Daniel Flores-Guerrero v. Jefferson Sessions ( 2018 )


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  •                                                                               FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    MAR 21 2018
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    DANIEL SANTIAGO FLORES-                          No. 15-72015
    GUERRERO,
    Agency No. A094-769-460
    Petitioner,
    v.                                              MEMORANDUM*
    JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, Attorney
    General,
    Respondent.
    On Petition for Review of an Order of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    Argued and Submitted March 7, 2018
    Pasadena, California
    Before: GRABER, W. FLETCHER, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.
    Petitioner Daniel Flores-Guerrero, a native and citizen of El Salvador, seeks
    review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ ("BIA") dismissal of his appeal from
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    an immigration judge’s ("IJ") denial of his applications for asylum and withholding
    of removal.1 We deny the petition.
    1. Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s determination that Petitioner
    failed to establish that the proposed social group, articulated variously as
    "individuals who have fled violence" or "witnesses to criminal activity [who] have
    cooperated with law enforcement or are perceived to have cooperated," meets the
    "social distinction" requirement. Reyes v. Lynch, 
    842 F.3d 1125
    , 1137 (9th Cir.
    2016) (stating substantial evidence standard), cert. denied, 
    138 S. Ct. 736
    (2018).
    As the BIA noted, Petitioner has presented no evidence that Salvadoran society
    recognizes that broad group of people as a social group. And it is not otherwise
    apparent that the group would "generally be recognizable by other members of the
    community." Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, 
    707 F.3d 1081
    , 1088 (9th Cir. 2013) (en
    banc) (internal quotation marks omitted).
    Similarly, the BIA did not err in determining that Petitioner’s proposed
    social group is insufficiently particular. See Pirir-Boc v. Holder, 
    750 F.3d 1077
    ,
    1081 (9th Cir. 2014) (stating de novo standard of review). Because cooperation
    with law enforcement is a vague and amorphous concept that may apply to a broad
    1
    Petitioner did not specifically contest the IJ’s denial of his claim for
    protection under the Convention Against Torture, so he has waived it. Jones v.
    Wood, 
    207 F.3d 557
    , 562 n.2 (9th Cir. 2000).
    2
    group of people, Petitioner’s proposed group, as articulated, does not constitute a
    particular social group. 
    Reyes, 842 F.3d at 1135
    .
    That is not to say that had Petitioner defined his social group more narrowly
    he would have been unable to establish membership in a particular social group.
    But, as presented, Petitioner’s proposed social group is too broad and vague to be
    socially distinct or particular.
    2. Substantial evidence also supports the BIA’s determination that, even if
    Petitioner had established membership in a particular social group, he failed to
    establish a nexus between that membership and his fear of persecution.
    Parussimova v. Mukasey, 
    555 F.3d 734
    , 742 (9th Cir. 2009). The record does not
    compel a finding that Petitioner’s proposed particular social group is "one central
    reason" for his fear of persecution because, as the BIA noted, his "fear of harm
    arises, in large part, from his resistance to recruitment in gang membership." 8
    U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i); Barrios v. Holder, 
    581 F.3d 849
    , 854–56 (9th Cir.
    2009).
    Petition DENIED.
    3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 15-72015

Filed Date: 3/21/2018

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/18/2021