M. G. v. Charles Samuels ( 2015 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION MAY 15 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
M. G., No. 13-55764
Plaintiff - Appellee, D.C. No. 3:12-cv-02956-H-WVG
v.
MEMORANDUM*
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant,
And
CHARLES E. SAMUELS, Director of the
Federal Bureau of Prisons; et al.,
Defendants - Appellants.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California
Marilyn L. Huff, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted May 6, 2015
Pasadena, California
Before: FISHER, BEA, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
Defendants–appellants Charles E. Samuels, Fernando A. Arriola, and Robert
Garcia appeal the district court’s order denying their motion to dismiss
plaintiff–appellee M.G.’s Bivens claims against them. See Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 671–72
(2009), and review de novo, see Dunn v. Castro, 621 F.3d 1196, 1198 (9th Cir.
2010). Because the complaint fails to allege nonconclusory facts from which we
can infer defendants’ subjective knowledge that a substantial risk of serious harm
to M.G. existed, we reverse the district court’s order and remand for further
proceedings.
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ A
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation omitted). To state a Bivens
claim against a prison official who has allegedly failed to protect inmates from
violence at the hands of other prisoners, a plaintiff must allege facts, which, if
proven, would show (1) the inmate was “incarcerated under conditions posing a
substantial risk of serious harm,” and (2) the official acted with “deliberate
indifference to inmate health or safety.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834
2
(1994) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Simmons v. Navajo Cnty., 609 F.3d
1011, 1017 (9th Cir. 2010). To establish deliberate indifference, a plaintiff must
show the official was “aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that
a substantial risk of serious harm exists,” and “dr[ew] the inference.” Farmer, 511
U.S. at 837.
M.G. claims defendants Arriola and Garcia1 were deliberately indifferent to
the substantial risk he faced when he was housed with his alleged assailant, Harold
Ford, a violent criminal. To plead deliberate indifference, M.G. must allege
nonconclusory facts from which we can infer defendants Arriola and Garcia
actually knew of the danger M.G. faced. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 686–87;
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. This the complaint fails to do. It fails to allege facts
from which we can infer, for example, that defendants knew M.G., a nonviolent
detainee, was housed with Ford, a violent detainee, or that defendants knew of
prior incidents of prison violence arising out of a failure to segregate violent and
nonviolent prisoners, and thus were subjectively aware of a substantial risk of harm
to M.G. Cf. Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011) (inferring sheriff’s
knowledge of substantial risk of serious harm to Starr from allegations that the
1
Samuels claims he is not named as a defendant in M.G.’s Bivens cause of
action; that section of the complaint names “Defendants ARRIOLA, GARCIA, and
DOE Defendants Only.” It seems the district court mistakenly included Samuels in
its discussion of M.G.’s Bivens claims.
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sheriff received notice of numerous incidents in which inmates had been killed or
injured because of the culpable actions of prison guards and allegations that the
sheriff received notice, in several reports, of systematic problems in the county
jails under his supervision that resulted in those deaths and injuries). We cannot
infer Arriola and Garcia specifically knew about the substantial risk of harm to
M.G. based solely on their positions and the allegation they were on “high alert” of
inmate violence in federal prisons generally.
We reverse the order of the district court and remand for further
proceedings, including the opportunity to amend the complaint if information is
obtained in discovery on M.G.’s pending FTCA claim against the United States
that would support a Bivens claim.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
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