Jerome Strong v. Merrill Lynch , 470 F. App'x 672 ( 2012 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION MAR 05 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JEROME STRONG, Rev., No. 11-15252
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 4:10-cv-00031-SBA
v.
MEMORANDUM *
MERRILL LYNCH,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Saundra Brown Armstrong, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted February 21, 2012 **
Before: FERNANDEZ, McKEOWN, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.
Jerome Strong appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in
his employment action alleging race discrimination and harassment in violation of
Title VII and the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”). We
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Leong v. Potter,
347 F.3d 1117, 1123 (9th Cir. 2003), and we affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Strong’s race
discrimination claim because Strong failed to raise a genuine dispute of material
fact as to whether he performed his job satisfactorily, whether similarly situated
individuals outside his protected class were treated more favorably, or whether
Merrill Lynch’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions were
pretextual. See id. at 1124-25; see also Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917,
923 (9th Cir. 2000) (same analysis applies to Title VII and FEHA claims).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Strong’s racial
harassment claim because Strong failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact
as to whether the alleged conduct was because of his race or was sufficiently
severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of his employment. See Vasquez v.
County of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 642-44 (9th Cir. 2004).
Strong’s remaining contentions are unpersuasive.
AFFIRMED.
2 11-15252