Hyeonjoo Mundkowsky v. County of Los Angeles , 693 F. App'x 594 ( 2017 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL 5 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
HYEONJOO MUNDKOWSKY, (H.M.), No. 15-56147
Individual,
D.C. No. 2:14-cv-00599-CAS-CW
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. MEMORANDUM*
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, a Public
Entity; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Christina A. Snyder, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted June 26, 2017**
Before: PAEZ, BEA, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.
Hyeonjoo Mundkowsky appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment
dismissing her 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 action alleging various federal and
state law claims stemming from custody proceedings. We have jurisdiction
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Cafasso, U.S. ex rel. v. Gen.
Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1053, 1055 n.4 (9th Cir. 2011) (dismissal
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) or 12(c)); First Nat’l Bank v.
Russell (In re Russell), 76 F.3d 242, 244 (9th Cir. 1996) (dismissal based on
collateral estoppel). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Claims 1, 2, and 3 of Mundkowsky’s
complaint as barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. See In re Russell, 76
F.3d at 244-45 (setting forth elements of collateral estoppel under California law);
see also In re Joshua J., 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 491, 497 (Ct. App. 1995) (giving
preclusive effect to prior judgment of dependency court).
The district court properly dismissed Claims 4, 6, and 7 of Mundkowsky’s
complaint because Mundkowsky failed to allege facts sufficient to state a plausible
claim for relief. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (plaintiff must
plead sufficient factual matter to allow the court to draw a reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Mundkowsky’s
remaining state law claims. See Notrica v. Bd. of Sup’rs of Cty. of San Diego, 925
F.2d 1211, 1213-14 (9th Cir. 1991) (setting forth standard of review and explaining
that judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to litigants should be considered
in deciding whether to hear pendant state law claims).
2 15-56147
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Mundkowsky’s
applications for entry of default judgment. See Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470,
1471-72 (9th Cir. 1986) (setting forth the standard of review and factors for
determining whether to enter default judgment).
We do not consider any arguments not specifically and distinctly raised in
the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
All pending motions are denied.
AFFIRMED.
3 15-56147