Alvaro Ramos-Diaz v. Loretta E. Lynch , 632 F. App'x 397 ( 2016 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT JAN 26 2016
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ALVARO MOISES RAMOS-DIAZ, No. 14-70498
Petitioner, Agency No. A200-670-941
v.
MEMORANDUM*
LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted January 20, 2016**
Before: CANBY, TASHIMA, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.
Alvaro Moises Ramos-Diaz, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for
review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing his appeal
from an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) denial of a continuance. We have jurisdiction
under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for abuse of discretion the denial of a motion to
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
continue and review de novo claims of due process violations. Sandoval-Luna v.
Mukasey, 526 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 2008) (per curiam). We deny the petition
for review.
The agency did not abuse its discretion by denying Ramos-Diaz’s motion for
a continuance to seek post-conviction relief because Ramos-Diaz failed to
demonstrate good cause. See Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1264, 1274 (9th Cir. 2011)
(“[A]n IJ ‘may grant a motion for continuance for good cause shown.’” (citation
omitted)). Ramos-Diaz conceded removability, he was ineligible for the relief
sought, and collateral post-conviction relief remained a merely speculative
possibility at the time of his final hearing. See id. (“[T]he IJ [is] not required to
grant a continuance based on . . . speculations.”).
Ramos-Diaz’s due process claim concerning voluntary departure fails
because he has not established prejudice. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(b)(1)(B) (requiring
a good moral character showing to receive voluntary departure); Colmenar v. INS,
210 F.3d 967, 971 (9th Cir. 2000) (requiring prejudice to prevail on a due process
challenge).
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.
2 14-70498