Floyd Morrow v. City of San Diego , 634 F. App'x 623 ( 2016 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FILED
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    FEB 09 2016
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FLOYD L. MORROW and MARLENE                      No. 14-55001
    MORROW, individually and on behalf of
    those similarly situated,                        D.C. No. 3:11-cv-01497-GPC-
    KSC
    Plaintiffs - Appellants,
    v.                                              MEMORANDUM*
    CITY OF SAN DIEGO, a charter city; et
    al.,
    Defendants - Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of California
    Gonzalo P. Curiel, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted February 5, 2016**
    Pasadena, California
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    Before: CALLAHAN and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges and RAKOFF,*** Senior
    District Judge.
    Floyd L. and Marlene Morrow appeal from the district court’s December 4,
    2013 order denying their motions to file an amended complaint and substitute Doe
    defendants in their 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging that defendants violated the
    Morrows’ equal protection rights by citing them for land use violations on their
    property. We grant the City of San Diego’s motion to dismiss the appeal for lack
    of appellate jurisdiction.
    The December 4, 2013 order is not an appealable final decision because it
    did not end the litigation on the merits or “clearly evidence[] the judge’s intention
    that it be the court’s final act in the matter.” Nat’l Distribution Agency v.
    Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 
    117 F.3d 432
    , 433 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Slimick v.
    Silva (In re Slimick), 
    928 F.2d 304
    , 307 (9th Cir. 1990)); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1291
    (“The courts of appeals . . . shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final
    decisions of the district courts of the United States . . . .”). The Morrows contend
    that the order nonetheless is appealable because it was based on
    Pullman abstention. See R.R. Comm’n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 
    312 U.S. 496
    (1941); Confederated Salish v. Simonich, 
    29 F.3d 1398
    , 1407 (9th Cir. 1994)
    ***
    The Honorable Jed S. Rakoff, Senior District Judge for the U.S.
    District Court for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.
    2
    (holding that a decision granting Pullman abstention is an appealable order). The
    December 4, 2013 order, however, did not grant Pullman abstention; rather, the
    district court granted abstention in an earlier order, from which the Morrows did
    not timely appeal. We therefore lack jurisdiction to hear this appeal.
    DISMISSED.
    3