Jean Ordonez-Garay v. Jefferson Sessions ( 2018 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
JAN 22 2018
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JEAN CARLOS ORDONEZ-GARAY, No. 14-72311
Petitioner, Agency No. A079-152-042
v.
MEMORANDUM*
JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Argued and Submitted November 17, 2017
San Francisco, California
Before: LEAVY, W. FLETCHER, and PAEZ, Circuit Judges.
Jean Carlos Ordonez-Garay petitions for review from a Board of
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision upholding the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”)
denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against
Torture, and affirming the Immigration Judge’s determination that he is
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii). We have jurisdiction under 8
U.S.C. § 1252, and we grant the petition.
Ordonez-Garay first raises claims of ineffective assistance of counsel by two
attorneys. “Ineffective assistance of counsel amounts to a violation of due process
if ‘the proceeding was so fundamentally unfair that the alien was prevented from
reasonably presenting his case.’ ” Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785, 793 (9th
Cir. 2005) (quoting Maravilla Maravilla v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 855, 858 (9th Cir.
2004)). “To make out an ineffective assistance claim, an immigrant must show (1)
that counsel's performance was deficient, and (2) that counsel's deficiency caused
prejudice.” Nehad v. Mukasey, 535 F.3d 962, 967 (9th Cir. 2008). We find
prejudice where counsel’s deficient performance may have affected the outcome of
the proceedings; we do not require petitioners to show “that the counsel's
ineffectiveness definitively changed the outcome.” Mohammed, 400 F.3d at 793.
Ordonez-Garay’s first attorney conceded before the IJ that Ordonez-Garay
had falsely claimed to be a United States citizen. An attorney is not ineffective in
conceding damaging facts where she comes to her decision “after carefully
weighing all the relevant facts and exploring the available legal options.” Santiago-
Rodriguez v. Holder, 657 F.3d 820, 832 (9th Cir. 2011). Here, however, nothing in
the hearing transcripts or in the attorney’s response to Ordonez-Garay’s inquiry
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letter suggests that she explored the possibility of raising a retraction defense to the
false claim to citizenship, despite a clear basis for such a defense in the documents
at her disposal, and even though a finding of inadmissibility based on a false claim
to citizenship has the “drastic impact” of acting as a “lifetime bar” to admissibility.
See Munoz-Avila v.Holder, 716 F.3d 976, 981 (7th Cir. 2013). This failure to
consider an obvious basis for relief fell below an objective standard of professional
competence and was therefore deficient.
In spite of the first attorney’s concessions, the IJ exercised her discretion to
permit Ordonez-Garay’s second attorney to put on evidence regarding the charged
false claim to citizenship. See 8 C.F.R. § 1240.10(c), (d). Although the second
attorney had ample resources and adequate opportunity to prepare a defense, he
refused “on principle” to offer any evidence or elicit testimony from his client, due
to an utterly unsupported belief that his client’s due process rights had been
violated. “An attorney's ‘unreasonable failure to investigate and present the factual
and legal basis of her client's claim would itself amount to ineffective assistance of
counsel.’ ” Ahmed v. Mukasey, 548 F.3d 768, 773 (9th Cir. 2008) (alterations
omitted) (quoting Jie Lin v. Ashcroft, 377 F.3d 1014, 1025 (9th Cir. 2004)).
Ordonez-Garay’s second counsel’s failure to contest the charge of falsely claiming
citizenship fell below an objective standard of professional competence.
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These attorneys’ deficiencies prejudiced Ordonez-Garay. Ordonez-Garay
has a colorable claim that he was unaware of the connection between Puerto Rican
birth and United States citizenship, as well as a potentially viable retraction
defense. The IJ properly signaled her willingness to listen to Ordonez-Garay’s
version of events at the border rather than relying solely on the Record of Sworn
Statement. Had Ordonez-Garay’s attorneys performed competently, they may have
defeated the charge. We therefore hold that both of Ordonez-Garay’s attorneys
rendered ineffective assistance of counsel.
Concessions in removal proceedings are not binding if the concessions were
made under “egregious circumstances,” including where the concessions “were the
result of unreasonable professional judgment.” Santiago-Rodriguez v. Holder, 657
F.3d 820, 830-32 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Matter of Velasquez, 19 I. & N. Dec. 377(BIA 1986)). Because counsel was ineffective in conceding the false claim charge,
Ordonez is free, on remand, to present evidence regarding his intent,
unencumbered by the improper concessions of his prior attorney.
We therefore grant the petition and order that Ordonez-Garay be permitted
to amend the pleadings and to offer evidence on the false claim to citizenship
charge, including evidence on whether his retraction was timely.
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We also note four errors in the decisions below. First, the BIA found that
“[b]y the time the respondent failed primary inspection, and was referred to
secondary, the opportunity to timely recant had passed.” We construe this
statement to mean that Ordonez-Garay could not, as a matter of law, timely recant
following primary inspection. See Ruiz-Del-Cid v. Holder, 765 F.3d 635, 639 (6th
Cir. 2014) (treating similar language by BIA regarding timely recantation as a
question of law). Reviewing de novo, see Fakhry v. Mukasey, 524 F.3d 1057,
1062 (9th Cir. 2008); Delgado v. Holder, 648 F.3d 1095, 1106, n.15 (9th Cir.
2011) (en banc), we hold that the BIA incorrectly stated the law. Our case law
requires only that a retraction be made with sufficient promptness that “an
intention to deceive cannot rightly be drawn." See Llanos-Senarillos v. United
States, 177 F.2d 164, 165-66 (9th Cir. 1949). The 2.5-hour period that passed
between the alleged false statement and the retraction, does not, standing alone,
make his recantation untimely. See, e.g., Ruiz-Del-Cid, 765 F.3d at 638-39, 641
(holding that recantation was timely despite four-year gap, as petitioner retracted
false statement absent actual or imminent exposure).
Second, substantial evidence does not support the IJ’s factual findings. The
IJ incorrectly determined that “[w]hen the officer found documents belonging to
Respondent and his brother, Respondent and his brother then admitted that they
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were from Venezuela.” The only evidence establishing a timeline, the Incident
Report from the secondary inspection point, unambiguously states that Ordonez-
Garay had already retracted by the time the agent discovered the documents. Cf.
Valadez-Munoz v. Holder, 623 F.3d 1304, 1310 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[W]hen a person
supposedly recants only when confronted with evidence of his prevarication,”
recantation doctrine is unavailable).
Third, the BIA applied the wrong legal standard to Ordonez-Garay’s asylum
and withholding claims based on membership in the particular social group
“military deserters.” Ordonez-Garay testified to reports from other soldiers that
deserters were locked in a room indefinitely and beaten with sticks, and other
reports from his sister that deserters were sometimes shot in the street. On appeal,
the BIA upheld the IJ’s denial of relief on the ground that Ordonez-Garay’s
testimony about the treatment of deserters was “not supported by the country
conditions evidence of record.” In pre-REAL ID Act cases like the one at bar, see
Joseph v. Holder, 600 F.3d 1235, 1240 n.3 (9th Cir. 2010), the BIA is prohibited
from requiring that the petitioner produce general country conditions evidence to
corroborate credible testimony. Ladha v. I.N.S., 215 F.3d 889, 900-01 (9th Cir.
2000). The IJ found Ordonez-Garay credible, and the BIA accepted that
determination. See Edu v. Holder, 624 F.3d 1137, 1143, n.5 (9th Cir. 2010)
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(holding that BIA had "accepted" IJ's favorable credibility determination where
BIA did not explicitly determine credibility and no adverse credibility
determination was made). On remand, the IJ and BIA should consider our recent
decisions in Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, 707 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc),
Madrigal v. Holder, 716 F.3d 499 (9th Cir. 2013), and Barajas-Romero v. Lynch,
846 F.3d 351 (9th Cir. 2017), in determining whether “military deserters” are a
particular social group and whether Ordonez-Garay is eligible for relief.
Fourth, the IJ abused her discretion in denying Ordonez-Garay’s motion to
reopen on the basis of changed personal circumstances and changed country
conditions. The IJ applied the wrong legal standard in requiring that the evidence
“show a fundamental change of circumstances.” (emphasis in original). The
proffered evidence need only have been “material.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(3). The
IJ further erred in concluding that evidence showing an “intensifying of [country]
conditions” cannot warrant a motion to reopen. See Malty v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d
942, 945-46 (9th Cir. 2004). Because the BIA applied the correct legal standard on
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de novo review, however, this second error was harmless.1 See Singh v. Holder,
591 F.3d 1190, 1198 (9th Cir. 2010).
Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s determination that Ordonez-Garay
was not persecuted in the past on the basis of political opinion, and similarly, that
he has not established a well-founded fear of persecution on account of political
opinion. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13. Substantial evidence also
supports the BIA’s determination that Ordonez-Garay failed to show that it is more
likely than not that he will be tortured if returned to Venezuela. See 8 C.F.R. §
208.16(b); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2).
GRANTED in part, DENIED in part, and REMANDED on an open record
for further proceedings consistent with this disposition.
1
We take judicial notice, Gafoor v. INS, 231 F.3d 645, 655-56 (9th Cir.
2000), of the fact that in the years since the BIA’s decision, Nicolás Maduro has
replaced Hugo Chávez as President of Venezuela, and that Venezuela is currently
undergoing significant political and economic turmoil. Our decision today is not
intended to pass upon the merits of any potential future motion to reopen, should
Ordonez-Garay file one.
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