Fuentes v. Diaz ( 2015 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION MAR 13 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ROGELIO FUENTES, No. 12-55873
Petitioner - Appellant, D.C. No. 5:09-cv-02193-DSF-
DTB
v.
RALPH M. DIAZ, Warden, MEMORANDUM*
Respondent - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Dale S. Fischer, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted February 2, 2015
Pasadena, California
Before: REINHARDT and GOULD, Circuit Judges and MOTZ,** Senior District
Judge.
Rogelio Fuentes appeals the district court’s denial of his petition for a writ of
habeas corpus under AEDPA.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The Honorable J. Frederick Motz, Senior District Judge for the U.S.
District Court for the District of Maryland, sitting by designation.
The state trial court excluded Fuentes’ confession to Detective Nieves as the
product of Nieves’ coercive interrogation. Shortly after confessing to Nieves,
Fuentes confessed to his girlfriend, whom he requested to see after he confessed to
Nieves, and to his mother, whom he requested be brought to the police station after
he confessed to Nieves and to his girlfriend. The state trial court admitted Fuentes’
confessions to his girlfriend and his mother and the California Court of Appeal
affirmed, holding that those confessions were sufficiently removed from the earlier
coercion and thus voluntary.
Fuentes argues that the California Court of Appeal’s decision was based on
two unreasonable factual determinations within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. §
2254(d)(2). First, that he initiated the conversations with his girlfriend and his
mother of his own volition; and second, that the environment had changed by the
time he confessed to them. Assuming arguendo that, as Fuentes contends, these are
factual, not legal, questions, we are not “convinced that an appellate panel,
applying the normal standards of appellate review, could not reasonably conclude
that the finding[s] [are] supported by the record.” Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992,
1000 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003)). We
similarly see no error in the state court’s treatment of Dr. Ofshe’s testimony, let
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alone an error that would compel the conclusion “that the state court’s fact-finding
process was [not] adequate.” Id.Fuentes also argues that the California Court of Appeal’s decision involved
an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as determined by the
Supreme Court, see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), but he identifies no Supreme Court
case that the state court applied unreasonably, and we are aware of none. Fuentes
has thus not established that the reasoning of the California Court of Appeal is
“inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of [the Supreme Court].”
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011).
We also reject Fuentes’ claim that excluding evidence of an inmate’s alleged
confession (to the Hernandez murder) to another inmate deprived him of his right
to present a complete defense. Wholly aside from the procedural questions and the
issues regarding the standard of review, we agree with the California Court of
Appeal’s determination that the alleged confession was not trustworthy. Thus, its
exclusion did not violate Fuentes’ due process rights. See, e.g., Christian v. Frank,
595 F.3d 1076, 1084–86 (9th Cir. 2010) (explaining that, under existing precedent,
the trustworthiness of proffered evidence is critical to determining whether its
admission is constitutionally compelled).
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Because we find no individual error, we also reject Fuentes’ cumulative
error claim.
***
The district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.
4