Peter Mabie v. T. Hogan ( 2017 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS OCT 3 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
PETER MICHAEL MABIE, No. 17-15856
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 1:16-cv-01035-MJS
v.
MEMORANDUM*
T. HOGAN; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Michael J. Seng, Magistrate Judge, Presiding**
Submitted September 26, 2017***
Before: SILVERMAN, TALLMAN, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
California state prisoner Peter Michael Mabie appeals pro se from the
district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging excessive
force, retaliation, and free exercise claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
Mabie consented to proceed before a magistrate judge. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(c).
***
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
§ 1291. We review de novo a dismissal for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A. Hamilton v. Brown, 630 F.3d 889, 892 (9th Cir. 2011). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Mabie’s excessive force claim because
Mabie failed to allege facts sufficient to show that defendant Hogan acted
“maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-
7 (1992) (explaining elements of excessive force claim in prison context).
The district court properly dismissed Mabie’s free exercise claim because
Mabie failed to allege facts sufficient to show his practice of religion was
substantially burdened. See Jones v. Williams, 791 F.3d 1023, 1031 (9th Cir.
2015) (“A person asserting a free exercise claim must show that the government
action in question substantially burdens the person’s practice of [his] religion.”).
The district court properly dismissed Mabie’s retaliation claim because
Mabie failed to allege facts sufficient to show that defendant Hogan took adverse
action against him because of his engagement in protected conduct, or that any
such action by Hogan chilled Mabie’s exercise of his First Amendment rights. See
Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005) (explaining elements of
retaliation claim in prison context).
We do not consider Mabie’s arguments regarding defendant Perez because
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Mabie failed to replead claims against Perez in his second amended complaint.
See Chubb Custom Ins. Co. v. Space Sys./Loral, Inc., 710 F.3d 946, 973 n.14, 974
n.15 (9th Cir. 2013) (failure to replead claims after dismissal with leave to amend
amounts to waiver).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009). We do not
consider documents and facts not presented to the district court. See United States
v. Elias, 921 F.2d 870, 874 (9th Cir. 1990) (“Documents or facts not presented to
the district court are not part of the record on appeal.”).
AFFIRMED.
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