Theresa Kimes v. Kathryn Matayoshi ( 2019 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                            FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        OCT 28 2019
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    THERESA KIMES, Individually and as              No.    18-16249
    Guardian Ad Litem for her minor daughter
    R.K.,                                           D.C. No.
    1:16-cv-00264-JMS-RLP
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.                                             MEMORANDUM*
    KATHRYN MATAYOSHI, in her official
    capacity as Superintendent of the State of
    Hawaii Department of Education; NICOLE
    CARLSON; BURT NAKAMOTO; PETER
    TOVEY; STATE OF HAWAII
    DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Hawaii
    J. Michael Seabright, Chief District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted October 24, 2019**
    Honolulu, Hawaii
    Before: GRABER, M. SMITH, and WATFORD, Circuit Judges.
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    Page 2 of 5
    1. To recover damages on her Rehabilitation Act claim against the
    Department of Education (DOE), Theresa Kimes was required to show not only
    that school officials denied R.K. a reasonable accommodation, but also that they
    did so with deliberate indifference. Mark H. v. Lemahieu, 
    513 F.3d 922
    , 938 (9th
    Cir. 2008). To prove deliberate indifference, Kimes had to show that DOE
    (1) knew that its actions would likely result in a violation of R.K.’s right to an
    equal public education and (2) took those actions anyway. Mark H. v. Hamamoto,
    
    620 F.3d 1090
    , 1102 (9th Cir. 2010). The jury returned a special verdict that found
    DOE did not act with deliberate indifference. The jury’s finding is supported by
    substantial evidence.
    Kimes alleged that school officials denied R.K. a reasonable accommodation
    in four different respects. First, she argued that DOE adopted a Behavior Support
    Plan (BSP) that inappropriately authorized the use of restraints and that DOE did
    so without input from R.K.’s previous school. However, the jury heard testimony
    that DOE met monthly with administrators from R.K.’s previous school in the
    lead-up to creating its own BSP, and that DOE justified its authorization of
    restraints in part because R.K.’s new school had 350 students, whereas her former
    school had only 10. DOE also offered evidence that Kimes herself had attended
    the meeting at which R.K.’s BSP was developed and the restraint techniques were
    authorized, and that Kimes had raised no objection. Relying on this evidence, the
    Page 3 of 5
    jury could reasonably have concluded that DOE thought its BSP would adequately
    protect R.K.’s rights.
    Second, Kimes alleged that DOE denied R.K. a reasonable accommodation
    when school officials forcibly restrained her on March 10, 2016. Several witnesses
    testified that this decision responded to R.K.’s verbal and physical threats to kill
    herself and occurred after half an hour of attempted de-escalation. The jury could
    reasonably have concluded that school officials decided to restrain R.K. to protect
    her, and thus meant to further her right to safe education, not hinder it.
    Third, Kimes alleged that DOE took impermissible disciplinary action
    against R.K. for behavior stemming from her disability. The Supreme Court has
    held that, “where a student poses an immediate threat to the safety of others,
    officials may temporarily suspend him or her for up to 10 schooldays” without
    violating the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. Honig v. Doe, 
    484 U.S. 305
    , 325 (1988). The jury heard that the disciplinary actions taken against R.K.
    amounted to no more than two isolated half-day suspensions, both on days when
    R.K. had acted violently toward others. The jury thus could reasonably have found
    that DOE believed these suspensions did not violate R.K.’s federally protected
    rights.
    Fourth, Kimes challenged DOE’s decision to prohibit R.K.’s nurse from
    accompanying her onto campus on March 11, 2016. DOE employees testified that
    Page 4 of 5
    the school had a back-up nurse that day and that officials were in the process of
    communicating with R.K.’s previous school to request that they send another
    nurse. This testimony supports a finding that DOE did not know it was likely R.K.
    would be deprived of her right to a safe education, but rather intended that she
    receive necessary support from these other nurses.
    Ample evidence supports the jury’s determination that DOE was not
    deliberately indifferent to R.K.’s needs. The district court therefore correctly
    denied Kimes’ motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
    A similar analysis governs the district court’s denial of Kimes’ motion for a
    new trial. New trials should be granted when the jury’s “verdict is contrary to the
    clear weight of the evidence.” Silver Sage Partners, Ltd. v. City of Desert Hot
    Springs, 
    251 F.3d 814
    , 819 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted).
    Because the jury’s verdict was supported by substantial evidence, the district court
    did not abuse its discretion in denying Kimes’ request for a new trial. See Hung
    Lam v. City of San Jose, 
    869 F.3d 1077
    , 1085 (9th Cir. 2017).
    2. We affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment to defendants
    on Kimes’ state law claims. Under Hawaii law, state officials are shielded by a
    conditional privilege unless they act with malice. Towse v. State, 
    647 P.2d 696
    ,
    701–02 (Haw. 1982). We need not decide whether Kimes is correct that deliberate
    indifference suffices to show malice for purposes of overcoming a conditional
    Page 5 of 5
    privilege. Cf. Awakuni v. Awana, 
    165 P.3d 1027
    , 1042 (Haw. 2007). At the
    summary judgment stage, Kimes relied on the same evidence to establish
    deliberate indifference that she later presented at trial to prove her Rehabilitation
    Act claim. As discussed above, the jury expressly found that evidence was
    insufficient to establish deliberate indifference, a finding that is amply supported
    by the trial record. Thus, the individual officials are shielded from liability on
    Kimes’ state law claims, so those claims would have failed had the district court
    permitted them to go to trial.
    AFFIRMED.