Zhi Liu v. Jefferson Sessions , 694 F. App'x 551 ( 2017 )


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  •                                                                             FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    JUL 21 2017
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    ZHI YUAN LIU; QIAO LING TANG,                    No. 12-72866
    Petitioners,                       Agency Nos. A076-217-282
    A076-217-283
    v.
    JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, Attorney              MEMORANDUM*
    General,
    Respondent.
    On Petition for Review of an Order of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    Submitted July 11, 2017**
    San Francisco, California
    Before: GRABER and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges, and MARSHALL,***
    District Judge.
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes that this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    ***
    The Honorable Consuelo B. Marshall, United States District Judge for the
    Central District of California, sitting by designation.
    Petitioner Zhi Yun Liu,1 a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of
    China, petitions for review of an order by the Board of Immigration Appeals
    ("BIA"). The BIA dismissed Petitioner’s appeal of an immigration judge’s ("IJ")
    denial of her application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under
    the Convention Against Torture ("CAT").2 We deny the petition.
    1. Substantial evidence supports the conclusion that Petitioner did not
    testify credibly. See Kin v. Holder, 
    595 F.3d 1050
    , 1054 (9th Cir. 2010) ("We
    review an adverse credibility finding for substantial evidence."). In particular, the
    discrepancy between Petitioner’s testimony as to when her husband left China and
    the documentary evidence goes to the heart of her claims and constitutes a
    "specific and cogent" reason to find her testimony incredible. 
    Id. at 1055.
    Because
    the adverse credibility determination is supportable on that ground, there is no
    1
    Petitioner’s daughter, Qiao Ling Tang, joins in the petition for review. Her
    request for relief is completely derivative of Petitioner’s, so her "claims succeed or
    fail with [Petitioner’s] claims." Don v. Gonzales, 
    476 F.3d 738
    , 739 n.1 (9th Cir.
    2007).
    2
    Petitioner failed to challenge the IJ’s disposition of her CAT claim on
    appeal to the BIA. Accordingly, she "failed to exhaust [that] claim below—and
    this court therefore has no jurisdiction to review that decision." Rizo v. Lynch, 
    810 F.3d 688
    , 693 (9th Cir. 2016).
    2
    reason to review the remaining grounds on which the BIA relied. Id.3
    2. Substantial evidence supports the conclusion that, in light of her
    incredible testimony, Petitioner has not established past persecution. See Guo v.
    Ashcroft, 
    361 F.3d 1194
    , 1203 (9th Cir. 2004) ("In determining whether an
    applicant was subjected to past persecution, we review the record for substantial
    evidence."). The record does not compel the conclusion that the documentary
    evidence submitted by Petitioner establishes past persecution. The certificates
    showing that Petitioner underwent an abortion and had an intrauterine device
    ("IUD") implanted in 1990, do not establish that those procedures were performed
    without Petitioner’s consent. The letter from Petitioner’s mother stating that
    Petitioner was forced to undergo the abortion and the insertion of the IUD does not
    compel a different conclusion, as Petitioner’s mother was not subject to cross-
    examination and her knowledge came entirely from what Petitioner told her.
    3. The BIA’s determination that Petitioner has not shown past persecution
    related to the secret removal of her IUD is supported by substantial evidence. The
    record does not compel the conclusion that Petitioner suffered any past
    persecution, including persecution on account of the removal of her IUD.
    3
    Because Petitioner filed her asylum application before May 11, 2005, the
    REAL ID Act of 2005 does not apply. In re S-B-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 42, 43 (B.I.A.
    2006).
    3
    4. Substantial evidence supports the conclusion that Petitioner has not
    established a well-founded fear of future persecution. The record does not compel
    the conclusion that Petitioner would face a reasonable possibility of persecution
    upon returning to China, Al-Harbi v. INS, 
    242 F.3d 882
    , 888 (9th Cir. 2001), either
    in retaliation for the removal of her IUD over 20 years ago or for giving birth to
    children in excess of the one-child limit while living in the United States, see In re
    J-W-S-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 185, 191 (B.I.A. 2007) ("The evidence of record suggests
    that if a returnee who has had a second child while outside of China is penalized at
    all upon return, the sanctions would be fines or other economic penalties.").
    5. Because substantial evidence supports the conclusion that Petitioner has
    failed to qualify for asylum, substantial evidence necessarily supports the
    conclusion that Petitioner has failed to qualify for withholding of removal. Al-
    
    Harbi, 242 F.3d at 888
    –89.
    Petition DENIED.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 12-72866

Citation Numbers: 694 F. App'x 551

Judges: Graber, Friedland, Marshall

Filed Date: 7/21/2017

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/6/2024