United States v. Wayne McDuffie , 454 F. App'x 624 ( 2011 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION OCT 24 2011
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 09-30307
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 2:08-cr-00102-RHW-1
v.
MEMORANDUM *
WAYNE D. MCDUFFIE,
Defendant - Appellee.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 09-30370
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 2:08-cr-00102-RHW-1
v.
WAYNE D. MCDUFFIE,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Washington
Robert H. Whaley, Senior District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted October 14, 2011
Seattle, Washington
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
Before: BEEZER and PAEZ, Circuit Judges, and COLLINS,** District Judge.
The government appeals the district court’s orders granting Defendant
Wayne McDuffie a new trial and suppressing drug-related evidence. We affirm
the grant of a new trial, but reverse the order suppressing evidence.1
In granting McDuffie a new trial, the district court concluded that the
government violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), when it failed to
disclose in a timely manner certain fingerprint evidence. To establish a Brady
violation, a defendant must show that “[t]he evidence at issue [is] favorable to the
accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that evidence
[was] suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice . . .
ensued.” United States v. Price, 566 F.3d 900, 907 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting
Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999)) (internal quotations omitted).
**
The Honorable Raner C. Collins, District Judge for the U.S. District
Court for Arizona, sitting by designation.
1
We review de novo the grant or denial of a motion for a new trial
based upon a violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). United States v.
Price, 566 F.3d 900, 907 (9th Cir. 2009). We also review de novo the denial of a
motion to suppress and whether the exclusionary rule applies to a given case.
United States v. Crawford, 372 F.3d 1048, 1053 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc). The
underlying factual findings are reviewed for clear error. Id.Page 2 of 5
The evidence at issue here showed that Detective Barrington’s fingerprint
was on a drug scale, which was found in the Ash Street apartment. This evidence
supported McDuffie’s theory that Barrington sought to frame him in order to
pressure him to cooperate with one of Barrington’s on-going murder
investigations. This evidence was disclosed during trial, despite the fact that the
government learned of it some five days prior to trial.
The fingerprint evidence is favorable to McDuffie and potentially
impeaching of Barrington, the government’s key witness. Because the
government’s disclosure of this evidence near the end of its own case in chief
prevented McDuffie from presenting his theory of the case in a coherent manner,
the government effectively suppressed it. McDuffie was unable to retain his own
experts in forensics or police procedure, or to do any pre-trial discovery into the
CD scale’s chain of custody. In light of its late disclosure, the evidence was of no
“substantial value” to McDuffie. United States v. Woodley, 9 F.3d 774, 777 (9th
Cir. 1993).
The government’s failure to disclose this evidence was also prejudicial,
again because it prevented McDuffie from presenting a coherent version of his
theory of the case. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 683 (1985).
Detective Barrington was the government’s key witness, and had McDuffie been
Page 3 of 5
able to present a coherent theory of evidence tampering, there is a reasonable
probability that the jury would have discredited Barrington and reached a different
conclusion in the case. The prejudicial effect of the government’s late disclosure is
therefore “sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial.” Price,
566 F.3d at 911. The district court did not err in granting a new trial on the basis
of the Brady violation.
McDuffie’s motion to suppress evidence sought to exclude items seized
from searches of McDuffie’s car and Walnut Street apartment. The Supreme Court
recently held in Davis v. United States that “searches conducted in objectively
reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent are not subject to the
exclusionary rule.” 131 S.Ct. 2419, 2423-24 (2011). The search of McDuffie’s car
after the police had already handcuffed him and placed him in a patrol car clearly
violated Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009), which was decided after the search
of McDuffie’s car but while McDuffie’s case was on appeal. The car search,
however, did not violate New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981), which was
binding precedent at the time of the search. Therefore, the search of McDuffie’s
car—although unconstitutional under Gant—does not invoke the exclusionary rule
and the evidence found in his car is admissible.
Page 4 of 5
The items seized from McDuffie’s Walnut Street apartment, which the
district court deemed “fruit of the poisonous tree” and excluded, are also
admissible. The exclusionary rule’s “sole purpose . . . is to deter future Fourth
Amendment violations.” Davis, 131 S.Ct. at 2426; see also Hudson v. Michigan,
547 U.S. 586, 596-99 (2006) (discussing deterrence as a necessary but not
sufficient condition for applying the exclusionary rule). There is no deterrent
effect when the police are not culpable. See Davis, 131 S.Ct. at 2428-29; see also
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984). Here, the police obtained a
search warrant on the basis of an affidavit that relied, in part, on the evidence
found in McDuffie’s car, and searched his apartment pursuant to that warrant.
Because the police relied on binding appellate precedent when they seized
evidence from McDuffie’s car, and then properly obtained a warrant before
searching his apartment, there would be no deterrent effect from excluding the
evidence found in the apartment. We therefore reverse the district court’s order
granting McDuffie’s motion to suppress.
AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part.
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