Liqiang Yang v. Merrick Garland ( 2022 )


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  •                               NOT FOR PUBLICATION                        FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        FEB 17 2022
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    LIQIANG YANG,                                   No.    20-73675
    Petitioner,                     Agency No. A208-429-602
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
    General,
    Respondent.
    On Petition for Review of an Order of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    Submitted February 15, 2022**
    San Francisco, California
    Before: McKEOWN and W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judges, and VRATIL,***
    District Judge.
    Petitioner Liqiang Yang seeks review of a decision of the Board of
    Immigration Appeals (“Board”) dismissing his appeal of a decision by an
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    ***
    The Honorable Kathryn H. Vratil, United States District Judge for the
    District of Kansas, sitting by designation.
    immigration judge (“IJ”) denying his application for asylum. Although the IJ also
    denied petitioner’s applications for withholding of removal and protection under the
    Convention Against Torture (“CAT”), petitioner only challenges the denial of
    asylum on appeal. We have jurisdiction under 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
     and deny the petition
    for review. Because the Board conducted its own review and did not adopt the IJ’s
    decision, we review the Board’s decision for substantial evidence. Lalayan v.
    Garland, 
    4 F.4th 822
    , 826 (9th Cir. 2021). The agency’s determination will be
    upheld if “it is supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence in the
    record.” Halim v. Holder, 
    590 F.3d 971
    , 975 (9th Cir. 2009).
    To be eligible for asylum, petitioner must establish a “subjectively genuine
    and objectively reasonable” fear of persecution. Parada v. Sessions, 
    902 F.3d 901
    ,
    909 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Sael v. Ashcroft, 
    386 F.3d 922
    , 924 (9th Cir. 2004);
    
    8 C.F.R. § 1208.13
    (a). The objective prong requires a showing of “a good reason to
    fear future persecution based on credible, direct, and specific evidence in the record
    of facts that would support a reasonable fear of persecution.” Zhao v. Mukasey, 
    540 F.3d 1027
    , 1029 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Ladha v. INS, 
    215 F.3d 889
    , 897 (9th Cir.
    2000)).
    Petitioner did not present credible, direct, specific evidence that he had an
    objectively reasonable fear of persecution. As a result, the Board reasonably
    concluded that he had not met his burden of proof. The Board noted that the State
    2
    Department Human Rights Report for China did not support petitioner’s contention
    that the Chinese government would persecute him because he expressed
    dissatisfaction with the government in one letter to the government. The Board also
    found that standing alone, a letter from petitioner’s friend in China about an
    “outstanding arrest warrant” was not direct or credible evidence that the government
    would persecute him—especially since the Chinese government had never contacted
    petitioner’s family regarding his whereabouts. These findings constitute substantial
    evidence in support of the Board’s conclusion that petitioner did not meet his burden
    of proof.
    Petitioner argues that the IJ improperly failed to provide petitioner with notice
    and an opportunity to produce corroborative evidence of the Chinese government’s
    intent to persecute him. This issue is not properly before this Court because
    petitioner did not exhaust the issue on appeal to the Board.             See 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    (d)(1) (court may review final order of removal only if non-citizen has
    exhausted all administrative remedies available to him).
    Because the Board did not err in denying Petitioner’s asylum application on
    the merits, we do not address his challenges to the IJ’s alternative conclusion that
    his asylum application was untimely.       See INS v. Bagamasbad, 
    429 U.S. 24
    ,
    25 (1976) (“As a general rule courts and agencies are not required to make findings
    on issues the decision of which is unnecessary to the results they reach.”).
    3
    PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.
    4