers as sufficiently sensitive to warrant legislation
    prohibiting merchants from printing such numbers on
    receipts—specifically to reduce the risk of identity theft. See
    15 U.S.C. § 1681c(g) (2012). Although there is no
    allegation in this case that the stolen information included
    social security numbers, as there was in Krottner, the
    information taken in the data breach still gave hackers the
    means to commit fraud or identity theft, as Zappos itself
    effectively acknowledged by urging affected customers to
    change their passwords on any other account where they
    may have used “the same or a similar password.” 8
    7
    Plaintiffs include in the Complaint some emails sent to Zappos
    from other customers saying that their credit cards were fraudulently
    used following the breach.
    8
    We use the terms “identity fraud” and “identity theft” in
    accordance with the GAO definition Plaintiffs rely on in the Complaint.
    See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
    14                      IN RE ZAPPOS.COM
    Indeed, the plaintiffs who alleged that the hackers had
    already commandeered their accounts or identities using
    information taken from Zappos specifically alleged that they
    suffered financial losses because of the Zappos data breach
    (which is why the district court held that they had standing).
    Although those plaintiffs’ claims are not at issue in this
    appeal, their alleged harm undermines Zappos’s assertion
    that the data stolen in the breach cannot be used for fraud or
    identity theft. In addition, two plaintiffs whose claims are at
    issue in this appeal say that the hackers took over their AOL
    accounts and sent advertisements to people in their address
    books. 9 Though not a financial harm, these alleged attacks
    further support Plaintiffs’ contention that the hackers
    accessed information that could be used to help commit
    identity fraud or identity theft. We thus conclude that
    Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged an injury in fact under
    Krottner.
    Zappos contends that even if the stolen data was as
    sensitive as that in Krottner, too much time has passed since
    the breach for any harm to be imminent. Zappos is mistaken.
    Our jurisdiction “depends upon the state of things at the time
    of the action brought.” 10 Mollan v. Torrance, 
    22 U.S. 537
    ,
    539 (1824). The initial complaint against Zappos was filed
    on the same day that Zappos provided notice of the breach.
    Other Plaintiffs’ complaints were filed soon thereafter. We
    9
    The district court held that these plaintiffs nonetheless lacked
    standing because they had not suffered “additional misuse” or “actual
    damages” from the data breach.
    10
    Consistent with this principle, Krottner did not discuss the two-
    year gap between the breach and the appeal, focusing instead on the
    sensitivity of the stolen information. See 
    628 F.3d at 1143
    .
    IN RE ZAPPOS.COM                               15
    therefore assess Plaintiffs’ standing as of January 2012, not
    as of the present. 11
    Plaintiffs also specifically allege that “[a] person whose
    PII has been obtained and compromised may not see the full
    extent of identity theft or identity fraud for years.” And “it
    may take some time for the victim to become aware of the
    theft.”
    Assessing the sum of their allegations in light of
    Krottner, Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged an injury in fact
    based on a substantial risk that the Zappos hackers will
    commit identity fraud or identity theft. 12
    11
    Of course, as litigation proceeds beyond the pleadings stage, the
    Complaint’s allegations will not sustain Plaintiffs’ standing on their own.
    See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 
    504 U.S. 555
    , 561 (1992) (“[E]ach element
    [of Article III standing] must be supported in the same way as any other
    matter on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, i.e., with the
    manner and degree of evidence required at the successive stages of the
    litigation.”). In opposing a motion for summary judgment, for example,
    Plaintiffs would need to come forward with evidence to support standing.
    See 
    id.
     But the passage of time does not change the relevant moment as
    to which Plaintiffs must establish that they had standing or heighten
    Plaintiffs’ burden in opposing the motion to dismiss. See id.; Mollan,
    
    22 U.S. at 539
    . A case may also, of course, become moot as time
    progresses. But there is no reason to doubt that Plaintiffs still have a live
    controversy against Zappos here. Cf. Z Channel Ltd. P’ship v. Home
    Box Office, Inc., 
    931 F.2d 1338
    , 1341 (9th Cir. 1991) (“If [a plaintiff] is
    entitled to collect damages in the event that it succeeds on the merits, the
    case does not become moot even though declaratory and injunctive relief
    are no longer of any use.”).
    12
    This conclusion is consistent with the Fourth Circuit’s decision in
    Beck v. McDonald, 
    848 F.3d 262
     (4th Cir. 2017), cert. denied sub nom.
    Beck v. Shulkin, 
    137 S. Ct. 2307
     (2017). The plaintiffs in Beck, patients
    with personal data on a laptop stolen from a hospital, did not allege that
    the “thief intentionally targeted the personal information compromised
    16                       IN RE ZAPPOS.COM
    C.
    The remaining Article III standing requirements are also
    satisfied. Plaintiffs sufficiently allege that the risk of future
    harm they face is “‘fairly traceable’ to the conduct being
    challenged”—here, Zappos’s failure to prevent the breach.
    Wittman v. Personhuballah, 
    136 S. Ct. 1732
    , 1736 (2016)
    (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 
    504 U.S. 555
    , 560–61
    (1992)).
    That hackers might have stolen Plaintiffs’ PII in
    unrelated breaches, and that Plaintiffs might suffer identity
    theft or fraud caused by the data stolen in those other
    breaches (rather than the data stolen from Zappos), is less
    about standing and more about the merits of causation and
    damages. As the Seventh Circuit recognized in Remijas v.
    Neiman Marcus Group, LLC, 
    794 F.3d 688
     (7th Cir. 2015),
    that “some other store might [also] have caused the
    plaintiffs’ private information to be exposed does nothing to
    negate the plaintiffs’ standing to sue” for the breach in
    in the data breaches.” 
    Id. at 274
    . The Fourth Circuit held that the
    absence of such an allegation “render[ed] their contention of an
    enhanced risk of future identity theft too speculative.” 
    Id.
     Here, by
    contrast, Plaintiffs allege that hackers specifically targeted their PII on
    Zappos’s servers. It is true that in Beck the Fourth Circuit opined that
    “‘as the breaches fade further into the past,’ the Plaintiffs’ threatened
    injuries become more and more speculative.” 
    Id. at 275
     (quoting
    Chambliss v. Carefirst, Inc., 
    189 F. Supp. 3d 564
    , 570 (D. Md. 2016),
    and citing In re Zappos.com, Inc., 
    108 F. Supp. 3d 949
    , 958 (D. Nev.
    2015)). But the time since the data breach appears to have mattered in
    Beck because the court concluded that the plaintiffs lacked standing after
    the breach in the first place, so it made sense to consider whether any
    subsequent events suggested a greater injury than was initially apparent.
    See 
    id. at 274
    .
    IN RE ZAPPOS.COM                                17
    question. 13 
    Id. at 696
    ; cf. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,
    
    490 U.S. 228
    , 263 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring in the
    judgment) (“[I]n multiple causation cases, . . . the common
    law of torts has long shifted the burden of proof to multiple
    defendants to prove that their negligent actions were not the
    ‘but-for’ cause of the plaintiff’s injury.” (citing Summers v.
    Tice, 
    199 P.2d 1
    , 3–4 (Cal. 1948))), superseded on other
    grounds by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2012).
    The injury from the risk of identity theft is also
    redressable by relief that could be obtained through this
    litigation. See Lujan, 
    504 U.S. at 561
    . If Plaintiffs succeed
    on the merits, any proven injury could be compensated
    through damages. See Remijas, 794 F.3d at 696–97. And at
    least some of their requested injunctive relief would limit the
    extent of the threatened injury by helping Plaintiffs to
    13
    Clapper is not to the contrary. In Clapper, the Supreme Court
    held that, even assuming the plaintiffs were going to be surveilled, any
    future surveillance could not be traced to the challenged statute because
    the risk of being surveilled did not increase with the addition of the new
    statutory tool. 
    568 U.S. at 413
     (“[B]ecause respondents can only
    speculate as to whether any (asserted) interception would be under
    § 1881a or some other authority, they cannot satisfy the ‘fairly traceable’
    requirement.”). There were many surveillance options, all of which were
    in the hands of one actor: the government. Thus, a plaintiff’s risk of
    surveillance hinged on whether the government chose to surveil him in
    the first place. In contrast, with each new hack comes a new hacker, each
    of whom independently could choose to use the data to commit identity
    theft. This means that each hacking incident adds to the overall risk of
    identity theft. And again, as explained above, the key injury recognized
    in Krottner is the risk of being subject to identity theft, not actual identity
    theft.
    18                       IN RE ZAPPOS.COM
    monitor their credit and the like. 14 See Monsanto Co. v.
    Geertson Seed Farms, 
    561 U.S. 139
    , 154–55 (2010).
    IV.
    For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE the district
    court’s judgment as to Plaintiffs’ standing and REMAND.
    14
    Plaintiffs need only one viable basis for standing. See Douglas
    Cty. v. Babbitt, 
    48 F.3d 1495
    , 1500 (9th Cir. 1995). Because Plaintiffs
    sufficiently allege standing from the risk of future identity theft, we do
    not reach their other asserted bases for standing.