Nicholas Honchariw v. County of Stanislaus ( 2022 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
FEB 22 2022
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
NICHOLAS HONCHARIW, Trustee, No. 21-15801
Honchariw Family Trust,
D.C. No.
Plaintiff-Appellant, 1:16-cv-01183-DAD-BAM
v.
MEMORANDUM*
COUNTY OF STANISLAUS; BOARD
OF SUPERVISORS OF COUNTY OF
STANISLAUS,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Dale A. Drozd, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted February 17, 2022**
San Francisco, California
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Before: McKEOWN and W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judges, and BENNETT,***
District Judge.
Plaintiff Nicholas Honchariw appeals from the district court’s grant of
judgment on the pleadings to Defendants County of Stanislaus (“County”) and
Board of Supervisors of County of Stanislaus (“Board”). Plaintiff claims that the
Board effected a taking of his property and denied him due process in violation of
the Fifth Amendment when it denied his application to subdivide his property in
2009.
Following the denial of his application, Plaintiff successfully obtained relief
in a state court mandamus action in 2011. See Honchariw v. Cty. of Stanislaus,
200 Cal. App. 4th 1066 (2011). He obtained administrative approval of his
application in 2012 and filed a new state court action for inverse condemnation that
the California Court of Appeal held was time barred. See Honchariw v. Cty. of
Stanislaus, 238 Cal. App. 4th 1, 15 (2015). He then brought the instant takings and
due process claims in federal court on August 10, 2016.
We previously held that Plaintiff’s takings claim is unripe and that his due
process claim is time barred. Honchariw v. Cty. of Stanislaus, 715 Fed. Appx. 760(9th Cir. 2019). Plaintiff petitioned for a writ of certiorari and, while the petition
***
The Honorable Richard D. Bennett, United States District Judge for
the District of Maryland, sitting by designation.
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was pending, the Supreme Court decided Knick v. Township of Scott, 139 S. Ct.
2162 (2019). The Court subsequently granted Plaintiff’s petition, vacated our
judgment, and remanded the case for further consideration in light of Knick.
Honchariw v. Cty. of Stanislaus, 139 S. Ct. 2772 (2019). We remanded to the
district court. Honchariw v. Cty. of Stanislaus, 774 Fed. Appx. 411 (9th Cir.
2019). The district court held that Plaintiff’s takings claim is time barred, and
again held that his due process claimed is time barred. We have jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.
We review de novo a district court’s grant of judgment on the pleadings.
Cafasso, U.S. ex rel. v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1053 (9th Cir.
2011). “A judgment on the pleadings is properly granted when, taking all the
allegations in the non-moving party’s pleadings as true, the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Marshall Naify Revocable Tr. v. United
States, 672 F.3d 620, 623 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Fajardo v. Cnty of Los Angeles,
179 F.3d 698, 699 (9th Cir. 1999)). We “need not accept conclusory allegations of
law or unwarranted inferences.” Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Intern. Service Ass’n, 494
F.3d 788, 794 (9th Cir. 2007). We “may affirm on any ground supported by the
record, even if it differs from the reasoning of the district court.” Garcia v.
Bunnell, 33 F.3d 1193, 1195 (9th Cir. 1994).
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Plaintiff argues that neither claim ripened until the approval of his
application in 2012 because the approval was the Board’s final decision concerning
his property. With respect to Plaintiff’s takings claim, the challenged deprivation
of the use of his property occurred when the Board denied his application, not
when the Board subsequently approved it. In Knick v. Township of Scott, the
Supreme Court reaffirmed that a takings claim accrues immediately upon a taking
and held that it is ripe for federal review at that time. 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2172-73
(2019). The Court more recently reiterated that a decision is final for purposes of
accrual when “[Plaintiff] has actually ‘been injured by the Government’s action’
and is not prematurely suing over a hypothetical harm.” Padkel v. City and Cty. of
San Francisco, California, 141 S. Ct. 2226, 2230 (2021) (quoting Horne v. Dep’t
of Agriculture, 569 U.S. 513, 525 (2013)).
The decision that allegedly injured Plaintiff was the 2009 denial and not the
subsequent 2012 approval that remedied the alleged injury. The same analysis
applies to Plaintiff’s due process claim, which also accrued when his application
was denied in 2009, and not when the 2012 approval eliminated the purported
violation.
Because Plaintiff’s claims accrued when the Board denied his application on
March 24, 2009, his federal suit, filed August 10, 2016, was untimely under the
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applicable two-year statute of limitations. Action Apartment Ass’n, Inc. v. Santa
Monica Rent Control Bd., 509 F.3d 1020, 1026 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[C]laims brought
under § 1983 borrow the forum state's statute of limitations for personal injury
claims, and in California, that limitations period is two years.”). While the district
court erred in holding that the claims accrued when the Board approved his
application on May 22, 2012, it correctly held that the claims are time barred.
AFFIRMED.
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