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 2017-06

Mann v. Structured Asset Mortgage Investment II Trust 2007-AR3 , 692 F. App'x 416 ( 2017 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        JUN 5 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CHAUNCEY LUTHER MANN, III,                      No. 15-56379
Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. No. 5:14-cv-01723-JGB-SP
v.
MEMORANDUM*
STRUCTURED ASSET MORTGAGE
INVESTMENT II TRUST 2007-AR3,
MORTGAGE PASS-THROUGH
CERTIFICATES SERIES 2007-AR3; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Jesus G. Bernal, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted May 24, 2017**
Before:      THOMAS, Chief Judge, and SILVERMAN and RAWLINSON,
Circuit Judges.
Chauncey Luther Mann, III, appeals pro se from the district court’s
judgment dismissing his action alleging federal and state law claims arising from
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
foreclosure proceedings. We have jurisdiction under
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . We
review de novo the district court’s dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
Dumas v. Kipp,
    90 F.3d 386
    , 389 (9th Cir. 1996). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Mann’s Truth in Lending Act
(“TILA”) and Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act (“HOEPA”) rescission
claim, and fraud claims seeking declaratory relief, because these claims are time-
barred. See
    15 U.S.C. § 1635
    (f) (borrower has three years to rescind under TILA);
    15 U.S.C. § 1640
    (e) (one-year statute of limitations for TILA and HOEPA
damages claim);
    Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §§ 337
    (1), (3) (four-year statute of
limitations for action seeking rescission based on fraud); Miguel v. Country
Funding Corp.,
    309 F.3d 1161
    , 1165 (9th Cir. 2002) (borrower’s rescission under
TILA not effective when it was not provided to the lender within three years, even
though servicer received the notice within the three-year window).
The district court properly dismissed Mann’s quiet title claim because
Mann’s failed to allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief. See
Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
    556 U.S. 662
    , 678 (2009) (plaintiff must plead sufficient factual
matter to allow the court to draw a reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable).
The district court properly dismissed Mann’s claim related to the
securitization of his loan because Mann has not established that he has standing to
2                                     15-56379
bring such a claim. See Hess v. Ford Motor Co.,
    41 P.3d 46
    , 51 (Cal. 2002) (third
party may enforce a contract only if the contract was made for its benefit); see also
Yvanova v. New Century Mortg. Corp.,
    365 P.3d 845
    , 858 (Cal. 2016) (plaintiff
bringing wrongful foreclosure claim has standing only when challenging a void
assignment).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mann leave to
amend because amendment would be futile. See Owens v. Kaiser Found. Health
Plan, Inc.,
    244 F.3d 708
    , 712 (9th Cir. 2001) (standard of review); Dumas,
    90 F.3d at 389
     (leave to amend may be denied where amendment would be futile).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in granting the motion to set
aside default because it properly found that defendants established meritorious
defenses. See United States v. Signed Personal Check No. 730 of Yubran S. Mesle,
    615 F.3d 1085
    , 1091, 1094 (9th Cir. 2010) (setting forth the three-factor test to
determine whether good cause exists to set aside default and noting that to
establish a meritorious defense, a party only has to “allege sufficient facts that, if
true, would constitute a defense”); Franchise Holding II, LLC v. Huntington Rests.
Grp., Inc.,
    375 F.3d 922
    , 925 (9th Cir. 2004) (standard of review).
We reject as without merit Mann’s contentions that the district court was
biased against him.
We do not consider Mann’s contentions regarding the district court’s order
3                                     15-56379
denying Mann’s motion for reconsideration because Mann failed to file a new or
amended notice of appeal after the district court issued this order. See Fed. R.
App. P. 4(1)(A) (notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days after entry of the
judgment or order appealed from).
Mann’s request for judicial notice (Docket Entry No. 34) is denied.
AFFIRMED.
4                                   15-56379