Yunita Lie v. Merrick Garland ( 2022 )


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  •                               NOT FOR PUBLICATION                        FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        FEB 18 2022
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    YUNITA THERESIA LIANA LIE,                      No.    15-73781
    Petitioner,                     Agency No. A089-880-599
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
    General,
    Respondent.
    On Petition for Review of an Order of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    Submitted February 16, 2022**
    Pasadena, California
    Before: BRESS and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges, and GLEASON,*** District
    Judge.
    Yunita Lie, a citizen of Indonesia, petitions for review of a Board of
    Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision dismissing her appeal of an Immigration Judge
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    ***
    The Honorable Sharon L. Gleason, United States District Judge for
    the District of Alaska, sitting by designation.
    (IJ) order denying her claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under
    the Convention Against Torture (CAT). We review for substantial evidence and
    may grant relief only if the record compels a contrary conclusion. Yali Wang v.
    Sessions, 
    861 F.3d 1003
    , 1007 (9th Cir. 2017). We have jurisdiction under 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    , and we deny the petition.1
    1.     To obtain withholding of removal, Lie must establish a clear probability
    of future persecution on account of a protected ground. See Zi Lin Chen v. Ashcroft,
    
    362 F.3d 611
    , 617 (9th Cir. 2004); 
    8 C.F.R. § 208.16
    (b)(2). The record does not
    compel the conclusion that Lie made this showing.
    The BIA reasonably determined that the harm Lie experienced in Indonesia
    did not rise to the level of past persecution. See Nagoulko v. INS, 
    333 F.3d 1012
    ,
    1016 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Persecution . . . is an extreme concept that does not include
    every sort of treatment our society regards as offensive.” (quotations omitted)); see
    also Sharma v. Garland, 
    9 F.4th 1052
    , 1060–63 (9th Cir. 2021) (identifying factors
    considered in analyzing past persecution). Here, Lie was not physically harmed,
    most of the events occurred decades earlier when she was a child, and a later robbery
    reflected a criminal rather than persecutory act. The BIA could conclude these
    allegations of past persecution are insufficient. See Sharma, 9 F.4th at 1063 (noting
    1
    Lie does not challenge the BIA’s determination that her asylum claim was
    untimely. She has thus forfeited any challenge to the denial of asylum. See
    Martinez-Serrano v. INS, 
    94 F.3d 1256
    , 1259 (9th Cir. 1996).
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    that key factors for establishing past persecution include “physical violence and
    resulting serious injuries, frequency of harm, specific threats combined with
    confrontation, length and quality of detention, harm to family and close friends,
    economic deprivation, and general societal turmoil”).
    The BIA also reasonably determined that Lie had not demonstrated an
    individualized risk of persecution on account of being Chinese and Catholic distinct
    from her membership in these disfavored groups. See Halim v. Holder, 
    590 F.3d 971
    , 979 (9th Cir. 2009) (requiring a “unique risk of persecution” that is “distinct
    from the petitioner’s mere membership in a disfavored group”) (quoting Lolong v.
    Gonzales, 
    484 F.3d 1173
    , 1180 n.5 (9th Cir. 2007)). The BIA could reasonably
    conclude that Lie had not presented evidence that would support this showing,
    especially considering the lack of any past physical harm and the fact that her family
    still resides in Indonesia.
    2.     Lie also argues that the agency violated her due process rights by
    “cherry picking positive statements in the record, while excluding evidence of
    violence against Christians.” To establish a due process violation, Lie must show
    both that the proceeding was “so fundamentally unfair that [she] was prevented from
    reasonably presenting [her] case” and prejudice, “which means that the outcome of
    the proceeding may have been affected by the alleged violation.” Colmenar v. INS,
    
    210 F.3d 967
    , 971 (9th Cir. 2000). Lie has not made this showing. There is no
    3
    indication that the BIA failed to consider Lie’s arguments, and the BIA was not
    required to address in writing every piece of evidence Lie submitted. See Garcia v.
    Holder, 
    749 F.3d 785
    , 791 (9th Cir. 2014).
    3.     To obtain CAT relief, Lie must show that government officials or
    private actors with government consent would more likely than not torture her if she
    is returned to Indonesia. See Garcia-Milian v. Holder, 
    755 F.3d 1026
    , 1033 (9th
    Cir. 2014); 
    8 C.F.R. § 1208.16
    (c)(2). The record does not compel the conclusion
    that Lie made this showing. Lie has not demonstrated past torture, and the record
    does not require the conclusion that Lie would be tortured with the participation or
    consent of the Indonesian government. See Wakkary v. Holder, 
    558 F.3d 1049
    , 1068
    (9th Cir. 2009).
    PETITION DENIED.
    4