Neslihan Yildizhan v. Merrick Garland ( 2022 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 18 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
NESLIHAN YILDIZHAN, No. 15-73783
Petitioner, Agency No. A072-113-410
v.
MEMORANDUM*
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted February 16, 2022**
Pasadena, California
Before: BRESS and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges, and GLEASON,*** District
Judge.
Neslihan Yildizhan, a citizen of Turkey, seeks review of a Board of
Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision denying Yildizhan’s third untimely motion to
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable Sharon L. Gleason, Chief United States District Judge
for the District of Alaska, sitting by designation.
reopen immigration proceedings on her 2007 removal order. “We review a BIA
ruling on a motion to reopen for an abuse of discretion, and will reverse the denial
of a motion to reopen only if the Board acted arbitrarily, irrationally, or contrary to
law.” Martinez-Hernandez v. Holder, 778 F.3d 1086, 1088 (9th Cir. 2015) (per
curiam) (quotation omitted). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we
deny the petition.
“The BIA can deny a motion to reopen on any one of at least three independent
grounds—failure to establish a prima facie case for the relief sought, failure to
introduce previously unavailable, material evidence, and a determination that even
if these requirements were satisfied, the movant would not be entitled to the
discretionary grant of relief which he sought.” Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983,
986 (9th Cir. 2010) (quotations omitted). The BIA did not abuse its discretion in
concluding that Yildizhan failed to make a sufficient showing to justify reopening.
First, the BIA did not err in concluding that Yildizhan’s conversion to
Christianity and the birth of her biracial son do not constitute a change in
circumstances or country conditions “arising in the country of nationality,” see 8
U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii), because both are changes in personal circumstances,
which alone are insufficient. He v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1128, 1132 (9th Cir. 2007);
cf. Chandra v. Holder, 751 F.3d 1034, 1037 (9th Cir. 2014).
Second, the BIA reasonably concluded that the general country conditions
2
evidence Yildizhan submitted does not demonstrate changed conditions or establish
prima facie eligibility for asylum or other relief. Yildizhan argues that Turkey has
become a “warzone territory” and that the Turkish government has targeted Kurdish
citizens. But the BIA could conclude that the country reports and other evidence
Yildizhan submitted do not indicate that conditions in Turkey have materially
worsened. See Malty v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 942, 945 (9th Cir. 2004) (“The critical
question is . . . whether circumstances have changed sufficiently that a petitioner
who previously did not have a legitimate claim for asylum now has a well-founded
fear of future persecution.”). Further, Yildizhan presented no evidence to support
her assertion that “major policy changes in the government of Turkey specifically
targeting Kurds” have occurred.1 Accordingly, the BIA provided sufficient grounds
for denying reopening.
PETITION DENIED.
1
In her motion to reopen, Yildizhan argued that unrest in Syria makes her more
vulnerable to persecution. In her opening brief Yildizhan presented no argument on
this point, and thus the issue is forfeited. See, e.g., Castro-Perez v. Gonzales, 409
F.3d 1069, 1072 (9th Cir. 2005).
3