Gregory Mergenthaler v. Kilolo Kijakazi ( 2021 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       AUG 24 2021
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    GREGORY J. MERGENTHALER,                        No.    19-35877
    Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. No. 9:19-cv-00007-KLD
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner
    of Social Security,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Montana
    Kathleen Louise DeSoto, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted October 6, 2020
    Portland, Oregon
    Before: PAEZ and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges, and PREGERSON,** District
    Judge.
    Gregory Mergenthaler (“Mergenthaler”) appeals the district court’s
    judgment affirming the Social Security Commissioner’s partial denial of his
    applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The Honorable Dean D. Pregerson, United States District Judge for
    the Central District of California, sitting by designation.
    benefits under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act, 
    42 U.S.C. §§ 401
    –03,
    1381–83. We have jurisdiction under 
    12 U.S.C. § 1291
    . “We review the district
    court’s order affirming the ALJ’s denial of social security benefits de novo and
    will disturb the denial of benefits only if the decision ‘contains legal error or is not
    supported by substantial evidence.’” Ford v. Saul, 
    950 F.3d 1141
    , 1153–54 (9th
    Cir. 2020) (citation omitted).
    1.    The district court did not violate Mergenthaler’s due process rights by failing
    to enforce equally Montana District Court Local Rule 78.2. The agency’s brief
    contained a concise statement of the case, and Mergenthaler cites no relevant
    authority to support his contention that more was required.
    2.    The ALJ did not err in rejecting the medical opinions of Mergenthaler’s
    treating physicians. Initially, by not raising it in the district court, Mergenthaler
    forfeited his argument that the ALJ erred in rejecting Dr. Allison Cobb’s opinion.
    See Ford, 950 F.3d at 1158 n.12. Likewise, Mergenthaler forfeited his argument
    that the ALJ failed to consider Dr. John Willoughby’s August 2018 opinion. And
    although Mergenthaler sufficiently argued in the district court that the ALJ failed
    to review and consider Dr. Willoughby’s treatment records, the administrative
    record does not support this contention. Indeed, the ALJ’s decision references Dr.
    Willoughby’s treatment records. 
    20 C.F.R. § 404.1527
    (b).
    The ALJ also provided a “clear and convincing” reason to reject Dr.
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    Hergenrather’s medical opinion. The ALJ rejected Dr. Hergenrather’s opinion to
    the extent that it suggested that Mergenthaler was incapable of any gainful
    employment because Dr. Hergenrather “only considered whether [Mergenthaler]
    could perform his past work as a custodian” and not other available work. The
    record supports that explanation—although Dr. Hergenrather identified several
    functions that Mergenthaler could not perform, she imposed a full medical
    restriction in the context of Mergenthaler’s custodian job. Thus, there is no reason
    to disturb the ALJ’s treatment of Dr. Hergenrather’s medical opinion.
    3.    The ALJ did not err in his treatment of “other source” evidence. Initially,
    we reject Mergenthaler’s invocation of an “interdisciplinary team exception,”
    which we have never recognized in the Title II context. See Taylor v. Comm’r of
    Soc. Sec. Admin., 
    659 F.3d 1228
    , 1234 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Gomez v. Chater, 
    74 F.3d 967
     (9th Cir. 1996)); see also Molina v. Astrue, 
    674 F.3d 1104
    , 1111 n.3 (9th
    Cir. 2012). We accordingly treat Greg Shanks, a licensed therapist, as an “other
    source.” To reject the opinions of an “other source,” the ALJ must provide a
    “germane” reason. Revels v. Berryhill, 
    874 F.3d 648
    , 655 (9th Cir. 2017).
    The ALJ assigned “minimal weight” to Shanks’s October 2015 opinion that
    Mergenthaler’s mental health symptoms precluded any work activity during the
    relevant period because Shanks’s opinion was not supported by his
    contemporaneous treatment notes prior to the date last insured. Shanks’s 2015
    3
    opinion acknowledged “a big reduction of [Mergenthaler’s] PTSD symptoms to a
    sub clinical level.” Shanks’s treatment records indicated that Mergenthaler’s
    PTSD was well controlled by March 17, 2011, PTSD was no longer a supportable
    diagnosis by June 1, 2011, and that Mergenthaler’s depressive symptoms were also
    controlled. The ALJ’s reason for rejecting Shanks’s opinion was thus “germane”
    and supported by substantial evidence. See Coleman, 979 F.3d at 757; Ford, 950
    F.3d at 1154.
    We reject Mergenthaler’s argument that the ALJ failed to provide a
    sufficient reason to reject employment records from the University of Montana.
    While relevant, these records do not provide an opinion about Mergenthaler’s
    impairments. Therefore, the ALJ was not required to provide “germane” reasons
    to discount the records.
    4.    The ALJ provided clear and convincing reasons for discounting
    Mergenthaler’s own testimony. Contrary to Mergenthaler’s argument, the ALJ did
    not rely on a generalized adverse credibility determination but instead permissibly
    considered “inconsistencies . . . between testimony and conduct.” Orn v. Astrue,
    
    495 F.3d 625
    , 636 (9th Cir. 2007). Specifically, the ALJ did not credit
    Mergenthaler’s testimony regarding the frequency of his syncopal episodes and
    flashbacks because of his other testimony explaining that he regularly drove his car
    during that period, never experienced an episode while driving, and was only
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    briefly placed on a medical restriction from driving. Therefore, the ALJ’s adverse
    credibility determination is supported by specific, clear, and convincing reasons.
    AFFIRMED.
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