Harold Harter v. E.K. McDaniel ( 2017 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                         JUN 6 2017
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    HAROLD HARTER,                                  No. 16-17101
    Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. No. 3:16-cv-00118-RCJ-WGC
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    E.K. McDANIEL, Warden; et al.,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Nevada
    Robert Clive Jones, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted May 24, 2017**
    Before:      THOMAS, Chief Judge, and SILVERMAN and RAWLINSON,
    Circuit Judges.
    Harold Harter appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment in his 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     action alleging equal protection and due process claims in
    connection with parole consideration. We have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . We review for an abuse of discretion a dismissal for failure to prosecute.
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    Edwards v. Marin Park, Inc., 
    356 F.3d 1058
    , 1063 (9th Cir. 2004). We affirm.
    The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Harter’s action
    for failure to prosecute because Harter was given leave to amend his complaint and
    he failed to do so. See Edwards, 
    356 F.3d at 1065
     (“The failure of the plaintiff
    eventually to respond to the court’s ultimatum – either by amending the complaint
    or by indicating to the court that it will not do so – is properly met with the
    sanction of a Rule 41(b) dismissal.”); Yourish v. Cal. Amplifier, 
    191 F.3d 983
    , 989
    (9th Cir. 1999) (listing factors to be considered in dismissing a case as a sanction
    for failure to prosecute).
    Because Harter’s action was dismissed as a sanction for failure to prosecute,
    the dismissal of his due process claim is not reviewable. See Al-Torki v. Kaempen,
    
    78 F.3d 1381
    , 1386 (9th Cir. 1996) (“[I]nterlocutory orders, generally appealable
    after final judgment, are not appealable after a dismissal for failure to
    prosecute[.]”).
    AFFIRMED.
    2                                      16-17101
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 16-17101

Judges: Thomas, Silverman, Rawlinson

Filed Date: 6/6/2017

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024