SolarCity Corp. v. Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement & Power District , 692 F. App'x 458 ( 2017 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 12 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
SOLARCITY CORPORATION, No. 15-17302
Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No. 2:15-cv-00374-DLR
v.
MEMORANDUM *
SALT RIVER PROJECT
AGRICULTURAL IMPROVEMENT AND
POWER DISTRICT,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Douglas L. Rayes, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted November 18, 2016
San Francisco, California
Before: KOZINSKI, GILMAN,* * and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.
We lack jurisdiction to consider the Power District’s arguments based on
Arizona Revised Statutes section 12-820.01. That section establishes an immunity
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The Honorable Ronald Lee Gilman, United States Circuit Judge for
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation.
against claims for damages, but not against claims for injunctive relief.
AlliedSignal, Inc. v. City of Phoenix, 182 F.3d 692, 697 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing
Zeigler v. Kirschner, 781 P.2d 54, 61 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989)). SolarCity’s claims
for antitrust damages were dismissed, and neither it nor the Power District has
appealed that decision. SolarCity also abandoned its previously asserted claim for
tort damages in favor of an earlier trial. Thus, section 12-820.01 can become
relevant only after judgment is entered, if at all—for example, if SolarCity
eventually appeals the district court’s order dismissing its damages claims. The
Power District’s current appeal of the issue is thus not ripe. 1 See, e.g., Mohawk
Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 106 (2009) (emphasizing that a collateral
order can be appealed only if review would be ineffective after final judgment);
Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. 296, 300 (1998) (“A claim is not ripe for
adjudication if it rests upon ‘contingent future events that may not occur as
anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.’” (quoting Thomas v. Union Carbide
Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 580-81 (1985))).
Lastly, as to the filed-rate doctrine, the Power District argues only that we
have pendent jurisdiction to consider its appeal. We cannot have pendent
1
The Power District’s motion for judicial notice is accordingly denied as moot.
2
jurisdiction without appellate jurisdiction over some other matter—which we lack
for the reasons stated above and in our concurrently filed opinion.
DISMISSED.
3