United States v. Cathleen Cantlon , 691 F. App'x 489 ( 2017 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
MAY 30 2017
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Nos. 16-30121
16-30190
Plaintiff-Appellee,
D.C. No.
v. 9:15-cr-00012-DLC-1
CATHLEEN ROSELYN CANTLON,
MEMORANDUM*
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Montana
Dana L. Christensen, Chief Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted May 18, 2017
Seattle, Washington
Before: GOULD and PAEZ, Circuit Judges, and LEMELLE,** District Judge.
Cathleen Cantlon (“Cantlon”) appeals the district court’s order denying her
motion for a new trial following her convictions for (1) interstate mailing of a
firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(e), and (2) possession of a firearm by a
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The Honorable Ivan L.R. Lemelle, United States District Judge for the
Eastern District of Louisiana, sitting by designation.
person who has been committed to a mental institution, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
922(g)(4). Cantlon argues that the possession conviction is invalid under the Fifth
Amendment because the Montana Supreme Court subsequently vacated the
underlying commitment order and directed the state district court to dismiss it. She
further argues that the evidence supporting the possession conviction led to
prejudicial spillover on the interstate mailing charge during trial. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s denial of a motion for a
new trial under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33. See United States v.
French, 748 F.3d 922, 934 (9th Cir. 2014); Fed. R. Crim. P. 33. Applying the law
of analogous felon-in-possession cases United States v. Padilla, 387 F.3d 1087,
1090–92 (9th Cir. 2004) and Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 60–65 (1980),
the district court ruled that the dismissal of Cantlon’s commitment order did not
operate retroactively to affect her conviction. As a result, her conviction was not
invalid. The court also ruled that there was no “prejudicial spillover,” reasoning
that the undisputed evidence at trial proved the mailing charge “without any
reference whatsoever to [Cantlon’s] mental health condition.” We agree.
1. In challenging her possession conviction, Cantlon’s attempts to
distinguish Padilla and Lewis fail. As Cantlon’s counsel conceded at argument,
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Cantlon had a right to a jury trial. And we conclude that the Montana trial court’s
“bare-bone[s]” commitment order was not vacated and dismissed for reasons any
less “technical” than those given in Padilla and Lewis. We agree with Cantlon that
the burden of proof is lower in involuntary commitment proceedings: clear and
convincing evidence is all that is required to prove the existence of a mental
disorder. See In re R.T., 665 P.2d 789, 790 (Mont. 1983). But Cantlon has not
explained why that fact should differentiate the instant case, especially in light of
the Supreme Court’s reading of the “sweeping” text and “broad” purpose of a
similar provision in the same statute at issue here. Lewis, 445 U.S. at 61, 64–65
(interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)). At the very least, the district court did not
abuse its discretion in applying Padilla and Lewis.
2. Turning to Cantlon’s mailing conviction, her argument is likewise
unpersuasive. Applying the Lazarenko factors, the balance of competing
considerations do not support a finding of prejudicial spillover. See United States
v. Lazarenko, 564 F.3d 1026, 1044 (9th Cir. 2009). The district court did not abuse
its discretion in reaching the same conclusion, especially, as the court noted, given
the strength of the government’s case.
AFFIRMED.
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