Niki-Alexander Shetty v. Wells Fargo Bank, Na , 696 F. App'x 828 ( 2017 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 24 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
NIKI-ALEXANDER SHETTY, No. 16-56207
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:16-cv-01514-AB-MRW
v.
MEMORANDUM*
WELLS FARGO BANK, NA, as Trustee
under Pooling and Servicing Agreement
dated 9/1/2006 Securitized Asset Backed
Receivables LLC Trust 2006-HE2 Mortgage
Pass- Through Certificates, Series 2006-
HE2, an entity of unknown form; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Andre Birotte, Jr., District Judge, Presiding
Submitted August 9, 2017**
Before: SCHROEDER, TASHIMA, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Niki-Alexander Shetty, aka Satish Shetty, appeals pro se from the district
court’s judgment dismissing his action alleging federal and state law claims
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
relating to a foreclosure and a third-party borrower’s refinance loans. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the district court’s
dismissal based on res judicata. Stewart v. U.S. Bancorp, 297 F.3d 953, 956 (9th
Cir. 2002). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Shetty’s action as barred by the
doctrine of res judicata because Shetty’s claims were raised, or could have been
raised, in prior actions between the parties or their privies, and those prior actions
resulted in final judgments on the merits. See id. (setting forth elements of res
judicata and noting that the doctrine of res judicata bars subsequent litigation both
of claims that were raised and those that could have been raised in a prior action);
see also Tahoe Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 322
F.3d 1064, 1081 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Even when the parties are not identical, privity
may exist if there is substantial identity between parties, that is, when there is
sufficient commonality of interest” (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted)).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by taking judicial notice of
federal and state court proceedings. See Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2); United States v.
Woods, 335 F.3d 993, 1000-01 (9th Cir. 2003) (setting forth standard of review);
U.S. ex rel. Robinson Rancheria Citizens Council v. Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 244,
248 (9th Cir. 1992) (explaining that a court “may take notice of proceedings in
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other courts, both within and without the federal judicial system, if those
proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue” (citation omitted)).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Shetty’s motion for
default judgment against GF Mortgage, Inc. See NewGen, LLC v. Safe Cig, LLC,
840 F.3d 606, 616 (9th Cir. 2016) (setting forth standard of review and factors
relevant to entering a default judgment).
We reject as unsupported by the record Shetty’s contention that the district
court did not rule on his motion to strike, and reject as meritless his contention that
the appearance of appellees’ counsel was not authorized.
Appellees’ request for judicial notice (Docket Entry No. 13) is granted in
part. With respect to Exhibit 2, we take judicial notice of only the fact that the
document was filed in the Southern District of New York in Hernandez v. Wells
Fargo Bank, N.A., et al., No. 1:14-cv -07701-VEC (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2014).
Appellees’ request for judicial notice is otherwise granted.
AFFIRMED.
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