David Grossman v. John Popp , 696 F. App'x 248 ( 2017 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 17 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DAVID GROSSMAN, No. 16-55854
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 8:13-cv-00461-DDP-CW
v.
MEMORANDUM*
JOHN POPP; STEVE SHERRILL,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Dean D. Pregerson, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted August 9, 2017**
Before: SCHROEDER, TASHIMA, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
David Grossman appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment
in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging federal and state law claims arising from a
traffic stop, arrest, detention in jail, and vehicle impoundment. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Glenn v. Washington
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
County, 673 F.3d 864, 870 (9th Cir. 2011). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Grossman’s
claims under the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 13 of the California
Constitution related to his traffic stop and arrest because Grossman failed to raise a
genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendants had no reasonable
suspicion for the traffic stop and no probable cause to make an arrest. See
Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1614 (2015) (“[T]he tolerable duration
of police inquiries in the traffic-stop context is determined by the seizure’s
‘mission’—to address the traffic violation that warranted the stop and attend to
related safety concerns.” (citations omitted)); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964)
(arrest supported by probable cause does not violate the Fourth Amendment);
United States v. Hartz, 458 F.3d 1011, 1017 (9th Cir. 2006) (“A police-initiated
traffic stop is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment if the police stop the
vehicle because of a reasonable suspicion that the vehicle’s occupants have broken
a law.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Cal. Veh. Code § 22348(a)
(speeding); Cal. Veh. Code § 4000 (vehicle registration); Cal. Veh. Code § 26710
(defective windshield); see also Lyall v. City of Los Angeles, 807 F.3d 1178, 1186
n.7 (9th Cir. 2015) (Article I, Section 13 of the California Constitution provides the
same protection against seizures as the Fourth Amendment).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Grossman’s
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claims under the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 13 of the California
Constitution related to his booking into jail and detention because Grossman failed
to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether he had a right to immediate
release after his arrest. See Cal. Pen. Code § 853.6(g) (arresting officer has
discretion as to whether arrestee should be released without booking); Higbee v.
City of San Diego, 911 F.2d 377, 379 (9th Cir. 1990) (“[Misdemeanor arrestees do]
not have a constitutional right to immediate liberty once they [a]re subjected to
lawful arrest. The state is constitutionally permitted to detain all misdemeanor
arrestees for the usual post-arrest procedures.”).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Grossman’s
Fourth Amendment and due process claims relating to the seizure of his vehicle
because Grossman failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether
his constitutional rights were violated. See Ramirez v. City of Buena Park, 560
F.3d 1012, 1025 (9th Cir. 2009) (impound of vehicle is permissible under the
Fourth Amendment’s community caretaking doctrine when vehicle is parked in a
private parking lot and at risk of theft and vandalism); Miranda v. City of
Cornelius, 429 F.3d 858, 867 (9th Cir. 2005) (stating that “[i]mpoundment of a
vehicle left in a public place or a vehicle for which there is no licensed driver . . .
would not require a pre-deprivation notice and a pre-seizure hearing”); Scofield v.
City of Hillsborough, 862 F.2d 759, 764 (9th Cir. 1988) (an immediate post-towing
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hearing is not required by due process).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Grossman’s false
imprisonment claim because Grossman failed to raise a genuine dispute of material
fact as to whether defendant Popp acted without “lawful privilege.” See Young v.
County of Los Angeles, 655 F.3d 1156, 1169 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth elements
of false imprisonment claim under California law).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Grossman leave to
amend to add C.D. Vincent as a defendant because amendment would have been
futile. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (setting forth
standard of review).
AFFIRMED.
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