Sergio Escobar-Resendiz v. Merrick Garland ( 2022 )


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  •                                                                              FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    MAY 20 2022
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    SERGIO ESCOBAR-RESENDIZ, AKA                    No.    20-73807
    Sergio Escobar-Resendez,
    Agency No. A029-110-890
    Petitioner,
    v.                                             MEMORANDUM*
    MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
    General,
    Respondent.
    On Petition for Review of an Order of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    Submitted May 16, 2022**
    Pasadena, California
    Before: LEE and BRESS, Circuit Judges, and FITZWATER,*** District Judge.
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    ***
    The Honorable Sidney A. Fitzwater, United States District Judge for the
    Northern District of Texas, sitting by designation.
    Petitioner Sergio Escobar-Resendiz (“Escobar-Resendiz”), a native and citizen
    of Mexico, petitions for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision
    dismissing his appeal of an Immigration Judge’s (“IJ’s”) decision denying his
    application for withholding of removal and protection under the Convention Against
    Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction under 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    , and we deny the
    petition for review.
    We review the agency’s factual findings, including adverse credibility
    determinations, for substantial evidence. Mukulumbutu v. Barr, 
    977 F.3d 924
    , 925
    (9th Cir. 2020). Under this standard, we must uphold the agency’s determination
    unless any reasonable trier of fact “‘would be compelled to conclude to the contrary’
    based on the record.” Bringas-Rodriguez v. Sessions, 
    850 F.3d 1051
    , 1059 (9th
    Cir. 2017) (en banc) (quoting Zhi v. Holder, 
    751 F.3d 1088
    , 1091 (9th Cir. 2014)).
    In assessing an adverse credibility finding, this court “must look to the ‘totality of the
    circumstances[ ] and all relevant factors.’” Alam v. Garland, 
    11 F.4th 1133
    , 1137 (9th
    Cir. 2021) (en banc) (alteration in original) (quoting 
    8 U.S.C. § 1158
    (b)(1)(B)(iii)).
    1.     Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that Escobar-
    Resendiz was not credible when he testified before the IJ. First, in finding that
    Escobar-Resendiz was not credible, the IJ reasonably relied on Escobar-Resendiz’s
    inconsistent testimony regarding the timing of his kidnapping and the impossibility
    -2-
    of the timeline of his kidnapping based on other evidence in the record. See
    Ruiz-Colmenares v. Garland, 
    25 F.4th 742
    , 749-50 (9th Cir. 2022) (upholding
    agency’s adverse credibility finding in part because petitioner’s testimony as to the
    timing of his robberies was inconsistent and petitioner’s timeline surrounding his most
    recent robbery was impossible). The inconsistencies in Escobar-Resendiz’s testimony
    that the IJ identified are not trivial discrepancies in dates; rather, they are
    inconsistencies regarding the timing of the key event underlying Escobar-Resendiz’s
    applications for withholding of removal and CAT protection. See Rodriguez-Ramirez
    v. Garland, 
    11 F.4th 1091
    , 1093 (9th Cir. 2021) (per curiam) (“We have recognized
    that an IJ may rely upon an inconsistency in a crucial date concerning the very event
    upon which [a petitioner] predicated his claim for asylum.” (alteration in original)
    (quotations omitted)); Don v. Gonzales, 
    476 F.3d 738
    , 741-42 (9th Cir. 2007)
    (explaining that although trivial discrepancies in dates cannot form the basis of an
    adverse credibility finding, inconsistencies regarding the event that caused petitioner
    to leave his country are not trivial).
    Second, the IJ made specific observations about aspects of Escobar-Resendiz’s
    demeanor that undermined his credibility. For example, the IJ observed that Escobar-
    Resendiz avoided answering questions directly and laughed when confronted with
    inconsistencies in his testimony. See Huang v. Holder, 
    744 F.3d 1149
    , 1153 (9th Cir.
    -3-
    2014) (“Among other factors, an IJ may base an adverse credibility determination on
    the ‘demeanor, candor, or responsiveness’ of the applicant.” (quoting 
    8 U.S.C. § 1158
    (b)(1)(B)(iii))); Jibril v. Gonzales, 
    423 F.3d 1129
    , 1137 (9th Cir. 2005) (“We
    give ‘special deference’ to a credibility determination that is based on demeanor.”
    (quoting Singh-Kaur v. I.N.S., 
    183 F.3d 1147
    , 1151 (9th Cir. 1999))). Absent credible
    supporting testimony, substantial evidence supports the denial of Escobar-Resendiz’s
    withholding of removal claim. See Farah v. Ashcroft, 
    348 F.3d 1153
    , 1156 (9th Cir.
    2003).
    2.     Substantial evidence also supports the agency’s denial of CAT relief.
    Escobar-Resendiz’s CAT claim is based on the same testimony that the agency found
    not credible. He does not point to any other evidence in the record that compels the
    conclusion that it is more likely than not he would be tortured by, or with the consent
    or acquiescence of, the government if returned to Mexico. See Shrestha v. Holder,
    
    590 F.3d 1034
    , 1048-49 (9th Cir. 2010).
    PETITION DENIED.
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