Ronald Hanson v. Palehua Community Association ( 2015 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION MAR 20 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RONALD JULIAN HANSON; KATHY No. 13-15874
ANN HANSON,
D.C. No. 1:12-cv-00616-JMS-RLP
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
v. MEMORANDUM*
PALEHUA COMMUNITY
ASSOCIATION; GARY WB CHANG,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Hawaii
J. Michael Seabright, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted March 10, 2015**
Before: FARRIS, WARDLAW, and PAEZ, Circuit Judges.
Ronald Julian Hanson and Kathy Ann Hanson appeal pro se from the district
court’s judgment dismissing their action alleging federal and state law violations
arising out of a prior state court action. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
1291. We review de novo. Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th Cir. 2003)
(dismissal under Rooker-Feldman doctrine); Sadoski v. Mosley, 435 F.3d 1076,
1077, n.1 (9th Cir. 2006) (judicial immunity). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed the Hansons’ claims against
defendants alleging injuries from the prior state court judgment for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because these claims
amounted to a forbidden “de facto appeal” of the prior state court judgment and
raised issues that were “inextricably intertwined” with that state court judgment.
Noel, 341 F.3d at 1163-65; see also Henrichs v. Valley View Dev., 474 F.3d 609,
616 (9th Cir. 2007) (Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred plaintiff’s claim because
alleged legal injuries arose from the “state court’s purportedly erroneous
judgment” and the relief sought “would require the district court to determine the
state court’s decision was wrong and thus void”).
The district court properly dismissed the Hansons’ claim for invasion of
privacy against Judge Chang because Judge Chang was entitled to absolute judicial
immunity. See Sadoski, 435 F.3d at 1079 (judges are absolutely immune from
suits for damages based on their judicial conduct except when acting “in the clear
absence of all jurisdiction” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Hansons’
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recusal motion because the Hansons’ allegations regarding bias were conclusory
and Judge Seabright’s denial of the Hansons’ motions was not a proper basis for a
recusal motion. See Jorgensen v. Cassiday, 320 F.3d 906, 911 (9th Cir. 2003)
(setting forth standard of review); see also Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540,
555 (1994) (explaining that “judicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid
basis for a bias or partiality motion”).
We do not consider issues that were not distinctly and sufficiently raised and
argued in the Hansons’ opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985
n.2 (9th Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
The Hansons’ request to strike the Palehua Community Association’s
answering brief, as set forth in their reply brief, is denied.
The Hansons’ ex parte emergency motion for a temporary restraining order,
filed on March 11, 2015, is denied.
AFFIRMED.
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