Floyd Perryman v. Jasdeep Bal , 691 F. App'x 881 ( 2017 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                         JUN 1 2017
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    FLOYD PERRYMAN,                                 No. 16-16705
    Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. No. 2:14-cv-00680-WBS-EFB
    v.
    JASDEEP BAL, Chief Medical Officer,             MEMORANDUM*
    CSP - Sacramento,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of California
    William B. Shubb, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted May 24, 2017**
    Before:      THOMAS, Chief Judge, and SILVERMAN and RAWLINSON,
    Circuit Judges.
    Floyd Perryman, a California state prisoner, appeals pro se from the district
    court’s summary judgment in his 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     action alleging deliberate
    indifference to his serious medical needs. We have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . We review de novo, Toguchi v. Chung, 
    391 F.3d 1051
    , 1056 (9th
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    Cir. 2004), and we affirm.
    The district court properly granted summary judgment because Perryman
    failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendant was
    deliberately indifferent to his thumb injury. See 
    id. at 1057-60
     (deliberate
    indifference is a high legal standard; a difference of medical opinion concerning
    the course of treatment, negligence, or medical malpractice does not amount to
    deliberate indifference); see also Starr v. Baca, 
    652 F.3d 1202
    , 1207 (9th Cir.
    2011) (supervisory liability under § 1983 requires “knowledge of and acquiescence
    in unconstitutional conduct” by subordinates).
    The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Perryman’s motion
    to amend his complaint because any amendment would be futile. See AE ex rel.
    Hernandez v. County of Tulare, 
    666 F.3d 631
    , 636 (9th Cir. 2012) (setting forth
    standard of review); Weilburg v. Shapiro, 
    488 F.3d 1202
    , 1205 (9th Cir. 2007)
    (dismissal of a pro se complaint without leave to amend is proper “if it is
    absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by
    amendment” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
    The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Perryman’s motion
    for additional discovery because Perryman did not demonstrate how additional
    discovery would defeat summary judgment. See Qualls By & Through Qualls v.
    Blue Cross of Cal., Inc., 
    22 F.3d 839
    , 844 (9th Cir. 1994) (setting forth standard of
    2                                      16-16705
    review and explaining that district court properly denied Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f) (now
    Rule 56(d)) motion where additional requested discovery would not have
    precluded summary judgment).
    The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Perryman’s motion
    for the appointment of medical experts because Perryman failed to show that such
    an appointment was necessary. See Walker v. Am. Home Shield Long Term
    Disability Plan, 
    180 F.3d 1065
    , 1070-71 (9th Cir. 1999) (setting forth standard of
    review and noting that district court has discretion to appoint an expert where such
    an appointment is necessary).
    AFFIRMED.
    3                                   16-16705