United States v. Ronald Bradshaw ( 2011 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION MAY 20 2011
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 10-50204
Plaintiff - Appellee, D.C. No. 2:08-cr-00429-AHM-3
v.
MEMORANDUM *
RONALD LOUIS BRADSHAW,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
A. Howard Matz, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted April 12, 2011
Pasadena, California
Before: BYBEE and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges, and DAWSON, District Judge.**
Defendant-Appellant Ronald Bradshaw appeals a judgment following a jury
verdict convicting him on one count of aggravated identity theft, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1028A, and four counts of health care fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The Honorable Kent J. Dawson, United States District Judge for the
District of Nevada, sitting by designation.
§ 1347. The district court sentenced Bradshaw to 25-months imprisonment to be
followed by a 3-year term of supervised release. Because the parties are familiar
with the factual and procedural history of this case, we repeat only those facts
necessary to resolve the issues raised on appeal. We have jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1291. Considering the evidence presented at trial in the light most
favorable to the government, United States v. Mousavi, 604 F.3d 1084, 1090 (9th
Cir. 2010), we affirm.
Section 1028A of the Criminal Code, which “forbid[s] ‘[a]ggravated identity
theft[,]’ imposes a mandatory consecutive 2-year prison term upon individuals
convicted of certain other crimes if, during (or in relation to) the commission of
those other crimes, the offender ‘knowingly transfers, possesses, or uses, without
lawful authority, a means of identification of another person.’” Flores-Figueroa v.
United States, 129 S. Ct. 1886, 1888 (2009) (emphases omitted) (quoting 18 U.S.C.
§ 1028A(a)(1)). Although Bradshaw argues his activities were authorized by the
Delegation of Services Agreement, the document he relies on only authorizes a
physician assistant to perform activities under the supervision of a physician and to
“transmit . . . the supervising physician’s prescription.” It does not authorize the
level of autonomous behavior in which Bradshaw engaged. Given the testimony
that Dr. Shard never was present at Glenmountain and never authorized anyone at
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Glenmountain to use his unique physician identification number (UPIN), and
indeed that Bradshaw could not even identify his “supervisor” Dr. Shard in a photo
array, there was ample evidence for the jury to conclude that Bradshaw lacked
authorization to prescribe motorized wheelchairs. Moreover, Bradshaw’s acts of
prescribing medically unnecessary wheelchairs with Dr. Shard’s UPIN
undoubtedly constitute “use” of that number.
As to the health care fraud convictions, Bradshaw’s argument that he did not
“knowingly and willfully” defraud Medicare is contrary to the evidence.
“[W]illfulness may be inferred from circumstantial evidence of fraudulent intent.”
United States v. Dearing, 504 F.3d 897, 901 (9th Cir. 2007). The jury heard
testimony from several of Bradshaw’s patients who had no or little trouble walking
but nevertheless were prescribed an expensive motorized wheelchair. The clinic
itself was in disrepair and unfit for rendering legitimate medical services. The
clinic also had a very low rate of follow-up visits, which indicated that patients
were not seeking legitimate medical treatments from the outset. Taken together,
the government’s evidence described a situation conducive for fraud and abuse,
and a jury could reasonably infer that Bradshaw acted in that environment with the
intent to defraud Medicare.
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
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