Jesse Hall v. Daniel Paramo ( 2018 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
AUG 17 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
JESSE LLOYD HALL, No. 16-55055
Petitioner-Appellant, DC No. CV 11-0609 MMM
v.
DANIEL PARAMO, Warden, MEMORANDUM*
Respondent-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Margaret M. Morrow, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted August 9, 2018**
Pasadena, California
Before: TASHIMA and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges, and RUFE,*** District
Judge.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without
oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
***
The Honorable Cynthia M. Rufe, United States District Judge for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.
Jesse Lloyd Hall appeals the district court’s denial of his petition for writ of
habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Because the parties are familiar with the
facts, we do not recite them here. We review de novo the district court’s denial of
a habeas petition and review its findings of fact for clear error. Reis-Campos v.
Biter, 832 F.3d 968, 973 (9th Cir. 2016). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1291 and 28 U.S.C. § 2253, and we affirm.
Hall’s petition is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). We may grant relief only if the state court’s adjudication
of Hall’s claims “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on
an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the
State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). “Under § 2254(d), [we] must
determine what arguments or theories supported or, as here, could have supported,
the state court’s decision; and then [we] must ask whether it is possible fairminded
jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the
holding in a prior decision of [the Supreme] Court.” Harrington v. Richter, 562
U.S. 86, 102 (2011).
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1. The state court reasonably denied Hall’s claim alleging a violation of
Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959). “A claim under Napue will succeed when
‘(1) the testimony (or evidence) was actually false, (2) the prosecution knew or
should have known that the testimony was actually false, and (3) the false
testimony was material.’” Reis-Campos, 832 F.3d at 976 (quoting Jackson v.
Brown, 513 F.3d 1057, 1071–72 (9th Cir. 2008)).
Hall’s claim fails because the state court could have reasonably determined
that Rachelle’s trial testimony was true, even despite her post-trial recantation.
Recantations are generally recognized as suspect; thus, “a witness’ ‘later
recantation of [her] trial testimony does not render [her] earlier testimony false.’”
Jones v. Taylor, 763 F.3d 1242, 1248 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Allen v. Woodford,
395 F.3d 979, 994 (9th Cir. 2005)). Rachelle’s trial testimony was consistent with
the other evidence at trial, while her recantation was not. Her declaration detailing
her recantation was signed almost four years after the trial concluded, but did not
explain the reason for her delay. Rachelle is also related to Hall, and there was
evidence that other family members pressured Rachelle to recant. In light of this
evidence, it is reasonable to view Rachelle’s post-trial recantation as particularly
unreliable, and therefore reasonable to conclude both that her trial testimony was
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true, and that the prosecution had no reason to believe otherwise. See Jones, 763
F.3d at 1248–51; see also Allen, 395 F.3d at 994–95.
2. The state court reasonably denied Hall’s claim alleging violations of
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). “To establish a Brady violation, [Hall]
must show that: (1) the evidence at issue is favorable to the accused, either
because it is exculpatory or because it is impeaching; (2) the evidence was
suppressed by the government, regardless of whether the suppression was willful
or inadvertent; and (3) the evidence is material to the guilt or innocence of the
defendant.” United States v. Sedaghaty, 728 F.3d 885, 899 (9th Cir. 2013).
The state court could have reasonably determined that no tape recording of
Rachelle’s interview existed, and thus that no evidence was suppressed. Hall
speculates that a recording existed and was deleted or withheld; however, the
evidence in the record supports that the recording equipment simply
malfunctioned. While Rachelle’s declaration suggests a spoliation motive, as
already detailed, it would be reasonable to reject Rachelle’s new allegations that
law enforcement coerced her into making false accusations. Rejecting Rachelle’s
claims of coercion would also be reasonable given the evidence at trial indicating
that Rachelle had reported abuse before this interview and that Hall was seen
engaging in inappropriate behavior with Rachelle and other victims.
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For similar reasons, the state court could have reasonably determined that
Rachelle did not attempt to recant on the morning before she testified and thus,
again, that no such evidence was suppressed. Because it would be reasonable to
credit Rachelle’s testimony and reject the allegations in her declaration, it would be
reasonable to determine that there was no improper coercion, no reason to recant,
and that this purported pre-testimony recantation never occurred.
• ! •
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
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