Bonifacio Torres-Hurtado v. Merrick Garland ( 2022 )


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  •                                                                               FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    FEB 28 2022
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                         MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    BONIFACIO TORRES-HURTADO,                        No.   18-73141
    Petitioner,                        Agency No. A091-760-693
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
    General,
    Respondent.
    On Petition for Review of an Order of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    Submitted February 18, 2022**
    San Francisco, California
    Before: GOULD and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges, and ZIPPS,*** District Judge.
    Petitioner Bonifacio Torres-Hurtado (Petitioner) is a native and citizen of
    Mexico. He seeks review of an order from the Board of Immigration Appeals
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    ***
    The Honorable Jennifer G. Zipps, United States District Judge for the
    District of Arizona, sitting by designation.
    (BIA) dismissing his appeal from the denial of his request for deferral of removal
    under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). We have jurisdiction under 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
     and we DENY the petition.
    1. We review the factual findings underlying the BIA’s determination that a
    petitioner is ineligible for deferral of removal under CAT for substantial evidence.
    See Edu v. Holder, 
    624 F.3d 1137
    , 1142 (9th Cir. 2010). We grant a petition for
    review only if the evidence compels the conclusion that the BIA’s decision was
    erroneous. See Jie Shi Liu v. Sessions, 
    891 F.3d 834
    , 837 (9th Cir. 2018).
    Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s determination that Petitioner failed
    to demonstrate that it was more likely than not that he would be tortured if
    removed to Mexico. Petitioner testified that he was shot five times twenty years
    ago and that the attack was motivated by a local gang’s attempt to recruit his
    brother Roberto to join their ranks. In the twenty years since the shooting,
    however, Roberto died and Petitioner has returned to Mexico without incident.
    Kamalthas v. I.N.S., 
    251 F.3d 1279
    , 1282 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting that when
    evaluating a CAT claim, “all evidence relevant to the possibility of future torture
    shall be considered, including, but not limited to: [e]vidence of past torture
    inflicted upon the applicant; [and] [e]vidence that the applicant could relocate to a
    part of the country of removal where he or she is not likely to be tortured”)
    2
    (emphasis omitted). Petitioner’s testimony therefore failed to establish that he is
    more likely than not to experience future torture.1
    Substantial evidence also supports the conclusion that Petitioner does not
    face a clear probability of torture by or with government acquiescence. Petitioner
    testified that the police knew the identity of the man who shot him, but did not
    arrest him. This testimony is insufficient to establish government acquiescence
    without a showing that the police are “unable or unwilling to oppose . . . crime.”
    Garcia-Milian v. Holder, 
    755 F.3d 1026
    , 1034 (9th Cir. 2014). Although
    Petitioner testified regarding his belief that the police did not arrest the man that
    shot him because “the government works with the cartel,” he did not present any
    evidence establishing corruption, or that his belief was anything more than
    speculation. See Garcia v. Wilkinson, 
    988 F.3d 1136
    , 1148 (9th Cir. 2021)
    (“[S]peculative fear of torture is not sufficient to satisfy the applicant's burden.”)
    This record does not compel a conclusion that the BIA erred in denying CAT
    relief. See Liu, 891 F.3d at 837.
    1
    Petitioner argues that the Immigration Judge (IJ) applied a flawed
    analytical structure by failing to consider all aspects of his claim, and failing to
    separately discuss the likelihood of future torture, government acquiescence and
    internal relocation. However, our review is limited to the BIA’s decision. See
    Quijada-Aguilar v. Lynch, 
    799 F.3d 1303
    , 1305 (9th Cir. 2015) (“Because the BIA
    conducted an independent review of the facts and law, we review only the BIA’s
    decision.”)
    3
    2. We review the BIA’s decision not to take administrative notice of the
    evidence Petitioner submitted with his appeal brief for an abuse of discretion. See
    Castillo-Villagra v. I.N.S., 
    972 F.2d 1017
    , 1028 (9th Cir. 1992). Because this
    country conditions evidence was not presented to the Immigration Judge, the BIA
    did not abuse its discretion by declining to take administrative notice of these new
    facts and engage in factfinding to decide Petitioner’s appeal. See Brezilien v.
    Holder, 
    569 F.3d 403
    , 413 n.3 (9th Cir. 2009).
    PETITION DENIED.
    4