United States v. Jorge Bravo-Rosas , 607 F. App'x 632 ( 2015 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                            FILED
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT                             APR 13 2015
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                        No. 13-50405
    Plaintiff - Appellee,              D.C. No. 3:12-cr-05132-JLS-1
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    JORGE FRANCISCO BRAVO-ROSAS,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of California
    Janis L. Sammartino, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted April 6, 2015
    Pasadena, California
    Before: SILVERMAN and BEA, Circuit Judges and DONATO,** District Judge.
    Jorge Francisco Bravo-Rosas appeals his conviction for illegal reentry after
    removal in violation of 
    8 U.S.C. § 1326
    (a). We have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    .
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    **
    The Honorable James Donato, District Judge for the U.S. District
    Court for the Northern District of California, sitting by designation.
    I.
    To convict a defendant of “illegal reentry under 
    8 U.S.C. § 1326
    , the
    Government must establish that the defendant ‘left the United States under order of
    exclusion, deportation, or removal, and then illegally reentered.’” United States v.
    Raya-Vaca, 
    771 F.3d 1195
    , 1201 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v.
    Barajas–Alvarado, 
    655 F.3d 1077
    , 1079 (9th Cir. 2011)). Bravo filed a motion to
    dismiss the indictment to challenge the validity of the expedited removal order that
    served as the basis for his conviction, as was his right under the Fifth Amendment.
    See United States v. Ubaldo-Figueroa, 
    364 F.3d 1042
    , 1047 (9th Cir. 2004). We
    review “a denial of a motion to dismiss an 
    8 U.S.C. § 1326
     indictment de novo
    when the motion is based upon . . . alleged due process defect[s] in the underlying
    deportation proceeding.” Raya-Vaca, 771 F.3d at 1201 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting
    United States v. Camacho–Lopez, 
    450 F.3d 928
    , 929 (9th Cir. 2006)). We review
    for clear error the district court’s findings of fact. 
    Id.
    The district court applied the framework we articulated in Barajas-Alvarado
    to find the alleged due process violations during Bravo’s expedited removal did not
    prejudice Bravo. We have since refined that framework in Raya-Vaca. Because
    the district court did not have the benefit of our opinion in Raya-Vaca, we vacate
    its decision to deny Bravo’s motion to dismiss and remand for the district court to
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    reevaluate, in light of Raya-Vaca, whether Bravo’s due process rights were
    violated and whether he suffered prejudice as a result of the alleged violations. We
    leave it to the district court to decide whether the parties should supplement the
    evidentiary record before the district court makes its decision.
    II.
    None of Bravo’s alleged trial errors warrant reversal of Bravo’s conviction.
    First, the district court did permit Officer Valdes to testify in violation of the
    sequestration order. But “[a] witness is not [automatically] disqualified merely
    because he remains in the courtroom after a sequestration order.” United States v.
    English, 
    92 F.3d 909
    , 913 (9th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted). Disqualification is
    “strongly disfavored.” 
    Id.
     The prosecutor was unaware of Bravo’s “official
    restraint” defense until after the prosecutor excused Officer Valdes. As a result,
    there was “no indication the prosecution intended to violate the court’s order.” 
    Id.
    The district court therefore did not abuse its discretion. 
    Id.
    Second, the district court correctly instructed the jury on Bravo’s “official
    restraint” defense. For a defendant to be entitled to a jury instruction, his proposed
    instruction must have a “basis in fact and law.” United States v. Romm, 
    455 F.3d 990
    , 1002 (9th Cir. 2006). To that end, we have held that “those who evade
    government observation while crossing the border are deemed to be free from
    3
    official restraint, regardless of the distance they travel between entry and arrest.”
    United States v. Cruz-Escoto, 
    476 F.3d 1081
    , 1085–86 (9th Cir. 2007) (some
    emphasis in original). Bravo’s proposed jury instruction asked the jury to
    consider, among other factors, “the distance he may have traveled into the United
    States” and “the amount of time he may have been physically present in the United
    States prior to apprehension.” The instruction therefore did not have a “basis in
    law.”
    Third, the prosecutor did not improperly vouch for Officer Valdes during
    closing argument because the prosecutor did not “place[] the prestige of the
    government behind [Valdes] by providing personal assurances of” Valdes’s
    testimony or suggest that Valdes’s testimony was “supported by information
    outside that presented to the jury.” United States v. Wright, 
    625 F.3d 583
    , 610 (9th
    Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). Further, the prosecutor could suggest Bravo’s
    testimony was not credible because it was “reasonable to infer, and hence to argue,
    that one of the two sides [was] lying.” United States v. Ruiz, 
    710 F.3d 1077
    , 1083
    (9th Cir. 2013); see also United States v. Molina, 
    934 F.2d 1440
    , 1445 (9th Cir.
    1991) (same).
    Fourth, the prosecutor’s statement during closing argument that Castro “was
    hiding in that brush because he was a convicted felon” does not warrant reversal
    4
    even if defense counsel properly objected below. See United States v. Vaandering,
    
    50 F.3d 696
    , 701 (9th Cir. 1995). Though the government conceded the statement
    was improper at oral argument, “[e]stablishing . . . prosecutorial misconduct is not
    in and of itself sufficient to merit reversal of a conviction.” United States v. Berry,
    
    683 F.3d 1015
    , 1024 (9th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). “[I]mproprieties in
    counsel’s arguments to the jury do not constitute reversible error unless they are so
    gross as probably to prejudice the defendant, and the prejudice has not been
    neutralized by the trial judge.” 
    Id.
     (citation omitted). The jury already knew of
    Bravo’s conviction because the district court authorized the prosecution to use the
    conviction for impeachment purposes. And the prosecutor repeatedly referenced
    the conviction for that purpose during closing argument. The prosecutor’s single
    improper reference to the conviction as Bravo’s motive for evading immigration
    officials was not “so gross as probably to prejudice” Bravo. 
    Id.
     Further, the
    district court’s instruction to the jury that it could consider the conviction “only as
    it may affect the defendant’s believability as a witness” neutralized any alleged
    prejudice. United States v. Lopez-Alvarez, 
    970 F.2d 583
    , 598 (9th Cir. 1992).
    VACATED AND REMANDED.
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