Mamikon Karapetian v. Kia Motors America , 633 F. App'x 476 ( 2016 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
MAR 21 2016
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MAMIKON KARAPETIAN, No. 14-55457
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 8:08-cv-00227-CJC-
RNB
v.
KIA MOTORS AMERICA, INC., MEMORANDUM*
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Cormac J. Carney, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted March 9, 2016**
Pasadena, California
Before: REINHARDT, MURGUIA, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.
Mamikon Karapetian appeals the district court’s order denying his requests
for a judgment debtor examination under Cal. Code Civ. P. § 708.110(a) and for
attorney’s fees under Cal. Civ. Code § 1794(d). Reviewing the district court’s
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
legal determinations de novo, Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Chrysler Grp., LLC, 809 F.3d
1092, 1096 (9th Cir. 2016), and its denial of attorney’s fees under California law
for abuse of discretion, Doppes v. Bentley Motors, Inc., 94 Cal. Rptr. 3d 802, 828
(Ct. App. 2009), we affirm.
1. Karapetian was not entitled to a judgment debtor examination. A judgment
creditor’s right to a judgment debtor examination is not absolute, as a court may
prevent an examination and grant a protective order “as justice may require.” Cal.
Code Civ. P. § 708.200. More fundamentally, there must be a debt to collect. See
Cal. Code Civ. P. § 680.240 (“‘Judgment creditor’ means the person in whose
favor a judgment is rendered.”). Kia paid the $205,675.23 attorney’s fee award
ordered by the district court. Karapetian’s attorney, Martin Anderson, never asked
the court for an award of post-judgment interest, nor would he tell Kia how much
he wanted even after the company paid the attorney’s fee award and repeatedly
asked him to provide an interest calculation. The district court did not err in
rejecting a judgment debtor examination over an indeterminate amount that, in his
papers before the district court, Anderson suggested would amount to no more than
a few hundred dollars. Like the California Court of Appeal in another case
involving Anderson’s attempt to force a judgment debtor examination of a multi-
national corporation’s president over a few hundred dollars, “[w]e cannot fathom
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any legitimate reason for such a statutory procedure under the circumstances of this
case, given the minimal amount and questionable provenance of the ‘debt,’ and
[Kia’]s obvious ability to pay.” Hyundai Motor Am. v. Superior Court, 185 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 349, 355 (Ct. App. 2015)
2. The district court acted well within its discretion in denying Anderson’s
request for additional attorney’s fees. Doppes, 94 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 828 (“The
experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services
rendered in his or her court, and while his or her judgment is of course subject to
review, it will not be disturbed unless the appellate court is convinced that it is
clearly wrong.” (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted)). California
courts have consistently held that trial courts are not required to issue a statement
of decision for attorney’s fee awards. See Ketchum v. Moses, 17 P.3d 735, 747
(Cal. 2001); Christian Research Inst. v. Alnor, 81 Cal. Rptr. 3d 866, 872 (Ct. App.
2008). The district court nonetheless stated its reasons for denying attorney’s fees,
and those reasons are amply supported by the record.
Anderson’s conduct in this case was patently unreasonable, if not harassing
and frivolous. The record shows, for example, that Anderson needlessly prolonged
the dispute over the post-judgment interest amount. Even after Kia paid the
$205,675.23 attorney’s fee award, Anderson persisted in his request for post-
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judgment interest while stubbornly refusing to state how much he actually wanted.
Nothing prevented him from giving Kia a simple estimate, especially after Kia
repeatedly asked for a calculation and even made an offer to pay post-judgment
interest. Anderson instead dragged out the issue as long as possible, quite
evidently inflating the bill he would later attempt to force Kia to pay.
Trying to keep Kia from selling vehicles throughout California or to hale its
president into court over a questionable post-judgment interest “debt” amounting
to no more than a few hundred dollars hardly amounts to work that was “useful and
of a type ordinarily necessary to secure the litigation’s final result.” Meister v.
Regents of Univ. of Cal., 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 913, 925 (Ct. App. 1998) (quoting
Stewart v. Gates, 987 F.2d 1450, 1452 (9th Cir. 1993)). Nor was the district court
required to consider billings Anderson could have easily submitted in earlier fee
requests.
We endorse the California Court of Appeal’s “cautionary note about
litigation tactics,” and also question whether this case “is a wise use of anyone’s
resources.” Hyundai, 185 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 355–56. As that court observed with
respect to Anderson’s disturbingly familiar pattern of conduct, “[n]ature, not
judges, should be in charge of making mountains out of mole hills.” Id. at 351
(quoting Crum v. City of Stockton, 157 Cal. Rptr. 823, 826 (Ct. App. 1979)
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(Reynoso, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). We echo that sentiment
here.
AFFIRMED.
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