Perris Valley Community Hosp. v. Southern California Pipe Trade , 634 F. App'x 616 ( 2016 )


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  •                              NOT FOR PUBLICATION                         FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                      FEB 8 2016
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    PERRIS VALLEY COMMUNITY                      No. 14-55408
    HOSPITAL, LLC, DBA Vista Hospital of
    Riverside, A California Limited Liability    D.C. No. 5:13-cv-00291-GAF-
    Company,                                     DTB
    Plaintiff - Appellant,
    MEMORANDUM *
    v.
    SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA PIPE
    TRADES ADMINISTRATIVE
    CORPORATION, A California
    Corporation; SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
    PIPE TRADES HEALTH & WELFARE
    FUND, a California unknown entity,
    Defendants - Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Central District of California
    Gary A. Feess, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted February 2, 2016**
    Pasadena, California
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except
    as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without
    oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    Before: WARDLAW and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges and RICE,*** District Judge.
    Perris Valley Community Hospital LLC (the “Hospital”) appeals a summary
    judgment in favor of the Southern California Pipe Trades Administrative
    Corporation and the Southern California Pipe Trades Health and Welfare Fund (the
    “Administrators”). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.
    1. The Administrators oversee an employee benefit plan (the “Plan”) subject
    to the Federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. §
    1001 et seq. Months after a covered patient reached the Plan’s $500,000 lifetime
    benefits cap in December 2008, the Administrators issued a Supplement to the Plan
    supplying additional coverage for “claims incurred since January 1, 2009.” The
    Administrators then paid the Hospital’s claims for services rendered to the patient in
    January 2009, but refused to pay for charges incurred in December 2008 after the
    lifetime limit had been reached. The patient assigned her rights under the Plan to
    the Hospital, and this suit ensued.
    2. Because the Plan is subject to ERISA, confers discretionary authority on
    the Administrators to determine eligibility for benefits, and the Administrators both
    evaluate and fund the Plan, we review the Administrators’ decision under the
    skeptical abuse of discretion standard. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S.
    ***
    The Honorable Thomas O. Rice, Chief United States District Judge for the
    Eastern District of Washington, sitting by designation.
    2
    105, 111 (2008); Salomaa v. Honda Long Term Disability Plan, 
    642 F.3d 666
    , 673-
    77 (9th Cir. 2011). The “plan administrator’s interpretation of the plan will not be
    disturbed if reasonable.”    Conkright v. Frommert, 
    559 U.S. 506
    , 521 (2010)
    (internal quotation marks omitted).
    3. The Hospital argues that the language in the Supplement providing
    coverage for “claims incurred since January 1, 2009” is ambiguous and should be
    construed against the Administrators to refer to all bills received by the Plan after
    January 1, 2009, regardless of when the underlying services were rendered. See
    McClure v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 
    84 F.3d 1129
    , 1134 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating
    ambiguous language in ERISA insurance policies is construed in favor of the
    insured). The district court did not err in concluding that Administrators reasonably
    rejected the Hospital’s interpretation of the Supplement. See Evans v. Safeco Life
    Ins. Co., 
    916 F.2d 1437
    , 1441 (9th Cir. 1990) (stating that terms in an ERISA policy
    must be interpreted in an “ordinary and popular sense as would a person of average
    intelligence and experience” and should not be read to “artificially create ambiguity
    where none exists”) (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted). Read in
    context, the phrase “claims incurred since January 1, 2009” in the Supplement means
    claims for services rendered after January 1; a claim is ordinarily understood to be
    “incurred” when a service is rendered, not when the Hospital decides to bill for the
    services.     See   Incur,   Merriam-Webster.com,      2015    http://www.merriam-
    3
    webster.com/dictionary/incur (last visited Feb. 2, 2016) (defining “incur” as “to
    become liable or subject to”).
    4. The Hospital submitted no evidence that the Administrators had previously
    interpreted the term “claims incurred” in a contrary manner. The record merely
    reflects that claims were categorized by the Administrators according to when they
    were received, and that each claim number could include billing for services
    rendered across multiple days.
    AFFIRMED.
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