Adela Ortiz-Ortiz v. Jefferson Sessions , 698 F. App'x 868 ( 2017 )


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  •                               NOT FOR PUBLICATION                        FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        JUN 9 2017
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    ADELA ORTIZ-ORTIZ,                              No.    14-73863
    Petitioner,                     Agency No. A205-420-865
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, Attorney
    General,
    Respondent.
    On Petition for Review of an Order of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    Argued and Submitted May 19, 2017
    Seattle, Washington
    Before: HAWKINS, GOULD, and PAEZ, Circuit Judges.
    Petitioner Adela Ortiz-Ortiz (“Ortiz”), a native and citizen of Guatemala,
    petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’s (“BIA”) denial of her
    applications for withholding of removal and protection under the Convention
    Against Torture (“CAT”). The BIA found Ortiz not credible due to inconsistencies
    between her testimony to the immigration judge (“IJ”) and statements that she
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    made during an interview with an asylum officer. We have jurisdiction under 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    . We grant the petition and remand on an open record.
    1. When the BIA “conduct[s] its own review of the evidence and law rather
    than simply adopting the immigration judge’s decision,” our review “is limited to
    the BIA’s decision, except to the extent the IJ’s opinion is expressly adopted.”
    Hosseini v. Gonzales, 
    471 F.3d 953
    , 957 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks
    omitted). Here, the BIA did not adopt any part of the IJ’s opinion, and expressly
    rejected much of the IJ’s credibility analysis. We confine our review to the BIA’s
    decision.
    2. The government contends that several of Ortiz’s challenges are
    unexhausted because she did not raise them in her notice of appeal to the BIA. But
    Ortiz appealed to the BIA pro se, so we “construe [her claims] liberally,” and “do
    not employ the exhaustion doctrine in a formalistic manner.” Ren v. Holder, 
    648 F.3d 1079
    , 1083 (9th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). Viewing her
    prior appeal to the BIA in such a manner, we hold that Ortiz’s claims are
    exhausted.
    3. The BIA concluded that Ortiz lacked credibility on the basis of two
    inconsistencies in her testimony: (1) during her interview with the asylum officer,
    Ortiz said that on March 19, 2013, two men on motorcycles shot at her at a town
    fair, but during the hearing before the IJ, Ortiz testified that her ex-husband Mario
    2
    Alberto Divas beat and tried to kill her outside of a church on that day; and (2)
    during her interview with the asylum officer, Ortiz said that she was on her way
    back from shopping when she found a young girl hanged, but before the IJ, Ortiz
    testified that she was on her way home from work, and that the girl had been tied
    up with wire and shot several times.
    When theses purported inconsistencies are considered alongside the other
    significant evidence of abuse and threats in the record, they are relatively minor.
    Ortiz submitted letters and declarations of friends and family members stating that
    Divas beat her; pictures and a physician’s report detailing scars consistent with her
    testimony; and a country report and articles describing a high rate of domestic
    violence in Guatemala. Ortiz also gave ample testimony during the hearing that
    was fully consistent with her statements to the asylum officer.
    Further, we question whether Ortiz’s statements are inconsistent at all. Ortiz
    could have encountered shots fired at her at the town fair and later that day been
    beaten by Divas outside a church. Ortiz’s statement that she “found a young girl
    hanged” is not inconsistent with “they tie[d] her up with a wire” if by “tie[d] her
    up” Ortiz had meant tied her up to something above the ground. And Ortiz might
    have spent time both working and shopping on the day she saw the murdered girl.
    Finally, the circumstances of Ortiz’s testimony make the asserted
    inconsistencies only minimally probative of her credibility. At both her reasonable
    3
    fear interview and at her hearing before the IJ, Ortiz testified without counsel,
    through an interpreter, and about very traumatic subjects. It is likely that the
    inconsistencies identified by the BIA were the products not of untruthfulness, but
    of misunderstanding, mistake, or bad memory. See Abovian v. INS, 
    219 F.3d 972
    ,
    979 (9th Cir.), amended on other grounds, 
    228 F.3d 1127
     (9th Cir. 2000); Singh v.
    Gonzales, 
    403 F.3d 1081
    , 1091 (9th Cir. 2005). Considering the record as a whole,
    the “totality of the circumstances, and all relevant factors,” we hold that the BIA’s
    adverse credibility determination was not supported by substantial evidence.
    Shrestha v. Holder, 
    590 F.3d 1034
    , 1040 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting 
    8 U.S.C. § 1158
    (b)(1)(B)(iii)).
    4. Ortiz has “a Fifth Amendment right to due process [at her] deportation
    proceedings, which ensures that [she] receive[s] a full and fair hearing.” Padilla-
    Martinez v. Holder, 
    770 F.3d 825
    , 830 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks
    omitted). The “BIA decision violates due process if the proceeding was so
    fundamentally unfair that [Ortiz] was prevented from reasonably presenting h[er]
    case.” Ramirez-Alejandre v. Ashcroft, 
    319 F.3d 365
    , 380 (9th Cir. 2003). For the
    reasons that follow, we have concerns about Ortiz’s due process rights.
    The IJ did not ask Ortiz about (1) the November 2011 beating where Divas
    knocked out four of Ortiz’s teeth and sent her and her son to the hospital; nor (2)
    the December 2012 attack where Divas threw Ortiz into the street by her hair and
    4
    stabbed and raped her. Both incidents were grounds for the asylum officer’s
    reasonable fear of persecution finding, and both incidents were listed in Ortiz’s
    Form I-589 Application for Withholding of Removal. In light of our review of the
    record, we conclude that the IJ’s failure to ask Ortiz about the incidents violated
    her due process rights. See Oshodi v. Holder, 
    729 F.3d 883
    , 890 (9th Cir. 2013)
    (en banc) (“Every asylum and withholding applicant is required to be examined
    under oath as to the contents of h[er] application.” (emphasis in original)). Failing
    to ask Ortiz about the incidents was also prejudicial. See 
    id.
     at 889–90 (“An
    applicant’s testimony of past persecution and/or h[er] fear of future persecution
    stands at the center of h[er] claim and can, if credible, support an eligibility finding
    without further corroboration.”); see also Jacinto v. INS, 
    208 F.3d 725
    , 734 (9th
    Cir. 2000).
    We remand to the BIA on an open record. The BIA shall grant Ortiz an
    opportunity to testify about the November 2011 and December 2012 incidents, and
    shall determine whether Ortiz is entitled to withholding of removal and CAT relief
    in light of our decision that the record does not support the BIA’s adverse
    credibility decision.
    PETITION GRANTED and REMANDED
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 14-73863

Citation Numbers: 698 F. App'x 868

Judges: Hawkins, Gould, Paez

Filed Date: 6/9/2017

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/6/2024