Safari Club International v. Becerra ( 2017 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       NOV 15 2017
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    SAFARI CLUB INTERNATIONAL,                      No.    16-15255
    Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. No.
    2:14-cv-01856-JAM-AC
    v.
    XAVIER BECERRA, Attorney General, in            MEMORANDUM*
    his official capacity as the Attorney General
    of California and CHARLTON H.
    BONHAM, in his official capacity as the
    Director of the California Department of
    Fish and Wildlife,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of California
    John A. Mendez, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted September 14, 2017
    San Francisco, California
    Before: GOULD and WATFORD, Circuit Judges, and SANDS,** District Judge.
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The Honorable W. Louis Sands, United States District Judge for the
    Middle District of Georgia, sitting by designation.
    Safari Club International challenges California’s prohibition on the
    importation, possession, and transportation of mountain lions in the state of
    California (the “Mountain Lion Prohibition” or “the Prohibition”). 
    Cal. Fish & Game Code § 4800
     et. seq. Safari Club asserts two issues on appeal: whether the
    district court erred by dismissing its dormant Commerce Clause claim, and
    whether the district court erred by dismissing its 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     claim.
    1.    Safari Club contends that it adequately alleged a plausible claim under the
    dormant Commerce Clause. We analyze dormant Commerce Clause claims under
    a two-tiered approach. First, we evaluate whether the law discriminates against or
    directly regulates interstate commerce. Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Cty. of
    Alameda, 
    768 F.3d 1037
    , 1041, 1044 (9th Cir. 2014). Second, under Pike v. Bruce
    Church, Inc., 
    397 U.S. 137
     (1970), we consider whether the burden imposed on
    interstate commerce is “clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.”
    
    Id. at 142
    .
    While Safari Club makes a number of allegations related to the effect of the
    Prohibition on interstate commerce and a small subset of residents in California, it
    does not allege that the Prohibition discriminates in favor of in-state interests. See
    Pac. Nw. Venison Producers v. Smitch, 
    20 F.3d 1008
    , 1012 (9th Cir. 1994). Nor
    could it make such a challenge. The Prohibition applies equally to in- and out-of-
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    state mountain lions, as well as in- and out-of-state residents. The district court
    correctly concluded that the Mountain Lion Prohibition is not discriminatory.
    Safari Club contends that the Prohibition substantially burdens interstate
    commerce because it discourages California residents from traveling to other states
    and countries to hunt mountain lions, and it prevents persons who have already
    hunted a mountain lion outside of California from shipping the animal’s remains to
    California. Safari Club alleged that 140 of its members would make plans to
    transport already harvested animals into California, hunt mountain lions outside of
    California, or provide services related to mountain lion hunting outside of
    California if the Prohibition were lifted.
    Although there is no absolute numeric test for determining whether a burden
    on interstate commerce is substantial, the survey responses of 100 or so persons in
    our view do not provide evidence of a substantial burden on interstate commerce.
    See Nat’l Ass’n of Optometrists & Opticians v. Harris, 
    682 F.3d 1144
    , 1149 (9th
    Cir. 2012). Safari Club estimates a burden based on the fact that 3.2% of its
    members said they were interested in possessing mountain lions in California—
    extrapolating that about 8,000 Californians would be interested in importing
    mountain lions hunted outside of California. But Safari Club gives no basis for
    why this small percentage of a specialty group is representative of all hunters in
    California, so it does not offer sufficient facts to allege a plausible claim.
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    Similarly, Safari Club’s projection of the revenue that would be generated from
    these interested persons’ ability to possess out-of-state harvested mountain lions
    did not allege an undue burden because it is extrapolated from Safari Club’s
    unsubstantiated estimate of California hunters’ interest. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, Inc.
    v. Davis, 
    307 F.3d 835
    , 858 (9th Cir. 2002), opinion amended on denial of
    reh’g, 
    312 F.3d 416
     (9th Cir. 2002). The district court did not err in concluding
    that Safari Club failed to allege a substantial burden on interstate commerce.
    Accordingly, the district court did not need to conduct a full Pike analysis.
    Pharm. Research & Mfrs., 768 F.3d at 1044 (noting that under Pike, a plaintiff
    must first show that the statute imposes a substantial burden before the court will
    determine whether the benefits of the challenged laws are illusory). Only after
    determining that the state law is discriminatory and there is an undue burden on
    interstate commerce do we need to undertake a full Pike analysis. Chinatown
    Neighborhood Ass’n v. Harris, 
    794 F.3d 1136
    , 1147 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. denied,
    
    136 S. Ct. 2448
    , 
    195 L. Ed. 2d 263
     (2016); see also Nat’l Ass’n of Optometrists,
    682 F.3d at 1156. The district court did not err in dismissing Safari Club’s suit for
    failure to state a claim.
    2.     Safari Club contends also that the district court erred by dismissing its
    Section 1983 claim based on alleged violations of the dormant Commerce Clause.
    Because the district court did not err in dismissing Safari Club’s dormant
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    Commerce Clause claim, the district court also did not err in dismissing its Section
    1983 claim. West v. Atkins, 
    487 U.S. 42
    , 48 (1988) (“To state a claim under §
    1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and
    laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was
    committed by a person acting under color of state law.”).
    AFFIRMED.
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