Jesse Scott v. Michael Leavitt , 379 F. App'x 603 ( 2010 )


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  •                                                                               FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                                MAY 17 2010
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                          U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    JESSE SCOTT, Reverend,                           No. 09-15576
    Plaintiff - Appellant,             D.C. No. 2:08-cv-01185-PMP-
    GWF
    v.
    KATHLEEN SEBELIUS,* Secretary of                 MEMORANDUM**
    the United States Department of Health
    and Human Services,
    Defendant - Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Nevada
    Philip M. Pro, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted May 12, 2010***
    San Francisco, California
    Before: SILVERMAN, FISHER, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
    *
    Kathleen Sebelius is substituted for her predecessor, Michael O.
    Leavitt, as Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services, pursuant to
    Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2).
    **
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    ***
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    Plaintiff-Appellant Jesse D. Scott filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court
    for the District of Nevada against the Secretary of Health and Human Services
    (Secretary-HHS), seeking judicial review of an administrative decision denying
    Scott coverage under his Medicare Advantage plan for medical costs he incurred
    while being treated at a Nevada medical center. The District Court granted the
    Secretary-HHS’s motion to dismiss for failure to effectuate proper service in
    accordance with Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and for lack of
    personal jurisdiction. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We reverse
    and remand.
    We review a district court’s dismissal pursuant to Rule 4 for abuse of
    discretion. See In re Sheehan, 
    253 F.3d 507
    , 511 (9th Cir. 2001). To conduct such
    a review, however, we must have the ability to discern how the district court
    exercised its discretion. In the present case, the District Court dismissed Scott’s
    complaint in summary fashion, without providing any explanation of the bases for
    its decision. As a result, we are unable to properly fulfill our judicial duty as an
    appellate court. See United Nat’l Ins. Co. v. R & D Latex Corp., 
    141 F.3d 916
    ,
    919 (9th Cir. 1998) (“[M]eaningful appellate review for abuse of discretion is
    foreclosed when the district court fails to articulate its reasoning.”).
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    We note that there may be merit to Scott’s claims. We have held that service
    under Rule 4 is “a flexible rule that should be liberally construed so long as a party
    receives sufficient notice of the complaint.” Direct Mail Specialists, Inc. v. Eclat
    Computerized Techs., Inc., 
    840 F.2d 685
    , 688 (9th Cir. 1988) (internal quotation
    marks omitted). We have articulated several factors that a court may consider in
    deciding whether to exercise its discretion, including “a statute of limitations bar,
    prejudice to the defendant, actual notice of a lawsuit, and eventual service.” Efaw
    v. Williams, 
    473 F.3d 1038
    , 1041 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks
    omitted); see also Lemoge v. United States, 
    587 F.3d 1188
    , 1198 (9th Cir. 2009)
    (holding relief was appropriate under Rule 4(m) in light of the plaintiffs being
    time-barred from re-filing their action). We are also aware that a district court’s
    discretion to either grant an extension of time in which to effect service, or to
    dismiss an action entirely for failure to effect service in accordance with Rule 4, is
    broad. In re 
    Sheehan, 253 F.3d at 513
    . Nevertheless, because the District Court
    did not articulate its reasons for granting the Secretary-HHS’s motion and
    dismissing Scott’s complaint, we cannot determine on this record whether its
    decision constituted an abuse of discretion.
    Accordingly, we reverse the District Court’s order granting the Secretary-
    HHS’s motion and dismissing Scott’s complaint. On remand, the District Court
    3
    should reconsider its order and provide an adequate explanation of the reasons
    supporting its decision. We retain jurisdiction of this appeal.
    REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
    4