Rose Duncan v. Megan Brennan , 692 F. App'x 387 ( 2017 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 1 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ROSE DUNCAN, No. 16-16545
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:14-cv-01229-JCM-
GWF
v.
MEGAN J. BRENNAN, Postmaster MEMORANDUM*
General,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Nevada
James C. Mahan, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted May 24, 2017**
Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, and SILVERMAN and RAWLINSON,
Circuit Judges.
Rose Duncan appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing
her employment action alleging federal claims against her previous employer. We
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review for an abuse of discretion the
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
district court’s dismissal for failure to serve a summons and complaint in a timely
manner. Puett v. Blandford, 912 F.2d 270, 273 (9th Cir. 1990). We affirm.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Duncan’s action
for failure to effectuate timely service because Duncan failed to show good cause
for her non-compliance with the service requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 4.
Specifically, Duncan did not provide the U.S. Marshals with summonses for all of
the recipients required under Rule 4(i)(1)-(2) until two months after the district
court directly advised her whom to serve, and seven months after the district
court’s extension of the service deadline. See Wei v. Hawaii, 763 F.2d 370, 372
(9th Cir. 1985) (“[Rule 4] places the burden of showing good cause for failure to
meet the [service] deadline upon the party on whose behalf service was required.”);
see also Townsel v. Contra Costa County, 820 F.2d 319, 320 (9th Cir. 1987) (“To
hold that complete ignorance of [Rule 4] constitutes good cause for untimely
service would allow the good cause exception to swallow the rule.”).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Duncan’s first
request for appointment of counsel. See Agyeman v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 390 F.3d
1101, 1102-03 (9th Cir. 2004) (the decision to appoint counsel is “within the sound
discretion of the trial court and is granted only in exceptional circumstances”
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
We lack jurisdiction to review the district court’s order denying Duncan’s
2 16-16545
second request for appointment of counsel. See Whitaker v. Garcetti, 486 F.3d
572, 585 (9th Cir. 2007) (discussing the requirement to file an amended or new
notice of appeal in order to contest an issue arising after filing an earlier notice of
appeal).
We reject as without merit Duncan’s contention relating to Brennan’s notice
of claim.
AFFIRMED.
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