Gregorio Ventura-Flores v. Merrick Garland ( 2022 )


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  •                               NOT FOR PUBLICATION                        FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        FEB 17 2022
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    GREGORIO CORAZON VENTURA-                       No.    19-71179
    FLORES, AKA Flores Genaro Alejandro,
    AKA Jorge Flores,                               Agency No. A208-308-144
    Petitioner,
    MEMORANDUM*
    v.
    MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
    General,
    Respondent.
    On Petition for Review of an Order of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    Submitted February 15, 2022**
    San Francisco, California
    Before: GOULD and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges, and ADELMAN,*** District
    Judge.
    Petitioner Gregorio Corazon Ventura-Flores seeks review of a decision by
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    ***
    The Honorable Lynn S. Adelman, United States District Judge for the
    Eastern District of Wisconsin, sitting by designation.
    the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirming the Immigration Judge’s
    denial of his application for cancellation of removal. The BIA affirmed the
    Immigration Judge’s finding that Ventura-Flores was ineligible for cancellation of
    removal pursuant to section 240A(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act
    (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(A)–(D). Specifically, Ventura-Flores failed to
    establish that he has not been convicted of a crime of domestic violence, which
    disqualifies an application for cancellation of removal. See § 1229b(b)(1)(C); §
    1227(a)(2)(E)(i).
    Ventura-Flores is a native and citizen of Mexico who entered the United
    States in 2003 without admission or parole. The Department of Homeland
    Security (“DHS”) started removal proceedings against him in 2016. Ventura-
    Flores admitted the factual allegations against him and conceded removability. He
    sought cancellation of removal or, in the alternative, voluntary departure.
    DHS submitted a criminal record (“rap sheet”) obtained from the Federal
    Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) which had Ventura-Flores’s fingerprints. The rap
    sheet contained convictions for an individual with a different name and birth date
    than that in his application for cancellation of removal: “Jorge Flores” with a birth
    date of May 22, 1973, in the rap sheet, and “Gregorio Corazon Ventura-Flores”
    with a birth date of May 25, 1972, in his application for cancellation of removal.
    The convictions in the rap sheet included a state court conviction from 2000 for
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    willful infliction of corporal injury to spouse or cohabitant, in violation of
    California Penal Code § 273.5(a). We have held that a violation of CPC § 273.5(a)
    is categorically a crime of domestic violence and disqualifies a noncitizen from
    being eligible for cancellation of removal. Carrillo v. Holder, 
    781 F.3d 1155
    ,
    1159–60 (9th Cir. 2015).
    The Immigration Judge denied Ventura-Flores’s application for cancellation
    of removal. At the hearing, Ventura-Flores’s attorney conceded that “because of
    the fingerprints” the rap sheet “is not contestable,” and he had no other objections
    to its admission.
    The BIA dismissed Ventura-Flores’s appeal of the Immigration Judge’s
    decision, concluding that “the record contains evidence from which a reasonable
    factfinder could conclude” that Ventura-Flores was convicted of violating CPC §
    273.5(a) and consequently was ineligible for cancellation of removal. In reaching
    this conclusion, the BIA, like the Immigration Judge, emphasized that the name
    listed on the rap sheet matched one of Ventura-Flores’s known aliases, the rap
    sheet was procured through a fingerprint-based FBI file number, and the name and
    birth date, while different from what was on Ventura-Flores’s application for
    cancellation of removal, matched those in the records he provided for a different
    conviction as part of his application. Emphasizing that the burden of proving
    eligibility for cancellation of removal is Ventura-Flores’s to bear, the BIA rejected
    3
    his argument that it was impossible for him to prove the absence of a disqualifying
    conviction because California had destroyed the state court records for the
    conviction at issue.
    Ventura-Flores filed this petition for review, alleging that the BIA denied
    him due process by relying on the FBI rap sheet even though the identity on the rap
    sheet differed from that in his application and the state records for the conviction
    were destroyed. We generally lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s denials of
    discretionary relief but retain jurisdiction to review questions of law. See 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    (a)(2)(D); Bonilla v. Lynch, 
    840 F.3d 575
     (9th Cir. 2016).
    1. The BIA did not err in concluding that Ventura-Flores was ineligible for
    cancellation of removal. The rap sheet was properly admitted pursuant to 
    8 C.F.R. § 1003.41
    (d) and contains sufficient indicia of reliability. See Sinotes-Cruz v.
    Gonzales, 
    468 F.3d 1190
    , 1196 (9th Cir. 2006); Padilla-Martinez v. Holder, 
    770 F.3d 825
    , 833 (9th Cir. 2014). DHS confirmed the rap sheet was acquired using
    Ventura-Flores’s fingerprints and associated FBI number. Though it contained a
    different name and birth date from what Ventura-Flores provided in his application
    for cancellation of removal, it matched the name and birth date in the documents
    he provided with his application, and he included the other name as a known alias
    in his application. As the BIA found, this evidence could lead a reasonable
    4
    factfinder to conclude that Ventura-Flores was convicted of the offense contained
    in the rap sheet.
    2. The BIA did not err in concluding that the burden of proving eligibility
    for cancellation of removal falls on Ventura-Flores. The INA unambiguously
    provides that a noncitizen applying for relief from removal “has the burden of
    proof to establish” that the noncitizen “satisfies the applicable eligibility
    requirements.” § 1229a(c)(4)(A). The Supreme Court recently clarified that any
    ambiguity or incompleteness in the record—unfairly or not—works against the
    noncitizen applying for discretionary relief from removal. Pereida v. Wilkinson,
    
    141 S. Ct. 754
    , 767 (2021).
    3. We deny Ventura-Flores’s due process claim because he does not have a
    liberty interest in discretionary relief from removal, and he did not show error and
    prejudice. While due process entitles noncitizens to a “full and fair hearing” in
    deportation proceedings, noncitizens do not have an enforceable liberty interest in
    privileges created by Congress, including cancellation of removal. Mendez-Garcia
    v. Lynch, 
    840 F.3d 655
    , 665 (9th Cir. 2016). Nor has he shown substantial
    prejudice. Lata v. INS, 
    204 F.3d 1241
    , 1246 (9th Cir. 2000). He has not
    demonstrated how the information in the purged state court documents would have
    established that the individual in those records is not him.
    PETITION DENIED.
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 19-71179

Filed Date: 2/17/2022

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 2/17/2022