Gregory Haynes v. Christian Hanson , 695 F. App'x 317 ( 2017 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 16 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
GREGORY MELVIN HAYNES, Nos. 13-16189
15-15550
Plaintiff-Appellant,
D.C. No. 3:11-cv-05021-JST
v.
CHRISTIAN HANSON; et al., MEMORANDUM*
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Jon S. Tigar, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted August 9, 2017**
Before: SCHROEDER, TASHIMA, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Gregory Melvin Haynes, an attorney, appeals pro se from the district court’s
judgments dismissing his action alleging federal claims arising out of an alleged
altercation in the hallway of a federal district court. We have jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Manufactured Home Cmtys. Inc. v. City of
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes these cases are suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
San Jose, 420 F.3d 1022, 1025 (9th Cir. 2005) (dismissal on the basis of res
judicata); Serrano v. Francis, 345 F.3d 1071, 1082 (9th Cir. 2003) (summary
judgment); Mullis v. U.S. Bankr. Court, 828 F.2d 1385, 1388 (9th Cir. 1987)
(dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)). We may affirm on any basis supported
by the record. Thompson v. Paul, 547 F.3d 1055, 1058-59 (9th Cir. 2008). We
affirm.
Appeal No. 13-16189
The district court properly dismissed Haynes’s claims against defendants
Herrera, Hoeper, and Zaheer as barred by the doctrine of res judicata because
Haynes could have raised his claims in his prior California state court action,
which involved the same primary rights, the same parties or privies, and resulted in
a final judgment on the merits. See Furnace v. Giurbino, 838 F.3d 1019, 1023 (9th
Cir. 2016) (a federal court must apply the res judicata law of the state in which the
judgment was entered); DKN Holdings LLC v. Faerber, 352 P.3d 378, 382 n.1 &
386-87 (Cal. 2015) (setting forth requirements for res judicata, or claim preclusion,
defining primary rights doctrine, and discussing privity).
The district court properly dismissed Haynes’s claims against defendant
Tolbert because Haynes failed to allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim.
See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (factual allegations must
“state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face”); United States v. Mendenhall,
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446 U.S. 544, 551-52 (1980) (threshold for detention under the Fourth Amendment
seizure).
To the extent that Haynes alleged an equal protection claim against
defendant Tolbert, dismissal was proper because Haynes failed to allege facts
sufficient to state a plausible claim. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570; Serrano, 345
F.3d at 1082 (requirements for equal protection claim based on membership in a
protected class).
Appeal No. 15-15550
The district court properly dismissed Haynes’s Fourth Amendment claim
against defendants Hanson and Oberstein based on Haynes’s initial detention
because Haynes failed to allege facts sufficient to show that the initial detention
was unreasonable. See United States v. Grigg, 498 F.3d 1070, 1081 (9th Cir.
2007) (explaining when, under the totality of circumstances, an officer may
conduct an investigatory stop based on a completed misdemeanor).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Haynes’s Fourth
Amendment claim against defendants Hanson and Oberstein based on the length of
Haynes’s detention because Haynes failed to raise a genuine dispute of material
fact as to whether defendants failed to “diligently pursue[] a means of investigation
that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions.” United States v. Torres-
Sanchez, 83 F.3d 1123, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996) (citation and internal quotation marks
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omitted).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Haynes’s claims
against defendant Coughlin with prejudice for failure to prosecute after providing
Haynes multiple warnings to comply with its orders to serve Coughlin. See
Omstead v. Dell, Inc., 594 F.3d 1081, 1084 (9th Cir. 2010) (setting forth standard
of review and factors that district court must weigh in determining whether
dismissal for failure to prosecute under Rule 41(b) is warranted).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing without
prejudice Haynes’s claims against defendant Almaraz for failure to effectuate
service of process because Haynes failed to show that he served Almaraz with the
First Amended Complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. 4(i) (requirements for serving federal
employee); Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m) (setting forth time limit to effect service absent
showing of good cause); Puett v. Blandford, 912 F.2d 270, 273 (9th Cir. 1990)
(standard of review).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Haynes leave to file
a Second Amended Complaint because the relevant factors weighed against
granting leave. See Chodos v. West Publ’g Co., 292 F.3d 992, 1003 (9th Cir.
2002) (setting forth standard of review and factors relevant to a motion to amend
and explaining that “when a district court has already granted a plaintiff leave to
amend, its discretion in deciding subsequent motions to amend is particularly
4 13-16189
broad.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
We reject as without merit Haynes’s contentions regarding the United States
Attorney’s Office’s representation of defendant Almaraz.
AFFIRMED.
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