Andrew Clark v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. ( 2022 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 28 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ANDREW G. CLARK, No. 21-35304
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 6:20-cv-00253-AA
v.
MEMORANDUM*
WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.;
OGLETREE, DEAKINS, NASH, SMOAK
& STEWART, P.C.; OREGON STATE
BAR ASSOCIATION; LEAH C. LIVELY;
DAVID P.R. SYMES; CHRISTOPHER
MIXON; MICHAEL HOGAN,
Administrative Law Judge, Hogan
Mediation; ALEX GARDNER, Forensic
Services Div.; ERIK HASSELMAN;
STEVEN W. SEYMOUR; CHRISTIAN
JOSEPH ROWLEY, Seyfarth; BENJAMIN
N. GUTMAN, Solicitor General; BARRY
DAVIS; DAVID CAMPBELL; BRUCE
NEWTON; PETER URIAS, Seyfarth;
ELLEN ROSENBLUM; SEBASTIAN
TAPIA; BEN MILLER; VANESSA A.
NORDYKE,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Oregon
Ann L. Aiken, District Judge, Presiding
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Submitted February 15, 2022**
San Francisco, California
Before: FERNANDEZ, TASHIMA, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.
Andrew G. Clark appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment
dismissing his action under 42 U.S.C § 1983, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (“RICO”), and the Clayton Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 15, alleging various federal claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §
1291. We review de novo. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341 (9th Cir. 2010)
(dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)); E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Gallo Cattle
Co., 967 F.2d 1280, 1287 (9th Cir. 1992) (summary judgment). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment for defendants
Hassleman and Gardner because Clark’s claims against them are barred by claim
preclusion. See W. Radio Servs. Co. v. Glickman, 123 F.3d 1189, 1192 (9th Cir.
1997) (explaining that claim preclusion “bars litigation in a subsequent action of
any claims that were raised or could have been raised in the prior action”).
The district court properly dismissed Clark’s claims against the Oregon State
Bar because Clark failed to allege facts sufficient to show any antitrust injury, a
violation of his constitutional rights, or a RICO predicate act. See Hebbe, 627 F.3d
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
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at 341-42 (holding that although pro se pleadings are construed liberally, plaintiff
must present factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief).
The district court properly dismissed Clark’s RICO and § 1983 claims
against Wells Fargo as barred by claim preclusion, and his remaining claims
against Wells Fargo and other defendants as time-barred. See 15 U.S.C. § 15b
(stating that Sherman and Clayton Antitrust Act claims must be initiated “within
four years after the cause of action accrued” or they “shall be forever barred”); Or.
Rev. Stat. § 12.110(1) (Oregon has a two-year statute of limitations for personal
injury actions); Carpinteria Valley Farms, Ltd. v. County of Santa Barbara, 344
F.3d 822, 828 (9th Cir. 2003) (“The applicable statute of limitations for actions
brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is the forum state’s statute of limitations for
personal injury actions.”); Pincay v. Andrews, 238 F.3d 1106, 1108 (9th Cir. 2001)
(noting the statute of limitations for civil RICO actions is four years); W. Radio
Servs. Co., 123 F.3d at 1192.
The district court properly denied Clark’s motion for intervention. See
Smith v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., 830 F.3d 843, 853 (9th Cir. 2016) (setting forth
standard of review and criteria for granting intervention under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24).
We reject as without merit Clark’s contention that the district judge engaged
in improper behavior.
All pending motions are denied.
3 21-35304
AFFIRMED.
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