Livia Ujhelyi v. Tom Vilsack ( 2017 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 15 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
LIVIA UJHELYI, No. 14-17573
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 4:12-cv-04282-JSW
v.
MEMORANDUM*
TOM VILSACK, Secretary, U.S.
Department of Agriculture,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Jeffrey S. White, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted August 9, 2017**
Before: SCHROEDER, TASHIMA, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Livia Ujhelyi appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment and
dismissal order in her employment action alleging retaliation in violation of Title
VII. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Arrington v. Wong, 237 F.3d 1066, 1069 (9th Cir. 2001) (dismissals under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(1)); Vasquez v. County of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 639 (9th Cir.
2003) (summary judgment). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
Ujhelyi’s allegations that her duties were significantly altered upon arrival at her
duty station and that the USDA intimidated her husband. See Freeman v. Oakland
Unified Sch. Dist., 291 F.3d 632, 636 (9th Cir. 2002) (district court only has
subject matter jurisdiction over allegations of discrimination that fell within the
scope of the EEOC’s actual investigation or which can reasonably be expected to
grow out of the charge of discrimination).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Ujhelyi’s
retaliation claim related to her termination because Ujhelyi failed to raise a genuine
dispute of material fact as to whether there was a causal connection between her
husband’s protected activity and her termination from employment. See Coons v.
Sec’y of the U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, 383 F.3d 879, 887-88 (9th Cir. 2004)
(elements of retaliation claim); see also Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133
S. Ct. 2517, 2533-34 (2013) (proper causation test for Title VII retaliation claim is
but-for causation).
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The district court properly granted summary judgment on Ujhelyi’s
retaliation claim related to Ujhelyi’s debt because Ujhelyi failed to raise a genuine
dispute of material fact as to whether defendant’s legitimate, non-discriminatory
reasons for denying her request to reconsider her debt were pretextual. See Stegall
v. Citadel Broad. Co., 350 F.3d 1061, 1066, 1068-69 (9th Cir. 2003)
(circumstantial evidence of pretext must be specific and substantial)
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Ujhelyi’s motion to
compel discovery because Ujhelyi failed to establish that the denial resulted in
actual and substantial prejudice. See Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 751 (9th
Cir. 2002) (setting forth standard of review and explaining that district court has
broad discretion to deny discovery).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Ujhelyi’s motion for
sanctions because Ujhelyi failed to establish that sanctions were warranted. See
Holgate v. Baldwin, 425 F.3d 671, 675 (9th Cir. 2005) (standard of review); Fink
v. Gomez, 239 F.3d 989, 991-92 (9th Cir. 2001) (inherent power of district court to
order sanctions).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding costs to defendant
as the prevailing party. See Ass’n of Mexican-Am. Educators v. Caifornia., 231
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F.3d 572, 591, 592 (9th Cir. 2000) (standard of review; strong presumption in
favor of awarding costs to the prevailing party).
Ujhelyi’s request for judicial notice (Docket Entry No. 13) is denied.
AFFIRMED.
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