L.R. Bretz v. Helena Elderhousing, Inc. , 623 F. App'x 502 ( 2015 )


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  •                                                                             FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                             NOV 30 2015
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    L. R. BRETZ, personal representative of          No. 13-35028
    Charles L. Caddell,
    D.C. No. 6:12-cv-00048-DLC
    Plaintiff - Appellant,
    v.                                              MEMORANDUM*
    HELENA ELDERHOUSING, INC.; et al.,
    Defendants - Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Montana
    Dana L. Christensen, Chief Judge, Presiding
    Submitted November 18, 2015**
    Before:        TASHIMA, OWENS, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.
    L. R. Bretz, personal representative of Charles L. Caddell, appeals pro se
    from the district court’s judgment dismissing Caddell’s action alleging various
    claims related to his residence in housing owned by Helena Elderhousing, Inc. We
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under 28
    U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) for failure to state a claim, Barren v. Harrington, 
    152 F.3d 1193
    , 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (order), and we affirm.
    Contrary to Caddell’s contentions, the magistrate judge properly conducted a
    preliminary screening of Caddell’s complaint as required by 28 U.S.C.
    § 1915(e)(2), and properly dismissed Caddell’s federal claims because Caddell
    failed to allege facts sufficient to state any plausible claims. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
    
    556 U.S. 662
    , 678 (2009) (to avoid dismissal, “a complaint must contain sufficient
    factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
    face” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); see also West v. Atkins, 
    487 U.S. 42
    , 48 (1988) (“To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the
    violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and
    must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under
    color of state law.”); Saxton v. Hous. Auth. of City of Tacoma, 
    1 F.3d 881
    , 883-84
    (9th Cir. 1993) (requirements for stating a claim under § 1983 alleging that public
    housing officials failed to provide grievance hearings to public housing tenants).
    Dismissal of Caddell’s state law claims was not an abuse of discretion in the
    absence of any cognizable federal claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (a district
    court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims upon
    2                                      13-35028
    the dismissal of the federal claims); Tritchler v. County of Lake, 
    358 F.3d 1150
    ,
    1153 (9th Cir. 2004) (standard of review).
    We reject Caddell’s argument that the magistrate judge was biased or
    prejudiced.
    We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
    appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 
    587 F.3d 983
    , 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
    AFFIRMED.
    3                                   13-35028