Todd Glassey v. Microsemi, Inc. ( 2016 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION MAR 03 2016
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
TODD GLASSEY, No. 14-17574
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 3:14-cv-03629-WHA
MICHAEL EDWARD McNEIL,
MEMORANDUM*
Plaintiff,
v.
MICROSEMI, INC.; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
William Alsup, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted February 24, 2016**
Before: LEAVY, FERNANDEZ, and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges.
Todd Glassey appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing
his action arising from a patent ownership dispute. We have jurisdiction under 28
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
U.S.C. § 1291. We review for an abuse of discretion a district court’s dismissal for
failure to comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Nevijel v. N.
Coast Life Ins. Co., 651 F.2d 671, 674 (9th Cir. 1981). We affirm.
The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Glassey’s action
because Glassey failed to comply with Rule 8(a)’s requirement of a short and plain
statement of the claims. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a); Cafasso v. Gen. Dynamics C4
Sys., Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1059 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Rule 8(a) has been held to be
violated by a pleading that was needlessly long, or a complaint that was highly
repetitious, or confused, or consisted of incomprehensible rambling.” (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted)).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Glassey’s motion to
quash because the motion was based on mere speculation. See Harris v. Bd. of
Supervisors, L.A. Cty., 366 F.3d 754, 760 (9th Cir. 2004) (standard of review and
requirements for preliminary injunctive relief).
The district court properly denied Glassey’s various motions for partial
summary judgment because they were not supported by any evidence in the record.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (setting forth requirements for summary judgment); Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986) (moving party bears initial burden of
showing the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact).
2 14-17574
The district court properly denied Glassey’s motions for a three-judge panel.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2284(a).
We reject as unsupported by the record Glassey’s contention that the district
court was biased.
We do not have jurisdiction over the portion of the judgment as to Michael
Edward McNeil because McNeil did not sign the notice of appeal. See Fed. R.
App. P. 3(c)(2); Fed. R. App. P. 4(a); United States v. Sadler, 480 F.3d 932, 937
(9th Cir. 2007) (Rule 4(a) is both mandatory and jurisdictional); C.E. Pope Equity
Trust v. United States, 818 F.2d 696, 697 (9th Cir. 1987) (a non-attorney does not
have authority to appear as an attorney for others).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief, or arguments raised for the first time on appeal. See Padgett
v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
All pending motions are denied.
AFFIRMED.
3 14-17574