R. Abcarian v. Meldon Levine , 693 F. App'x 487 ( 2017 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        JUL 3 2017
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    R. ABCARIAN; R. REYES; H. REYES,                No.    16-56765
    Plaintiffs-Appellants,          D.C. No.
    2:16-cv-07106-GHK-JPR
    v.
    MELDON EDISES LEVINE; WILLIAM     MEMORANDUM*
    WATSON FUNDERBURK, Jr.; JILL
    BANKS BARAD; MICHAEL F.
    FLEMING; CHRISTINA E. NOONAN;
    DAVID H. WRIGHT; MARCIE L. JAMES-
    KIRBY EDWARDS; JOSEPH A.
    BRAJEVICH; ERIC GARCETTI;
    GILBERT CEDILLO; PAUL
    KREKORIAN; BOB BLUMENFIELD;
    DAVID E. RYU; PAUL KORETZ; NURY
    MARTINEZ; FELIPE FUENTES;
    MARQUEECE HARRIS-DAWSON;
    CURREN D. PRICE; HERB J. WESSON,
    Jr.; MIKE BONIN; MITCHELL
    ENGLANDER; MITCH O'FARRELL;
    JOSE HUIZAR; JOE BUSCAINO;
    MICHAEL NELSON FEUER; JAMES
    PATRICK CLARK; TWENTY UNKOWN
    NAMED DEFENDANTS,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Central California
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    George H. King, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted June 9, 2017
    Pasadena, California
    Before: LIPEZ,** BEA, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
    As the result of Proposition 26, approved by voters in 2010, the California
    constitution prohibits local governments from imposing taxes without first
    submitting them for approval through a popular vote. Cal. Const. art. XIII C, § 2.
    A "tax" is defined to include "any levy, charge, or exaction of any kind imposed by
    a local government," but not "[a] charge imposed for a specific government service"
    that "does not exceed the reasonable costs to the local government of providing the
    service." Cal. Const. art. XIII C, § 1(e). This putative class action by ratepayers of
    the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power ("DWP"), against various
    individual officials and employees of DWP and the City of Los Angeles (the "City")
    who manage or administer the DWP or its setting of electricity rates, alleges that
    DWP charges rates in excess of its costs and then transfers its excess revenue to the
    City's General Fund, in violation of the California constitution.
    A consolidated class action previously filed in California state court also
    challenges DWP's rates and transfers. See Eck v. City of Los Angeles (LASC No.
    **
    The Honorable Kermit V. Lipez, United States Circuit Judge for the
    First Circuit, sitting by designation.
    2
    BC577028). The district court granted defendants' motion to stay this federal
    litigation under the Colorado River abstention doctrine, denied plaintiffs' motion to
    preliminarily enjoin defendants from charging rates above DWP's costs and from
    making future transfers to the General Fund, and denied plaintiffs' motion for a
    preliminary injunction staying the state court litigation. We have jurisdiction over
    plaintiffs' appeal of the district court's decision staying the case as a final order under
    
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    , and over their appeal of the district court's denial of their motions
    for preliminary injunctions under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1292
    (a)(1). We affirm.
    1. The district court properly stayed the case under Colorado River Water
    Conservation Dist. v. United States, 
    424 U.S. 800
     (1976). Given the pending state
    court litigation addressing the same underlying state constitutional issue, staying the
    case promotes "(w)ise judicial administration, giving regard to conservation of
    judicial resources and comprehensive disposition of litigation" because it provides
    an opportunity for the state court to rule on an important, and potentially dispositive,
    issue uniquely within its expertise. 
    Id. at 817
     (alteration in original) (quoting
    Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C-O-Two Fire Equip. Co., 
    342 U.S. 180
    , 183 (1952)). Exact
    parallelism between the federal and state actions is not required for a Colorado River
    stay, and the two cases here are "substantially similar." Nakash v. Marciano, 
    882 F.2d 1411
    , 1416 (9th Cir. 1989); see also Clark v. Lacy, 
    376 F.3d 682
    , 686 (7th Cir.
    2004) ("Parties with 'nearly identical' interests are considered 'substantially the same'
    3
    for Colorado River purposes." (quoting Caminiti & Iatarola, Ltd. v. Behnke
    Warehousing, Inc., 
    962 F.2d 698
    , 700-01 (7th Cir. 1992))).1
    2. The district court properly refused to enjoin defendants from charging
    existing power and water rates and from transferring DWP funds to the City's
    General Fund because plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that the balance of equities
    tipped in their favor or that an injunction would serve the public interest. See Winter
    v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 
    555 U.S. 7
    , 20 (2008); DISH Network Corp. v. FCC,
    
    653 F.3d 771
    , 776 (9th Cir. 2011) (a plaintiff "must demonstrate that it meets all four
    of the elements of the preliminary injunction test established in Winter").
    3. The district court's refusal to enter an injunction staying the state court
    litigation in favor of this case was also proper. Plaintiffs have offered no coherent
    argument otherwise. See, e.g., Aramark Facility Servs. v. Serv. Emps. Int'l Union,
    Local 1877, AFL CIO, 
    530 F.3d 817
    , 824 n.2 (9th Cir. 2008) (arguments not
    adequately briefed are waived).
    AFFIRMED.
    1
    We were advised at oral argument of a possible settlement of the state action.
    The parties should advise the district court of any developments in the state action
    that may impact the status of this case.
    4