United States v. Edsel Badoni ( 2017 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 1 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 14-10069
Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No.
3:12-cr-8262-GMS-1
v.
EDSEL AARON BADONI, aka Edsel MEMORANDUM*
Aaron Bedonie,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
G. Murray Snow, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted July 28, 2017**
San Francisco, California
Before: GRABER and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges, and FOOTE,*** District Judge.
Defendant Edsel Badoni appeals his conviction and sentences for assault
with a dangerous weapon (Count One); assault resulting in serious bodily injury
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without
oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable Elizabeth E. Foote, United States District Judge for the
Western District of Louisiana, sitting by designation.
(Count Two); and discharging a firearm during a crime of violence (Count Three).
The district court sentenced Badoni to 46 months’ imprisonment on Counts One
and Two, to run concurrently, followed by a consecutive 120-month sentence on
Count Three, which reflected the mandatory minimum sentence under 18 U.S.C. §
924(c). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm in part, vacate in
part, and remand to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this
memorandum disposition.
1. The district court did not plainly err by failing to give a separate
unanimity instruction on self-defense. See United States v. Nobari, 574 F.3d 1065,
1080 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that we review jury instructions for plain error when
defendant has failed to object at trial). While it is true that a jury must reject self-
defense unanimously, United States v. Southwell, 432 F.3d 1050, 1055 (9th Cir.
2005), we have never required that a special unanimity instruction be given in all
cases in which affirmative defenses are raised, Nobari, 574 F.3d at 1081.
Typically, “a general unanimity instruction suffices to instruct the jury that they
must be unanimous on whatever specifications form the basis of the guilty
verdict.” United States v. Kim, 196 F.3d 1079, 1082 (9th Cir. 1999). Here, the
district court gave a general unanimity instruction and also repeated the unanimity
requirement throughout its instructions. Further, the district court tracked this
circuit’s model jury instructions on the elements of self-defense. This case did not
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present “a genuine possibility of jury confusion or that a conviction may occur as
the result of different jurors concluding that the defendant committed different
acts.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
2. In light of the consecutive, ten-year mandatory minimum sentence that
Badoni faced on Count Three, the defense urged the district court to impose a
lesser sentence on Counts One and Two. Declining to do so, the district court
explained:
I take into account your argument that I can adjust the assault
sentences based on the fact that there is a 10-year mandatory
minimum. But I don’t believe that this is an appropriate instance in
which to give a time-served sentence on those other charges, and it
does seem to me that the better reading of the statute would require a
consecutive sentence, and that’s what Congress mandates, and it
would suggest that except for in very rare circumstances, I not adjust
downward the underlying convictions, because it doesn’t promote the
purposes of Congress.
While this case was pending on appeal, the Supreme Court held in Dean v.
United States, 137 S. Ct. 1170, 1176-77 (2017), that a sentencing court may
consider the consecutive mandatory minimum sentence required by § 924(c) when
calculating a just sentence for the predicate offense. Because the record does not
make clear whether the district court understood that it could consider the § 924(c)
mandatory sentence when imposing the sentence on the assault counts, we vacate
the sentences on those counts and remand for resentencing in light of Dean. We
express no opinion on the appropriate sentences to be imposed on remand.
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3. The district court abused its discretion by imposing a condition of
supervised release that permits the Probation Office to search Badoni’s computers,
electronic communications, and data storage devices or media. See United States
v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984, 993 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (holding that we review
sentencing decisions for abuse of discretion). As the Government concedes, the
condition was unsupported by the record. We remand to the district court for the
removal of that condition.
CONVICTIONS AFFIRMED; SENTENCES AFFIRMED in part and
VACATED in part, and REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING.
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