Douglas Woo v. Scottsdale Insurance Company ( 2017 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
APR 28 2017
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DOUGLAS WOO, an individual; No. 14-56992
ARTHUR MOORE, an individual;
BENSON LIN, an individual; JUAN D.C. No.
SALCEDO, an individual; JOHN ARAKI, 8:14-cv-00995-DOC-AN
an individual,
Plaintiffs-Appellants, MEMORANDUM*
v.
SCOTTSDALE INSURANCE
COMPANY, an Ohio corporation,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
David O. Carter, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted November 10, 2016
Pasadena, California
Before: O’SCANNLAIN and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges, and MARQUEZ,**
District Judge.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The Honorable Rosemary Marquez, United States District Judge for
the District of Arizona, sitting by designation.
Plaintiffs-Appellants Douglas Woo, Arthur Moore, Benson Lin, Juan
Salcedo, and John Araki (“Insureds”) sought declaratory relief and alleged
breaches of contract and the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing after
Defendant-Appellee Scottsdale Insurance Company (“Insurance Company”)
declined to defend against and provide coverage for a lawsuit brought against
Insureds. The United States District Court for the Central District of California
granted summary judgment in favor of the Insurance Company, and denied
summary judgment in favor of Insureds. Insureds now appeal.
We review de novo. Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir.
2001) (en banc); Moran v. Washington, 147 F.3d 839, 844 (9th Cir. 1998). “We
determine, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party, whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and whether the district
court correctly applied the relevant substantive law.” Oswalt v. Resolute Indus.,
Inc., 642 F.3d 856, 860 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Wallis v. Princess Cruises, Inc.,
306 F.3d 827, 832 (9th Cir. 2002)); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
The district court correctly granted the Insurance Company’s motion for
summary judgment and denied Insureds’ motion for summary judgment. At least
two clauses included in the parties’ insurance contract namely the exclusions for
prior knowledge and prior litigation expressly preclude coverage for the entirety of
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the Tatung lawsuit. The prior knowledge exclusion precludes coverage for the
Tatung suit because an insured, albeit not necessarily the Insureds here seeking
coverage, knew of the facts and circumstances from which the Tatung suit derived.
Similarly, the prior litigation exclusion precludes coverage for the Tatung suit
because the suit arose out of a demand letter issued before April 2010. Because
these exclusions render coverage impossible for any of the claims raised in the
Tatung lawsuit, Insurer has no duty to defend Insureds therein. See Montrose
Chem. Corp. v. Super. Ct., 861 P.2d 1153, 1157-59 (Cal. 1993).
AFFIRMED.
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